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Over the last few years, political and academic attention has focused on the future of 
copyright at the EU level. 
Following two decades of piecemeal legislative interventions, which have 
resulted in a limited harmonisation of the copyright laws of EU Member States, a 
debate has ensued as to the feasibility and desirability of achieving full copyright 
harmonisation at the EU level. This might be obtained either through a EU copyright 
code, encompassing a codification of the present body of EU copyright directives, or 
by way of a regulation (to be enacted pursuant to new Article 118(1) TFEU), aimed at 
creating an optional unitary copyright title.  
Thus far, however, no such legislative initiatives have been undertaken.  
Despite this impasse, the CJEU has notably been acting in a proactive way, 
inching towards full harmonisation. With its 2009 decision in Case C-5/08 Infopaq, 
the Court provided a EU-wide understanding of an important principle of copyright: 
the originality requirement. The CJEU further elaborated upon this in subsequent 
case law (notably, Case C-393/09 Bezpečnostní Softwarová Asociace, Joined Cases 
C-403/08 and C-429/08 Murphy, Case C-145/10 Painer, Case C-604/10 Football 
Dataco and Case C-406/10 SAS).  
The meaning of originality adopted by the CJEU as a EU-wide standard is akin 
to that envisaged in continental Member States’ copyright laws, thus differing from 
the loose notion of originality under UK law. As such, an examination as to the 
implications of CJEU harmonising jurisprudence in this Member State shall be 
undertaken, with regard to the scope of copyright protection and subject-matter 
categorisation. 
Overall, this contribution wishes to assess how, and to what extent, CJEU 
case law has resulted in de facto EU copyright harmonisation. In addition, it will 
attempt to foresee the fate of EU copyright in light of copyright reform projects which 















As this is a work about the recent past and the making of copyright future at the EU 
level, some copyright-enthusiasts might think that I wish to dedicate my ‘own 
intellectual creation’ to those at Curia, who have been mostly involved in copyright 
cases lately. Dedicating my work to Advocate General Yves Bot would be therefore a 
great choice (and presumably fairly original, too), but it would fail to recognise and 
pay due tribute to what has been my mood and spirit whilst writing this work.  
As a young woman, I am concerned with the future, but not only that of copyright. In 
relation to this, I am always impressed by stories of people who are able to 
beautifully represent the old and wise Latin motto Homo faber suae quisque fortunae 
(‘every man is the maker of his own destiny’). 
This is what I have felt most deeply whilst researching and writing this PhD thesis. 
The future of the law (and particularly of copyright) is a matter of willingness, as is the 
fate of men. Therefore, I dedicate this little work of mine to my brother, Carlo Maria, 
whom I not only love tenderly, but whom I also admire for his courage, capacity and 































It was the best of times, it was the worst of times,  
it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness,  
it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity,  
it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness,  




               Charles Dickens 


































































I. Copyright harmonisation: the age of innocence? 
II. The topicality of originality to EU copyright discourse 
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THE CHALLENGES OF EU COPYRIGHT 
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IV. Harmonisation through the 2000s 
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I. The structural character of copyright harmonisation 
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ORIGINALITY AS A POLICY TOOL 
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ORIGINALITY IN A WORK OR A WORK OF ORIGINALITY 
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THE CJEU GOES AHEAD 
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of licences 
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2. The CJEU follows Infopaq and goes even further … 
3. … Clarifying the meaning of originality … 
4. … Playing a requiem for subject-matter categorisation, and … 
5. Making it clear that copyright is not a story of the prince and 
the pauper 
III. Football Dataco: farewell to the arms (of UK copyright)? 
1. Background to the case 
2. Copyright in databases: what type of originality? AG Mengozzi 
explains 
3. An intellectual creation in not just labour and skill 
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5. The decision of the CJEU 
5.1. The requirements for copyright protection under the 
Database Directive 
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IV. SAS: Shake-and-Strain the scope of copyright protection 
1. Background to the case 
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4. The decision of the CJEU  
5. Problems with the interpretation of Advocate General Bot, as 

































CHALLENGING THE UK UNDERSTANDING OF COPYRIGHT 
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THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT AT THE EU LEVEL 
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I. EU copyright harmonisation: how? 
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I. Copyright harmonisation: the age of innocence? 
 
We are on the cusp of the convergence of two great trends: the pervading influence 
of the digital environment and the progression of European integration.  
 The process of European Union (EU) harmonisation in the field of copyright 
has brought about several changes in the domestic legal systems of the Member 
States. The impetus behind EU legislative initiatives in this area has been the 
awareness that differences between the copyright laws of Member States had the 
potential to impede the full realisation of the internal market objective. In the early 
days of European integration, intervention in the intellectual property (IP) laws of the 
Member States was infrequent and – when it happened – was justified in light of 
eliminating obstacles to free movement or competition. At the end of the 1980s, IP – 
and so copyright – became part of a broader strategy, aimed at favouring growth and 
competitiveness throughout Europe. During the 1990s, it became clear that copyright 
was to play a pivotal role in this respect. As such, the then European Community 
(EC) copyright agenda became gradually more ambitious. However, from the end of 
the century and throughout the 2000s, legislative interventions in the field of 
copyright have been piecemeal and more sporadic than they were previously. It was 
only at the end of the 2000s that the Commission’s copyright agenda re-gained 
momentum. It is submitted that this was no accident as, in parallel, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU, formerly the European Court of Justice, ECJ) 
gave a decisive boost to the area of copyright harmonisation by touching upon a 
basic copyright principle: the originality requirement.  
2 
 
So far, legislative discourse on copyright at the EU level has mostly focused 
on the harmonisation of the scope of exclusive rights, the delineation of protected 
subject-matter and the duration of protection. Although European harmonisation has 
moved forward by strengthening the protection afforded to copyright owners, EU 
directives have allowed Member States to maintain what are differing regimes, at 
least in certain respects. The result has been that many major fields have been left 
untouched or quasi-harmonised. In the words of Advocate General Jääskinen:  
“Copyright in the EU, as is the case elsewhere, remains largely a creature of national 
law … Harmonisation of copyright law in the EU has been a mixed process of partial 
and full harmonisation.”1  
Moreover, the harmonisation process has been deemed to be “blind to the 
structural impediment that territoriality presents to the free movement of goods and 
services, given that the copyrights and related rights that underlie these disparities 
are drawn along national borders”.2 The inherent territoriality of current EU copyright 
is indeed likely to impede the operation of an internal market free from barriers to 
trade. In light of the development of the digital environment and the challenges it has 
brought with it, the establishment of a strong internal market for copyright-related 
goods and services calls for a definitive confrontation of the issue of territoriality. 
Although territoriality is a practical feature of current copyright landscape, it is 
important to note that this term does not appear in any of the international intellectual 
property treaties.3 
It is submitted that a narrow and sporadic approach to EU copyright is no 
longer adequate. Further (more precisely: full) harmonisation of copyright is currently 
at the centre of heated debates as to its desirability and feasibility. In the course of 
2010, the Wittem Group published its European Copyright Code4 and the Monti 
Report tackled the role of copyright in light of proposing a new strategy for the 
                                                          
1
 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Case C-5/11, Criminal proceedings against Titus Donner, 
29 March 2012, 24-25.  
2
 M van Eechoud – PB Hugenholtz – S van Gompel – L Guibault – N Helberger, Harmonizing 
European copyright law. The challenges of better law making (2009), 308. 
3
 P Torremans, ‘Copyright territoriality in a borderless online environment’, in J Axhamn, Copyright in a 
borderless environment (2012) 23, 25-26, who highlights how the deepest cause of territorial 
approach to copyright lies on national treatment rules.  
4
 Wittem Group, European Copyright Code, 26 April 2010, available at copyrightcode.eu. 
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internal market.5 In 2011, the Commission published its blueprint for intellectual 
property rights to boost creativity and innovation6, and its follow-up to the Monti 
Report: the Single Market Act.7  
A EU copyright, if construed as taking precedence over national titles, would 
remove the inherent territoriality with respect to applicable national copyright rules. 
Therefore, the idea of a EU-wide copyright law, which might be established by means 
of a EU regulation or through a codification of the relevant acquis communauitarie, 
has been receiving increasing attention in both political and academic circles. The 
benefits of having a strong harmonisation law would be seen through the 




II. The topicality of originality to EU copyright discourse 
 
Traditionally, the originality requirement has been used in a different way between 
continental Member States and the UK. While the latter has adopted it as a loose 
notion referring to sufficient skill, labour and effort, continental European copyright 
laws have embraced stricter meanings of originality. 
 It is argued that originality, being at the basis of copyright protection, plays a 
fundamental policy role and, therefore, cannot be left outside the harmonisation 
discourse. This contribution will attempt to show the policy implications which come 
about from the adoption of one understanding of originality over another. By referring 
to paradigmatic experiences in the US and the UK, this work will try to offer an insight 
into the way the legal understanding of this concept has changed over time. Further, 
                                                          
5
 M Monti, A new strategy for the single market at the service of Europe’s Economy and Society. 
Report to the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, 9 May 2010.  
6
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee of the Regions, A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights 
Boosting creativity and innovation to provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first class 
products and services in Europe, Brussels, 24 May 2011, COM(2011) 287 final. 
7
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Single Market Act – Twelve levers to boost 
growth and strengthen confidence – “Working together to create new growth”, Brussels, 13 April 
2011, COM(2011) 206 final. 
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above all, it will look at how originality has been shaped and re-shaped to achieve 
precise policy objectives.  
 While the process of EU harmonisation in the field of copyright has brought 
about several changes to the domestic legal systems of the Member States, 
originality has been harmonised to a very limited extent. Where this has happened (in 
relation to computer programs, databases and photographs), originality has been 
interpreted as ‘the author’s own intellectual creation’. This meaning of the originality 
requirement is akin to the standard adopted in continental Member States. 
 While the EU legislature has not deemed it necessary to adopt a harmonised 
understanding of originality for subject-matter other than computer programs, 
databases and photographs, the CJEU has acted in a proactive way towards the 
actual harmonisation of copyright, by adopting a EU-wide notion of originality. The 
2009 decision in Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (‘Infopaq’)8, 
as followed in 2010 in Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany 
v Ministerstvo kultury (‘Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace’)9, provided for the 
harmonisation of the originality requirement. In these cases, the continental 
understanding of ‘the author’s own intellectual creation’ was adopted as the standard 
for originality in EU copyright, for subject-matter other than computer programs, 
databases and photographs.  
 Later decisions have further clarified and developed the EU concept of 
originality. These are: Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, 
Multichoice Hellas SA v QC Leisure, David Richardson, AV Station plc, Malcolm 
Chamberlain, Michael Madden, SR Leisure Ltd, Philip George Charles Houghton, 
Derek Owen and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (‘Murphy’)10; Eva-
Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH, Axel Springer AG, Süddeutsche Zeitung 
GmbH, SPIEGEL-Verlag Rudolf AUGSTEIN GmbH & Co KG and Verlag M. DuMont 
Schauberg Expedition der Kölnischen Zeitung GmbH & Co KG 8 (‘Painer’)11; Football 
Dataco Ltd, Football Association Premier League Ltd, Football League Limited, 
Scottish Premier League Ltd, Scottish Football League and PA Sport UK Ltd v 
                                                          
8
 Case C-5/08, [2009] I-06569, 16 July 2009. 
9
 Case C-393/09, [2010] I-13971, 22 December 2010. 
10
 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, [not yet published], 4 October 2011. 
11
 Case 145/10, [not yet published], 1 December 2011. 
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Yahoo! UK Limited, Stan James (Abingdon) Limited, Stan James PLC and Enetpulse 
APS (‘Football Dataco’)12; and SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd (‘SAS’).13  
 The phrase the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ is also to be found in the 
Software14, Database15 and Term Directives.16 As noted above, it was adopted as the 
standard for originality in Infopaq, and is to be understood as involving ‘creative 
freedom’ (Murphy), a ‘personal touch’ (Painer) and ‘free and creative choices’ 
(Football Dataco). To put it otherwise, originality is not simply a matter of sense, but 
also of sensibility. 
In addition, the aforementioned judgments have raised doubts as to whether a 
system of exhaustive subject-matter categorisation (as it is under UK law) is still in 
line with EU law. Following Murphy, Painer and SAS, the level of scrutiny in the EU 
for determining whether a work may qualify for copyright protection seems to require 
solely that the work is original, not that it also falls within a specific copyright-
protected subject-matter. This may be somewhat at odds with the Berne Convention 
which, although providing for a non-exhaustive list of copyright-protected works, 
seems to imply that any assessment of the actual originality of a work is only to be 
made once it has been determined that it is a production in the literary, scientific or 
artistic domain.  
Finally, as was made clear in Football Dataco, not only has the CJEU 
harmonised the originality requirement and, with it, the standard for protection under 
EU copyright, but it has also ruled out any possible alternative (quasi-copyright) 
protection for subject-matter such as databases. This may give rise to problematic 
gaps in a country – the primary example being the UK – which lacks a law of unfair 
competition and has traditionally relied on copyright and its low originality threshold 
(as well as passing off, although in a more limited way) to protect works. In a 
continental Member State, these same works would have not probably qualified for 
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 Case C-604/10, [not yet published], 1 March 2012. 
13
 Case C-406/10, [not yet published], 2 May 2012. 
14
 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programmes (Codified version), OJ L 111, 5 May 2009, 16–22. 
15
 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases, OJ L 77, 27 March 1996, 20–28. 
16
 Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the 




such protection, due to their limited (even below the minimal) degree of originality. 
However, it is worth recalling that the doctrine of ‘small change’, which is to be found 
in some continental Member States’ copyright laws, is actually intended to relax the 
originality threshold.   
The impact of these judgments on UK copyright law is indeed likely to be 
relevant, as was (partially) made clear by the ruling of the High Court of England and 
Wales in The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others v Meltwater Holding BV 
and Others17, as recently upheld by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales18, and 
also in the decision of Judge Birss QC in Temple Island Collections Ltd v New 
English Teas Ltd and Nicholas John Houghton.19 In addition, as previously 
mentioned, the rulings in  Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 
Murphy, Painer, Football Dataco, and SAS seem to imply that for copyright the 
subject-matter categorisation is merely exemplificative as far as the EU legal 
architecture is concerned. As will be explained in relation to the recent decision of the 
UK Supreme Court in Lucasfilm Ltd and Others v Ainsworth and Another20, this may 
lead UK courts to adopt different perspectives in the future and, as a consequence, 
achieve different outcomes. 
 
 
III. Scope and aim of this contribution 
 
Overall, the present work wishes to analyse and understand the reasoning underlying 
the aforementioned CJEU decisions, as well as their implications as far as UK 
copyright is concerned. 
Particular attention to UK copyright experience is justified in light of the fact 
that the harmonisation provided by CJEU jurisprudence now definitely means that EU 
copyright is in line with continental traditions. Hence, the UK is the Member State in 
which the effects of the Infopaq string of case law has the potential to be most 
relevant. 
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 [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch). 
18
 [2011] EWCA Civ 890. 
19
 [2012] EWPCC 1. 
20
 [2011] UKSC 39. 
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Although analysis of the actual legitimacy of CJEU harmonising jurisprudence, 
as well as its merits, is of fundamental importance to EU political and legal discourse, 
this will not be part of the present work. Attention will be devoted mainly to the 
analysis of judicial decisions which have touched upon originality, so as to assess the 
current challenges facing EU copyright harmonisation. The case of originality, which 
will be analysed from a legal standpoint, serves the objective of showing that full 
harmonisation is already in place at the EU level, outwith legislative and political 
initiatives. It is submitted that if EU legislative initiatives should in future decide to 
harmonise copyright fully, this process would result in CJEU case law being codified. 
The structure of this work reflects the research themes it is meant to explore. 
These can be summarised as follows: 
 
1) EU copyright harmonisation 
What have been the objectives and achievements of EU copyright 
harmonisation so far?  
Have the scope and objectives of the harmonisation process changed over 
time?  
How can harmonisation be seen in light of its structural character, overall 
ambition and merits? 
 
2) Meaning and functions of the originality requirement 
What is originality and how is this to be seen in light of other basic concepts 
such as authorship and creativity, and in the context of copyright legal 
understanding? 
How has originality been understood in EU copyright reforms? 
Is the meaning of originality different in the EU Member States? 
Does originality play a policy role?  
 
3) EU policy on originality 
Why has originality been harmonised only to a limited extent? 
 
4) CJEU case law on originality 
What is the relevant CJEU case law in this respect and what are its 
implications, also in relation to internationally-binding legal instruments? 
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What does a harmonised concept of originality imply? 
What is the EU understanding of subject-matter categorisation? 
 
5) UK copyright and the EU 
To what extent has the new EU originality standard affected the traditional UK 
understanding of originality? 
Is the bar to copyright protection higher after Infopaq and subsequent case law 
than previously?  
How is the bar to a finding of copyright infringement affected? 
Is the UK exhaustive subject-matter categorisation at odds with EU law?  
Might having an open subject-matter categorisation have led to different 
outcomes in cases such as Lucasfilm? 
 
6) The future of copyright at the EU level 
Is it possible to improve current copyright regimes? 
What are the terms of the debate in the US and Europe? 
Can the proposals of the Wittem Group and their Copyright Code be used to 
harmonise copyright further at the EU level? 
What are the legal tools that can be used to harmonise copyright further at the 
EU level? 





The approach this contribution adopts is mainly inductive. Significant attention will be 
devoted to the study and analysis of recent decisions of the CJEU, which shall be 
assessed in light of relevant EU policy documents and discussions as to the future of 
EU copyright that are ongoing at the Commission level and in leading academic 
circles. By adopting a methodology which takes into account multiple legal and 
judicial sources, as well as doctrinal approaches, this work wishes to assess the 
impact that relevant CJEU judgments has had on Member States’ copyright laws, 
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notably the UK, as well as drawing their implications for the future of copyright at the 
EU level.  
Within this framework, attention will be paid firstly to relevant legislative 
sources and policy documents, especially at the EU level. This is necessary to 
outline the EU understanding and evolution of copyright policy, along with the main 
objectives underlying EU intervention in this area of the law. 
Secondly, in relation to the analysis of the originality requirement, relevant 
literature, mainly from EU and UK scholarships, will be reviewed. This is required to 
define the legal foundations of the concept of originality, as well as its understanding 
in the broader context of EU and UK copyright regimes. 
Finally, the most relevant part of this work will be devoted to the reading and 
analysis of relevant judicial decisions, both at the level of the CJEU and of national 
(in particular, UK) courts.  
This work shall attempt to combine the various rationales extracted from the 
sources mentioned above, in order to address the research themes it is meant to 
explore. As EU copyright harmonisation is a work in progress, literature specifically 
tackling this issue is not particularly rich. As far as the Author of this work is aware, 
no major contributions dedicated to the analysis of EU copyright harmonisation in 














THE CHALLENGES OF EU COPYRIGHT 








The process of EU harmonisation in the field of copyright has brought about several 
changes to the domestic legal systems of the EU Member States. The underlying 
objective has been to foster innovation in order to enhance the creation, circulation 
and dissemination of knowledge in the EU. So far, copyright discourse at the EU 
level has mostly focused on the harmonisation of the scope of exclusive rights, the 
delineation of protected subject-matter and the duration of protection.  
 The impetus behind EU legislative initiatives in this area has been the 
awareness that differences between the copyright laws of Member States could 
impede the realisation of the internal market. Therefore the main sources of 
competence to enact EU intellectual property legislation have been what are 
currently Articles 26 and 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).  
 This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part contains a short history of 
copyright harmonisation thus far. The second part undertakes an analysis of the 
legislative and political evolution of copyright at the EU level. In particular, it looks at 
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the structural characteristics, the overall ambitiousness and the merits of 








I. The early days of European integration: IP rights and the 
internal market 
 
In general, it can be said that European concerns with copyright and intellectual 
property grew steadily as information became more significant as an economic 
commodity.22 So far, thirteen directives have been issued, directly or indirectly 
dealing with various aspects of copyright and related rights.23 Accordingly, 
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 M van Eechoud – PB Hugenholtz – S van Gompel – L Guibault – N Helberger, Harmonizing, cit, 1. 
23
 These relate to protection of computer programs (Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on 
the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 122, 17 May 1991, 42–46; Directive 2009/24/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer 
programs (Codified version), cit); enforcement (Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 157, 30 
April 2004, OJ L 195, 2 June 2004, 0016-0025); resale rights (Directive 2001/84/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of 
the author of an original work of art, OJ L 272, 13 October 2001, 32–36); copyright in the 
information society (Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, OJ L 167, 22 June 2001, 10–19); protection of databases (Directive 96/9/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of 
databases, cit); term of protection (Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising 
the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 290, 24 November 1993, 9–
13; Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (Codified version), cit; Directive 
2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 amending 
Directive 2006/116 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 265, 11 
October 2011, 1-5); satellite and cable (Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the 
coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to 
satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, OJ L 248, 6 October 1993, 15–21); rental rights 
(Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on 
certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, OJ L 346, 27 November 1992, 
61–66; Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the 
field of intellectual property (Codified version), OJ L 376, 27 December 2006, 28–35); and 
semiconductors (Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the legal protection of 




harmonisation has resulted in a rich body of case law, which has tackled copyright 
from several different perspectives.  
 Prior to the commencement of the harmonisation process (the debate 
surrounding which flourished at the institutional and political level only at the end of 
the 1980s, although there had been earlier studies which tackled harmonisation 
issues24), the intellectual property laws of the Member States had been affected by 
EC law to a limited extent. This was mainly through the treaty provisions on 
competition25 and free movement of goods.26 It is therefore apparent that, from its 
very onset, copyright harmonisation at the EU level was viewed as functional to the 
broader internal market objective. The latter denotes an area without internal 
frontiers, in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital27 is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions in the treaties.28 Therefore, competence of 
the EU as regards the harmonisation of the intellectual property laws of the Member 
States has been consistently justified in light of current Articles 26 and 114 TFEU. 
Article 26(1) TFEU sets out the EU competence to adopt measures aimed at 
establishing or ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the treaties. Article 114(1) TFEU states that the European 
Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market. 
 As is made clear by Article 36 TFEU, provisions relating to the free movement 
of goods shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in 
transit that are justified to protect industrial property. This is because the treaties 
shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of 
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 A notable example is A Dietz, Copyright law in the European Community (1978), which was 
prepared at the request of the then Commission of the European Communities.  
25
 Currently Title VII, Chapter I, of the consolidated version of the TFEU, OJ C 83, 30 March 2010, 47-
199.  
26
 Currently Title II TFEU. 
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 Title IV TFEU. 
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property ownership.29 However, in no case may such prohibitions or restrictions 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
between Member States.30 
 This said, what exactly is meant by ‘property’ within the treaty system is far 
from clear. This can be explained because,  
 
In contrast, with the objective of establishing a common market, the rules 
aiming to guarantee competition and free movement of goods were listed 
amongst the fundamental principles of the European legal order. It is well 
known that the subsequent reconciliation of intellectual-property rights with the 
Treaty provisions on competition and free movement of goods did not proceed 
without conflicts and was only achieved by virtue of the judicial practice 
established by the Court of Justice … concerning the “specific subject matter” 
and the “essential function” of intellectual-property law.31 
 
 Indeed, the relationship between intellectual property and free movement 
provisions has been difficult to define32, not helped by the fact that the latter are 
concerned with state measures, rather than actions of private individuals. Therefore, 
it  seems difficult to see how reliance on a patent, trademark, copyright or design 
right by an individual rightsholder who seeks to prevent the importation and sale of 
infringing good can be tantamount to a measure within the scope of free movement 
provisions.33  
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 Article 345 TFEU. 
30
 Article 36 TFEU. 
31
 C Geiger, ‘Intellectual “property” after the Treaty of Lisbon: towards a different approach in the new 
European legal order?’ (2010) 32 EIPR 255, 255-256, referring to G Tritton (ed), Intellectual 
property in Europe (3rd edn, 2008), 36 ff. 
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 G Tritton, ‘Articles 30 and 36 and intellectual property: is the jurisprudence of the ECJ of an ideal 
standard?’ (1994) 16 EIPR 422, commenting the then European Court of Justice’s decision in Case 
C-9/93 IHT Internationale Heitechnik GmbH and Uwe Danziger v Ideal Standard GmbH and Wabco 
Standard GmbH, [1994] I-02789, 22 June 1994. This was a reference for a preliminary ruling from 
the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) Düsseldorf, seeking clarification as to the 
interpretation of Articles 30 and 36 EEC Treaty (now respectively, Articles 36 and 42 TFEU) in 
order to assess the compatibility with Community law of restrictions on the use of a name where a 
group of companies held, through subsidiaries, a trade mark consisting of that name in several 
Member States but where it had been assigned to an undertaking outside the group, in one 
Member State only and covering only some of the products for which it had been registered. 
33




 In a series of cases34 the CJEU attempted to clarify under what conditions and 
to what extent the rules on competition and free movement may interfere with 
Member States’ IP laws. According to the Court, this happens when national 
legislation empowers IP rightsholders to exercise their rights in a manner that 
adversely affects the functioning of the internal market, thus resulting in an arbitrary 
discrimination or disguised restriction on trade between Member States. As was 
made clear by the CJEU in its seminal decision in Metro35: 
 
Among the prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of goods which it 
concedes Article 36 [EEC Treaty, now Article 42 TFEU] refers to industrial and 
commercial property … [I]t is … clear from that article that, although the Treaty 
does not affect the existence of rights recognized by the legislation of a 
Member State with regard to industrial and commercial property, the exercise 
of such rights may nevertheless fall within the prohibitions laid down by the 
Treaty. Although it permits prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of 
products, which are justified for the purpose of protecting industrial and 
commercial property, Article 36 only admits derogations from that freedom to 
the extent to which they are justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights 




II. The emergence of copyright as a European issue 
 
Following this first phase during which attention focused on the relationship between 
Member States’ intellectual property laws and the internal market objective, 
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 See M van Eechoud – PB Hugenholtz – S van Gompel – L Guibault – N Helberger, Harmonizing, 
cit, 3-4, and the case law cited therein. 
35
 Case C-78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co KG, 
[1971] 00487, 8 June 1971. This was a reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) Hamburg, seeking clarification as to the interpretation 
of Articles 5, 85(1) and 86 EEC Treaty (now, respectively, Articles 5 of consolidated version of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), OJ C 83, 30 March 2010, 13-45, and Article 101(1) and 102 
TFEU) concerning the distribution of sound recordings in various Member States. 
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European policy- and law-makers adopted the view that Member States’ intellectual 
property laws, if harmonised, would also have contributed to the realisation of the 
internal market. 
 1988 was the year when the first seeds of IP harmonisation were thrown. 
Council Directive 89/104/EEC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating 
to trade marks was published on 21 December 1988.37 This placed the legal 
foundations for the creation of an EC trade mark system, and was shortly followed by 
the beginning of the copyright harmonisation process. In June that year the 
Commission had already issued its Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of 
Technology (hereinafter, also the GPCCT).38 
 
 
1. The 1988 Green Paper 
 
As is made clear in §1.3. of the GPCCT, the concerns of the then European 
Economic Community (EEC) in the field of copyright were strong enough to call for 
EC legislative intervention in this field. The issues which called for consideration were 
four-fold. 
 Firstly, the proper functioning of the internal market was to be ensured. To this 
end, creators and providers of copyright goods and services should have been able 
to treat the Community as a single internal market. This required the elimination of 
obstacles and legal differences that substantially impaired the functioning of the 
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market by obstructing or distorting cross-frontier trade in such goods and services, as 
well as distorting competition. 
 Secondly, intervention was deemed necessary in order to improve the overall 
competitiveness of Europe in relation to its trading partners, particularly in areas of 
potential growth, such as media and information. 
 Thirdly, intellectual property resulting from creative efforts and substantial 
investments within the Community should not be misappropriated by third parties 
outside the territorial frontiers of the Community. 
 Finally, the Commission acknowledged that, in developing Community 
measures on copyright, due regard must be paid not only to the interests of the 
rightsholders but also to those of third parties and the public at large. 
 The GPCCT also anticipated some of the problems facing the digital revolution 
which had to get underway shortly: 
 
New dissemination and reproduction techniques have developed with an ever-
increasing speed and have added, at a corresponding rate of speed, to the 
complexity of this relationship. These new technologies have entailed the de 
facto abolition of national frontiers and increasingly made the territorial 
application of national copyright law obsolete, while, at the same time, 
permitting for better and for worse in every country ever more rapid, easy, 
cheap and high-fidelity reproduction. This has at one and the same time been 
a cause of satisfaction and concern.39 
 
 However, the GPCCT failed to acknowledge that differences in the laws of 
Member States had the potential to raise barriers to the functioning of the internal 
market.  Instead, it noted that: 
 
Many issues of copyright law, do not need to be subject of action at 
Community level. Since all Member States adhere to the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and to the Universal Copyright 
Convention, a certain fundamental convergence of their laws has already been 
achieved. Many of the differences that remain have no significant impact on 
                                                          
39




the functioning of the internal market or the Community’s economic 
competitiveness … The Community approach should therefore be marked by 
a need to address Community problems. Any temptation to engage in law 
reform for its own sake should be resisted.40 
 
 This said, the Commission identified six areas that required immediate 
legislative intervention by the EC. These were: piracy (enforcement); audiovisual 
home copying; distribution right, exhaustion and rental right; computer programs; 
databases; and multilateral and bilateral external relations.41   
 
 
III. Harmonisation through the 1990s 
 
Over the course of the 1990s, plans from the 1988 agenda were implemented and 
several directives on copyright and related rights were issued. These provided 
harmonisation as regards computer programs (1991), rental right (1992), term of 
protection (1993), satellite and cable (1993), and databases (1996). 
 In addition, along with the harmonisation of specific aspects of copyright, the 
agenda of the Commission gradually became more ambitious. 
 In 1993, the Commission published a White Paper42, in which the term 
‘information society’ was used for the first time. This expression is intended to signify 
a society in which management, quality and speed of information are key factors for 
competitiveness; as an input to the industries as a whole and as a service provided 
to ultimate consumers, information and communication technologies influence the 
economy at all stages.43 The Commission acknowledged that the competitiveness of 
the European economy depended on both the development and application of such 
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technologies, as well as the creation of a common information area within the then 
Community. Thus, it recommended that efforts should be undertaken to achieve 
those objectives linked to the building of an efficient European information 
infrastructure swiftly, as well as taking the measures necessary to create new 
services.44 
 Thus, in 1994 the Council convened a group of experts to report on the 
specific measures to be adopted by the Community and the Member States alike for 
the infrastructures in the sphere of information. The Bangemann Report45 
acknowledged the importance of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in developing a 
competitive European industry, both in the area of information technology and more 
generally across a wide variety of industrial and cultural sectors. Hence, it 
recommended common rules be agreed and enforced by the Member States.46 
 This led to the publication of a Communication on Europe’s Way to the 
Information Society: an Act on Plan47, in which the Commission recommended that 
measures adopted in relation to intellectual property rights be reviewed and new 
initiatives undertaken.48 
 Subsequently, in 1995 the Commission published its Green Paper on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (GPCRRIS).49  Therein, it 
was said that, due to the very nature of the networks operating in the information 
society, a wide variation in the level of protection of works and other protected matter 
between Member States was likely to give rise to obstacles to the development of the 
information society50, as well as impairing the functioning of the internal market.51 
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The position was said to be aggravated by the fact that, in the age of the information 
society, works would have been circulated increasingly in non-material forms. This 
meant that compliance with rules pertaining to the freedom to provide services ought 
to be ensured.52 As a consequence,  
 
While respecting the principle of subsidiarity, … the Community has an 
obligation to take measures in respect of copyright and related rights in order 
to guarantee the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services. 
This will involve harmonization of legislation, and mutual recognition too, in 
order to avoid creating distortions of competition which would confer an 
advantage on firms located in particular Member States.53 
 
 The following year the Commission issued its follow-up to the 1995 Green 
Paper,54 in which four priority issues for legislative action were identified in relation to 
the exploitation of copyright-protected works. These concerned the reproduction 
right, the right of communication to the public, the legal protection of anti-copying 
systems and distribution right. While acknowledging that further harmonisation was 
needed to adjust and complement the existing legal framework on copyright and 
related rights in light of the internal market objective, the Commission highlighted that 
parallel progress at the international level was also required. An isolated response 
from the EU would have not been sufficient, on account of the global reach of the 
information society. As is well known, in 1996 the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
were adopted. These were signed by the Member States, as well as by the EC, 
which became thus committed to implement the new international instruments and 
ensured harmonised transpositions into Member States’ laws.55 
 A directive on copyright and related rights in the information society was first 
proposed in 1997 and finally adopted in 2001. As noted, the InfoSoc Directive is 
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considerably broader than was required by the digital agenda it was intended to 
implement. In particular, the Directive harmonised the basic economic rights (rights of 
reproduction, communication to the public, and distribution) in a broad and 
supposedly ‘internet-proof’ manner, and introduced special protection for digital 
rights-management systems. In any case, the largest part of the Directive dealt with 
exceptions and limitations – a subject that was only incidental in the Green Papers 
which had been published prior to its adoption.56 The InfoSoc Directive has been 
criticised under several angles, in particular with regard to the set of exceptions and 
limitations envisaged therein. Criticisms have focused – inter alia – on the apparent 
lack of flexibility in the system of exceptions and limitations then adopted by Member 
States57, as well as their narrow scope58, and ineptness as regards scientific 
research59 and technological development.60 
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IV. Harmonisation through the 2000s 
 
One of the goals of the Lisbon Strategy61 was to make Europe the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010. However, following the publication 
of the InfoSoc Directive and despite increasing number of studies that showed the 
economic relevance of copyright industries to the European economy62, the 
harmonisation agenda lost momentum.   
 In particular, intervention by the Commission was deemed necessary to 
build up a level playing field with regard to two aspects, these being enforcement 
(which was harmonised by an ad hoc directive issued in 200463), and rights 
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management (which was dealt with simply by way of a Communication from the 
Commission64).65 
 The 2004 Commission Staff Working Paper66 was aimed at assessing 
whether any inconsistencies in the definitions or the rules on exceptions and 
limitations between the different copyright directives were such as to hamper the 
operation of the acquis communautaire, or would have a harmful impact on the fair 
balance of rights and other interests, including those of users and consumers. The 
paper supported only a minor adjustment to the definition of reproduction right and an 
extension in the application of the exception for certain temporary acts of 
reproduction under Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, to cover computer programs 
and databases. Since there were no apparent indications that EU legislative 
framework in the field of substantive copyright law contained shortcomings that had a 
negative impact on the functioning of the internal market, no further harmonisation 
measures were deemed necessary at that stage. In particular, the Working Paper 
contained an assessment of issues outside the current acquis (these being 
originality, ownership, definition of the term ‘public’, points of attachment, moral 
rights, and the exhaustion of rights) and concluded that no harmonisation was 
necessary in respect to these.67 
 Subsequently, former Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services 
Charlie McCreevy highlighted the need for Europe to improve drastically the 
economic performance of the internal market, by way of modernisation.68 To this end, 
he advocated the introduction of a modern, light-touch set of company law rules 
which could cut red tape while ensuring sound corporate governance, along with a 
reform of Europe's intellectual property rules to promote innovation and reward 
innovators. In relation to the latter, Mr McCreevy pointed out that: 
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The protection of intellectual and industrial property – copyright, patents, 
trademarks or designs – is at the heart of a knowledge-based economy and 
central to improving Europe’s competitiveness. This is a priority for reform: 
grounded on sound economics, not just legal concepts, and concentrating on 
solutions that foster innovation and investment in real life.69 
 
 With these words Mr McCreevy indicated the approach to be taken in order to 
pursue a sensible intellectual property policy at the European level. In parallel to this, 
the need to promote free movement of knowledge and innovation was identified by 
the Commission as the ‘Fifth Freedom’ in the single market.70  
 However, the 2008 Commission’s Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge 
Economy (GPCKE)71 appeared to be “remarkably less ambitious than its 
predecessors, at least when one views its objective and the means thought able to 
meet these.”72 This was because the Green Paper directly tackled none of the 
aforementioned issues. Neither the scope of exclusive rights, nor the delineation of 
protected subject-matter, or the duration of protection are dealt with therein.73 The 
purpose of the GPCKE was instead to foster a debate on how knowledge for 
research, science and education would be best disseminated in the online 
environment. This was also in light of the fact that “a forward looking analysis 
requires consideration of whether the balance provided by the [InfoSoc] Directive is 
still in line with the rapidly changing environment.”74  
The first part of the GPCKE dealt with general issues regarding exceptions to 
exclusive rights introduced in the InfoSoc Directive. The second part tackled specific 
issues relating to those exceptions and limitations that are most relevant for the 
dissemination of knowledge, and whether these exceptions should evolve in the era 
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of digital dissemination. In particular, the GPCKE focused on the exceptions to 
copyright for the benefit of libraries and archives; the exception allowing 
dissemination of works for teaching and research purposes; the exception for the 
benefit of people with a disability; and a possible exception for user-generated 
content (UGC). In addition, the GPCKE launched a public consultation, aimed at 
gathering the views of stakeholders as to whether technological and legal 
developments challenged the balance achieved by the law up until that point. In 
particular, due consideration was paid to the operation of broad exclusive rights as 
combined with specific and limited exceptions, most significantly asking whether 
these achieved a fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories 
of rightsholders and users.  
 The 2009 follow-up to the GPCKE75 reported on the results of the public 
consultation in relation to the exceptions dealt with in the GPCKE. It concluded along 
the lines that “copyright policy must be geared toward meeting the challenges of the 
internet-based knowledge economy”76, while highlighting that “[a]t the same time a 
proper protection of Intellectual Property Rights is decisive to stimulate innovation in 
the knowledge-based economy. Different interests have to be carefully balanced.”77 
Just to add something more to such a ‘Pontius Pilates-que’ approach, the 
Commission made it clear that “[i]n the immediate future, the preferred tool for many 
of the issues raised in the Green Paper [on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy] is 
a structured dialogue between relevant stakeholders, facilitated by services of the 
European Commission.”78 
 The year 2009 was to remain a fairly irrelevant period for copyright policy, at 
least on the part of the Commission. However, as will be examined below, this was 
not the case for the EU judiciary.  
 Towards the end of 2009, DG INFSO and DG MARKET jointly published a 
Reflection Document79, aimed at starting (!) a reflection and broad debate about the 
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 Reflection Document of DG INFSO and DG MARKT on Creative Content in a European Digital 




possible responses of the EU to the challenges facing dematerialisation of content. In 
particular, digital technologies were said to have brought about a number of changes 
to the way creative content is created, exploited and distributed. The Reflection 
Document thus addressed issues relating to UGC and rights management.  
With regard to UGC, the Commission acknowledged that, whilst content is 
created by traditional players such as authors, and producers, publishers, user-
generated content plays a new and important role.80 The co-existence of these two 
types of content was said to require a framework designed to guarantee both the 
freedom of expression and an appropriate remuneration for professional creators, 
who continue to play an essential role for cultural diversity.81  However, the outcome 
of the public consultation launched by the GPCKE highlighted the sentiment that 
most of the stakeholders believed that it was too early to regulate UGC. This resulted 
from the uncertainly as to whether amateurs and professionals should benefit from 
special rules on UGC, or simply from existing exceptions to copyright such as 
criticism or review, incidental use and caricature, parody and pastiche.   
 If we now turn to consider rights management, traditional practices for 
licensing rights were not always said to be fit for digital distribution. Digital 
technologies have brought new actors and new roles into the value chain, with 
previously separate services now converging. This has implied a change in the way 
in which creative content is distributed, in particular due to the integration of mobile 
operators, internet service providers (ISPs), telecom companies, broadband 
technology companies, websites, online shops, online rights aggregators and social 
networking platforms. In addition, making professionally produced creative content 
available online was considered to be a risky business, because of market 
fragmentation, high development and production costs and the need to fund as yet 
unprofitable new services from the declining revenue streams of ‘traditional’ analogue 
and physical distribution.82 However, as recently shown by some case studies83, the 
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presence of a digital sales channel may be important for encouraging the legal 
acquisition and use of works. In fact, when a digital sales channel is not available, 
users will probably turn to piracy and begin to consume much more content through 
illegal channels than they had previously purchased legally. This is because piracy 
has high fixed costs but negligible variable ones, the fixed costs being those 
associated with the purchase/rental of copying devices and the variable ones those 
influenced by the level of output, ie the amount of pirated material.84 Once the fixed 
costs are paid, it is unlikely that users, who have the choice between free pirated and 
lawful fee-paying content, will decide to switch back to obtaining content lawfully. 
These considerations demonstrate the importance of developing a level playing field 
for new business models and innovative solutions for the distribution of creative 
content85 in order to counteract the growth and spread of pirated works. 
 
 
V. Towards copyright full harmonisation? 
 
For what was probably the first time in an official document, the Reflection Document 
(despite the flaws highlighted above) specifically tackled the issue of copyright full 
harmonisation. This was in the context of discussions on to how improve the 
licensing framework at the European level.  
 According to the Commission, a ‘European Copyright Law’ may be established 
by means of a EU regulation, the legal basis for which may be new Article 118(1) 
TFEU, as introduced by the Lisbon Reform Treaty. This provision reads as follows:  
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In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall establish measures for the creation of European 
intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property 
rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide 
authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements. 
 
 Though the introduction of an EU-wide copyright title is discussed along with 
other possibilities (such as alternative forms of remuneration), the Commission 
seemed to welcome such an option. It viewed this as beneficial, inter alia, to the 
functioning of the internal market, as well as to consumer access in relation to 
exceptions and limitations to copyright.86  In the Reflection Document, it was stated 
that: 
 
A Community copyright title would have instant Community-wide effect, 
thereby creating a single market for copyrights and related rights. It would 
overcome the issue that each national copyright law, though harmonised  as to 
its substantive scope, applies only in one particular national territory. A 
Community copyright would enhance legal security and transparency, for right 
owners and users alike, and greatly reduce transaction and licensing costs. 
Unification of EU copyright by regulation could also restore the balance 
between rights and exceptions – a balance that is currently  skewed by the 
fact that the harmonisation directives mandate basic economic rights, but 
merely  permit  certain exceptions and limitations. A regulation could provide 
that rights and exceptions are afforded the same degree of harmonisation.  
By creating a single European copyright title, European Copyright Law would 
create a tool for streamlining rights management across the Single Market, 
doing away with the necessity of administering a "bundle" of 27 national 
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copyrights. Such a title, especially if construed as taking precedence over 
national titles, would remove the inherent territoriality with respect to 
applicable national copyright rules; a softer approach would be to make such a 
Community copyright title an option for rightsholders which  would not replace, 
but exist in parallel to national copyright titles.87  
 
 However, such a EU-wide copyright title would raise important issues for the 
organisation of rights management. Hence, further reflection on the future of 
European rights management would have to precede the introduction of a EU-wide 
copyright title.88 Finally, noting that new online services require a more dynamic and 
flexible framework in which they can legally offer diverse, attractive and affordable 
content to consumers, the Reflection Document recommended that careful analysis 
be undertaken as to the challenges facing the three main groups in the value chain – 
consumers, commercial users and rightsholders.89  
 
 
1. The legacy of the 2000s 
 
From the GPCKE – as well as its follow-up and the Reflection Document – two main 
threads seem to emerge.  
 Firstly, that difficulties remain as regards the balancing of the different 
interests involved in copyright law and policy90, this being the so-called public/private 
divide which has been well highlighted by, amongst others, Peter Jaszi.91  
 Secondly, that increasing digitisation and online distribution of cultural goods 
requires a reflection on the possible outcomes that might arise out of further and 
deeper harmonisation of the copyright laws of the (current) twenty-seven Member 
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States.92 As mentioned above, one of the goals of the Lisbon Strategy was to make 
Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010. As 
expressly stated by the GPCKE, creation, circulation and dissemination of knowledge 
in the single market are directly linked to the broader goals of the Lisbon Strategy.93 It 
is clear that a good protection model is the condicio sine qua non in order to achieve, 
or in the first instance, approach, these objectives.  
 
 
VI. The debate in 2010-2012: internal market, the role of academia 
and EU legislative 
 
Following the Reflection Document, debate around copyright full harmonisation at the 
EU level has constantly increased.  
In 2010 alone, two important documents were published.  
The first was the European Copyright code, released by the Wittem Group, 
composed of leading European copyright academics, in April of that year. The Code, 
as was clearly stated therein, “might serve as a model or reference tool for future 
harmonization or unification of copyright at the European level”.94 The contents of the 
Code will be discussed below, sub Chapter VI, Section I, §II. 
The second document of some relevance was released just one month later. 
The report entitled ‘A new strategy for the single market at the service of Europe’s 
economy and society’ was produced by Prof Mario Monti and addressed to the 
President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso95. This became known 






                                                          
92
 Cf Reflection Document, 10-13. 
93
 GPCKE, 3. 
94
 Wittem Group, European Copyright Code, Introduction, 5. 
95




1. The Monti Report 
 
The Report examines the challenges facing initiatives aimed at re-launching the 
internal market. Prof Monti identifies three main obstacles to the functioning of the 
internal market.96 The first challenge is said to come from the erosion of the political 
and social support for market integration in Europe. The second challenge comes 
from uneven policy attention given to the development of the various components of 
an effective and sustainable single market. The final challenge is due to what the 
Report defines as a ‘sense of complacency’, which has gained strength in the past 
decade. This sentiment has led to a belief that the single market has really already 
been completed, and can thus be put to rest as a political priority. Hence, the report 
advocates the adoption of a new strategy to safeguard the single market from the risk 
of economic nationalism, to extend it into new areas key for Europe's growth and to 
build an adequate degree of consensus around it. From these objectives, it is clearly 
not accidental that the actual Report is preceded by a quote from Paul-Henri Spaak: 
 
Tous ceux qui ont essayé de régler les problèmes économiques que posait le  
traité de Rome en oubliant le coté politique de la chose sont allés à un échec 
et aussi longtemps qu'on examinera [ces] problèmes uniquement sur le plan 
économique et sans penser à la politique, je le crains, nous irons à des 
échecs répétés.97 
 
Indeed, it is important to highlight that EU integration and development in 
relation to copyright requires not just ‘sound economics’ (as stated in 2006 by Charlie 
McCreevy), but also the political will to engage in such a debate. 
The Monti Report specifically tackles the issue of copyright harmonisation, 
saying that: 
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The European markets for online digital content are still underdeveloped as 
the complexity and lack of transparency of the copyright regime creates an 
unfavourable business environment. It is urgent to simplify copyright clearance 
and management by facilitating pan-European content licensing, by 
developing EU-wide copyright rules, including a framework for digital rights 
management … Additional measures should also be examined to take into 
account the specificities of all the different forms of on-line content, such as 
further harmonization of copyright, creation of an EU copyright title, 
considering that cross-border online transactions take place at the location of 
supply and extended collective licensing.98 
 
The political dimension of EU copyright debate is apparent if one looks at the 
2011 Commission’s blueprint for intellectual property rights to boost creativity and 
innovation99, and, prior to this, the follow-up to the Monti Report: the Commission’s 
Single Market Act.100 
 
 
2. The Single Market Act 
 
In April 2011, following the fifty proposals which it had put up for debate101, the 
Commission issued its action plan aimed at re-launching growth and strengthening 
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confidence in the internal market. As the shortcomings of the latter had been 
highlighted in the Monti Report, the adoption of a proactive and cross-cutting strategy 
was deemed necessary. In its Communication on the Single Market Act, the 
Commission set forth: 
 
This means putting an end to market fragmentation and eliminating barriers 
and obstacles to the movement of services, innovation and creativity. It means 
strengthening citizens’ confidence in their internal market and ensuring that its 
benefits are passed on to consumers. A better integrated market which fully 
plays its role as a platform on which to build European competitiveness for its 
peoples, businesses and regions, including the remotest and least 
developed.102  
 
The Single Market Act includes twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen 
confidence in the internal market. Among these, intellectual property rights are 
regarded as playing an important role. This is not only because between 45% and 
75% of the value of large enterprises is linked to their intellectual property rights103, 
but also because industries which make intensive use of intellectual property rights 
have a fundamental role in the sustainable development of European states’ 
economies.104  
This said, the Commission’s action plan suggests that legislation is enhanced 
to set up a unitary patent protection for the greatest possible number of Member 
States and a unified patent litigation system with the objective of issuing the first EU 
patents in 2013. The trademark system also requires updating, in order to improve 
the protection of trademarks and to make the European and national trademark 
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systems more coherent, by simplifying procedures, reducing costs and enabling the 
system to benefit fully from new technologies to facilitate research.  
In relation to copyright, the Single Market Act echoes Proposal No 2, which 
was part of the group of fifty proposals within the public consultation. This had 
followed from considerations as to how the absence of a EU-wide framework for the 
efficient management of copyright across the EU makes it difficult to disseminate 
knowledge and cultural goods online.105 Therefore, current systems for the granting 
of copyright licences for legal online distribution should be simplified and made more 
transparent. In addition, collective management must be able to evolve towards 
European models, allowing for licences to cover several territories, whilst at the same 
time providing a high level of protection for rightsholders.  
The hints contained in the Single Market Act were discussed and developed in 
the May 2011 blueprint for intellectual property rights. 
 
 
3. The 2011 Commission’s blueprint  
 
In May 2011, one month after the publication of the Single Market Act, the 
Commission issued its blueprint for intellectual property rights. This was aimed at 
setting an agenda to release the potential of European inventors and creators, as 
well as empowering them to turn ideas into high-quality jobs and promoting economic 
growth. In particular, according to the Commission, growth may be achieved only by 
putting in place a seamless, integrated and modern single market for intellectual 
property rights, which has not yet been realised. The fragmentation of the intellectual 
property landscape in the EU is said to have problematic implications for Europe's 
growth, job creation and competitiveness. In particular, difficulties are deemed to 
exist in relation to both exploitation and enforcement of intellectual property rights.106  
Licensing transactions are impaired by high costs and complexity. This results, inter 
alia, in ecommerce not having yet realised its full potential in the EU. In addition, 
existing intellectual property regimes have to cope with increasingly fast 
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technological progress, which changes the way products and services are produced, 
disseminated and consumed. As a consequence, Europe is not always at the 
forefront of providing new digital services.  
The enforcement of intellectual property rights within Europe and at its borders 
remains imperfect, not least because the EU enforcement regime is not in line with 
the new digital environment. In particular, enforcement needs to be strengthened, in 
order to effectively respond to the challenges facing dematerialisation of works and 
their distribution. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the construction of a single market for 
intellectual property rights is to become a major objective of EU policy. This was 
considered necessary not only to favour growth, sustainable job creation and 
competitiveness of EU economy, these being also key objectives of the EU 2020 
agenda107, but also as an essential element to sustain the EU’s recovery from the 
economic and financial crisis. Indeed, the development of sectors, such as 
ecommerce and digital industries, is deemed essential for EU economy, in that these 
offer the greatest potential for future growth.108 Most of the new jobs in the EU which 
have been created over the past decade have been in the knowledge-based 
industries, where employment has increased by 24%. In contrast, employment in the 
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rest of the EU economy has increased by just under 6%.109 Copyright-based creative 
industries contributed 3.3% to the EU GDP in 2006.110 
This said,  the blueprint also contains proposals to improve the EU intellectual 
property framework. Starting with patents, the Commission discusses the advantages 
of having a unitary patent protection and litigation system. As regards trademarks, it 
is suggested that EU trademark system is ameliorated by updating Regulation No 
207/2009.111 The blueprint also tackles issues pertaining to complementary 
protection of intangible assets, these being trade secrets, parasitic copies, and non-
agricultural geographical indications. It also calls for a heightened fight against 
counterfeiting and piracy, to be instigated by improving the structure of the European 
Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy, which is meant to serve as a platform to 
join forces, exchange experiences and information and to share best practices on 
enforcement. On 19 April 2012, the European Parliament and the Council adopted 
Regulation No 386/2012.112 This entrusts the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal 
Market (OHIM) with tasks related to the enforcement of IPRs, including the 
assembling of public and private-sector representatives as a EU Observatory on 
infringements of IPRs. 
 In addition, the Commission aims to pursue its objective of enhancing respect 
for intellectual property right standards at an international level by engaging in 
cooperation with third countries in the context of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. It will also contribute to the 
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promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology. Further, in the context of WIPO, it will continue to support large-scale 
ratification of the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties and their proper implementation into 
domestic laws113, as well as to negotiate intellectual property right provisions in EU’s 
free trade agreements with third countries.114 The Commission is also committed to 
enhancing intellectual property protection and enforcement at the EU borders. To this 
end, it proposes that a new regulation replacing Regulation No 1383/2003115 be 
adopted with the objective of strengthening enforcement while streamlining 
procedures.116 
At §3.3. the blueprint discusses the creation of a comprehensive framework for 
copyright in the digital single market, touching upon the following issues: copyright 
governance and management, user-generated content, private copying levies, 
access to Europe’s cultural heritage and fostering media plurality, performers’ rights, 
audiovisual works and artists’ resale right.  
 
 
4. Full harmonisation is on its way (via licensing?) 
 
The analysis carried out by the Commission is closely linked to what is considered as 
the state of the art in relation to dematerialisation and dissemination of works through 
digital channels117, and raising awareness as to how territorial constraints of Member 
States’ copyright laws are at odds with such a barrier-less environment: 
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The internet is borderless but online markets in the EU are still fragmented by 
multiple barriers. Europe remains a patchwork of national online markets and 
there are cases when Europeans are unable to buy copyright protected works 
or services electronically across a digital single market. Technology, the fast 
evolving nature of digital business models and the growing autonomy of online 
consumers, all call for a constant assessment as to whether current copyright 
rules set the right incentives and enable right holders, users of rights and 
consumers to take advantage of the opportunities that modern technologies 
provide.118 
 
This said, the agenda of the Commission includes a reform of copyright 
licensing, which has also recently been held to be of primary importance to future 
Commission actions.119 The creation of a European framework for online copyright 
licensing is said to have the potential to stimulate greatly the legal offer of protected 
cultural goods and services across the EU and to benefit rightsholders, collecting 
societies, service providers and consumers alike. The new framework for copyright 
licensing should establish common rules on governance, transparency and effective 
supervision, including collectively managed revenue streams.  
The blueprint also addresses how to foster the development of new online 
services covering a greater share of the world repertoire. It suggests that an 
enforceable European rights management regime facilitating cross-border licensing 
should be put in place. Furthermore, effective cross-border management of copyright 
for online services should be taken into consideration. The Commission advises that 
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means are provided to ensure that all operators comply with a high level of service 
standards for both rightsholders and users and that competition is not distorted. 
In order to tackle a more far-reaching overhaul of copyright at the EU level, the 
Commission expressly suggests considering the adoption of a European Copyright 
Code. For the second time in an official document (the first being the 2009 Reflection 
Document) the Commission not only mentions the possibility of harmonising 
copyright fully at the EU level, but also indicates how this objective may be achieved. 
In particular, the Commission explains that full harmonisation may be sought through 
two distinct and alternative routes: either a codification of the current acquis, or the 
issuing of an ad hoc regulation aimed at creating an optional EU copyright title. The 
blueprint provides: 
 
[A European Copyright Code] could encompass a comprehensive codification 
of the present body of EU copyright directives in order to harmonise and 
consolidate the entitlements provided by copyright and related rights at EU 
level. This would also provide an opportunity to examine whether the current 
exceptions and limitations to copyright granted under the [InfoSoc] Directive 
need to be updated or harmonised at EU level. A Code could therefore help to 
clarify the relationship between the various exclusive rights enjoyed by rights 
holders and the scope of the exceptions and limitations to those rights.  
The Commission will also examine the feasibility of creating an optional 
"unitary" copyright title on the basis of Article 118 TFEU and its potential 
impact for the single market, rights holders and consumers.  
These issues require further study and analysis. The Commission will examine 
these issues, inter alia, in the context of the dialogue with stakeholders 
foreseen in the Digital Agenda for Europe and report in 2012, in particular on 
whether the [InfoSoc] Directive needs to be updated.120 
 
As reported in the Annex to the blueprint, which contains a list of future 
Commission actions, the next couple of years promise to be crucial to the future of 
EU copyright. As recently as May 2011, the Commission issued its proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain permitted uses of 
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orphan works.121 In the foreseeable future (albeit it should have appeared in the 
second half of 2011), a proposal for a legal instrument to create a European 
framework for online copyright licensing in order to create a stable framework for the 
governance of copyright at the European level should also be published.  
Moreover, in 2012 the Commission will evaluate whether or not to adopt 
further measures in the area of copyright, following a consultation with relevant 
stakeholders. This shall be done having in mind the objectives of allowing EU 
citizens, online content services providers and rightsholders to benefit from the full 
potential of the digital internal market.  
Throughout 2012, the Enforcement Directive is going to be reviewed, in order 
to combat infringements of intellectual property rights via the internet more 
effectively. This review will take into account the need to ensure respect for all 
fundamental rights recognised by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights122, in 
particular the right to private life, protection of personal data, freedom of expression 
and information and to an effective remedy. In addition, any amendments should 
have as their objective to tackle infringements at their source and, to that end, foster 
cooperation of intermediaries, such as ISPs, while being compatible with the goals of 
broadband policies and without prejudicing the interests of end-consumers.123 
In the second half of 2012, the Commission is set to launch a stakeholder 
consultation over user-generated content. In relation to this, the Commission notes 
that there is a growing realisation that solutions are needed to make it easier and 
affordable for end-users to use third-party copyright-protected content in their own 
works. In other words, users who integrate copyright-protected materials into their 
own creations, which are then uploaded on the internet, should have access to a 
simple and efficient permissions system. This is found to be particularly pertinent in 
the case of amateur uses of copyright-protected materials for non-commercial 
purposes. According to the Commission, UGC of this type should not expose authors 
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to infringement proceedings if they upload material without the rightsholders' 
consent.124 
Finally, as mentioned above and still in the course of 2012, the Commission 
shall report on the application of the InfoSoc Directive and assess whether this needs 
to be updated. However, as was recently announced by current Head of Unit for 
Copyright within DG Internal Market & Services, Maria Martin-Prat, the review of the 
InfoSoc Directive will not result in any legislative initiatives until 2013 at the very 
earliest.125  
Closely linked to this, starting in 2012, the Commission is committed to 
assessing and discussing with concerned stakeholders the feasibility and desirability 
of producing a European Copyright Code. In relation to this, Ms Martin-Prat has 
made it clear that, whilst it is true that the priority of the Commission is to facilitate 
licensing across the EU and this implies facing the issue of territoriality, the possible 
establishment of a EU-wide licensing system is not going to affect the territoriality of 
EU Member States’ copyright laws.126 Therefore, debate as to the future of EU 




V. Why for the EU copyright is not just about copyright 
 
On 11 January 2012, the Commission published a Communication on A coherent 
framework to build trust in the Digital single market for e-commerce and online 
services.127 The Communication highlights the advantages of building a genuine 
digital single market. This is said to favour several categories of stakeholders128, as 
                                                          
124
 Ibid, 12. 
125




 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital 
Single Market for e-commerce and online services, Brussels, 11 January 2012, COM(2011) 942. 
128
 According to the Commission (ibid, 3-4), increased trust in the digital single market will be 
advantageous for consumers (who will benefit from lower prices, more choice and better quality of 
goods and services, due to cross-border trade and easier comparison of offer), small and medium 




well as to generate new types of growth, which the EU has not yet achieved129- not 
least because ‘internet Europe’ is still a patchwork of different laws130, rules, 
standards and practices with little or no interoperability. In particular, the Commission 
highlights that, “[t]he European Union cannot just resign itself to bearing the costs of 
a fragmented digital market after having set ambitious objectives for renewed, 
sustainable, smart and inclusive growth by 2020.”131 Hence, the Commission is 
committed to working with all the stakeholders to enhance a EU digital single market. 
Such an objective is to be achieved by 2015, as also recently stated by the European 
Council, whilst highlighting that, to this end, priority should be given to measures 
aimed at further developing cross-border online trade, boosting demand for the roll-
out of high-speed internet, modernising Europe's copyright regime and facilitating 
licensing.132 In relation to the latter, it is believed that any proposed measure should 
seek to reduce the administrative burdens and transaction costs associated with the 
licensing of content.133 
Fragmentation of the legal framework pertaining to online services is said to 
be at odds with the growth objectives set out by the Commission. Copyright is within 
this legal framework and, although the Communication does not specifically tackle 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
European borders), citizens (who will use the internet to carry out cross-border activities), workers 
(thanks to online services, high-quality jobs will be created, even in rural or isolated areas, and it 
will be possible to respond to job offers even outside the country), and the environment (growth 
generated through the development of e-commerce will be greener and more sustainable).  
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the issue of full copyright harmonisation, from the identification of the main obstacles 
to the development of the digital single market it is apparent that, amongst other 
things, copyright needs to be discussed from this perspective. 
According to the Commission itself, the following problems have to be solved: 
the supply of legal, cross-border online services, which is still said to be inadequate; 
the amount information for online service operators or protection for internet users, 
which is not enough; payment and delivery systems, which are said to be poor; 
settlement of disputes, where this avenue is still difficult to pursue; and high-speed 
communication networks and hi-tech solutions, which remain insufficient.134  
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the issue concerning the future of 
copyright at the EU level cannot be placed outwith the discourse concerning the 
enhancement of a EU digital single market. The development of legal and cross-
border offers of online products and services cannot rely solely upon the kind of 
harmonisation brought about by the Ecommerce Directive. This, indeed, did remove 
a series of obstacles to cross-border online activities. In particular, its internal market 
clause135, which forbids Member States from restricting the freedom to provide 
information society services from another Member State, is considered to be the 
cornerstone of the digital single market. Albeit a revision of the Ecommerce Directive 
is deemed un-necessary at this stage, an amelioration of its implementation, as well 
as clarification of certain aspects (such as the liability of ISPs), should be provided.  
In order to achieve the objective of facilitating cross-border offers of online 
products and services, the Commission deems it necessary to assess the way in 
which a number of obstacles are still impeding the development of online services 
and access to them. In particular, businesses are said to be reluctant to commit to 
innovative activities, due to the costs and risks arising from the fragmentation of 
rules. This is a clear consequence of having (currently) twenty-seven co-existing 
national legal systems, each having special regard to consumer law. However, this is 
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not the only field in which fragmentation is seen as detrimental to the achievement of 
the single digital market objective.136  
As far as the market for digital content is concerned, legal offers of both music 
and audiovisual entertainment is evolving at different rates throughout the Member 
States. This does not always meet consumers' expectations, in part due to the limited 
availability of transnational or pan-European offers. This said, the Commission 
stresses the need for collective management of copyrights to become more 
European in structure, so to allow for licences to cover a number of European 
regions. In addition, it is trusted that ambitious implementation of the 
recommendations included in the May 2011 blueprint of the Commission will foster 
the development of a richer and more suitable offer on a European scale.137  
As has been mentioned, the Commission document of January 2012 does not 
expressly mention the issue of copyright full harmonisation. However, this is implicit 
in the main actions that are indicated as being necessary. Among the other things, 
the Commission 
 
will ensure that the European strategy for intellectual property rights [indicated 
in the May 2011 blueprint] is implemented rapidly and ambitiously, in particular 
by means of a legislative initiative on … the review of the Directive on 
copyright in the information society ...138 
 
The review of the InfoSoc Directive that the Commission intends to carry out in 
2012 (and probably also 2013) will involve a discourse on whether and to what extent 
full copyright harmonisation is a desirable objective. As expressly stated in the May 
2011 blueprint – and here recalled once again – one option aimed at ensuring a more 
far-reaching overhaul of copyright at the EU level would be to create a EU-wide 
copyright title, either by means of a codification of the present body of EU copyright 
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directives, in order to harmonise and consolidate the entitlements provided by 
copyright and related rights at EU level, or by an ad hoc regulation issued pursuant to 
Article 118 TFEU. Discussion on this and other issues will be carried out in the 
context of the dialogue with relevant stakeholders. In the January 2012 document, 
the Commission made it clear that the EU intellectual property rights agenda is to be 
implemented rapidly and ambitiously. This rules out any possibility for full EU 









Debate on copyright harmonisation commenced nearly twenty-five years ago, with 
the 1988 GPPCT. Therefore, in relation to the history of EU integration as a whole, 
intellectual property (and copyright in particular) was not perceived, at first, as 
functional to achieving the internal market objective. It was only when awareness 
arose as to the key role of copyright in relation to its functioning that harmonisation 
was pursued.  
Progress and assessment of EU copyright harmonisation may be viewed from 
three different angles. The first angle concerns the structural character of 
harmonisation; the second, its overall ambitiousness; and the third, its merits. These 
will be examined in turn. 
 
 
I. The structural character of copyright harmonisation 
Since the 1988 GPPCT, harmonisation of copyright at the EU level has been 
characterised by the interdependence of its objective(s) and overall scope. 
As far as the objective of harmonisation is concerned, measures taken in this 
respect have often (if not always) been justified in light of eliminating obstacles and 




impair the functioning of the internal market.139 In particular, this was because the 
presence of differing legal solutions distorted cross-frontier trade of goods and 
services, as well as competition. Thus, from the very beginning of copyright 
harmonisation, removal of internal barriers has been at the centre of EU debate. 
This, however, has not been the only objective. Indeed, the enhancement of the 
overall competitiveness of the EU economy in relation to its trading partners has also 
been an important aspect. This can now rightly be considered as being at the centre 
of EU harmonisation model. In addition, effective enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, as well as the development of new business models aimed at favouring 
access to works by EU citizens have become increasingly relevant to the 
harmonisation discourse. 
As regards the scope of harmonisation, this has always occurred on an ad hoc 
basis and when differences in the laws of Member States were deemed to be 
detrimental to the internal market objective. Hence, EU approach to copyright has 
occurred following a sector-by-sector approach, and has been both functional and 
fragmented. From this point of view, the political breadth of the harmonisation 
process can be said to have been minimal, also (but not only) because intellectual 
property as such is an area in which the EU has no exclusive internal competence.  
Compliance with the principle of subsidiarity requires that action at the EU 
level in an area of non-exclusive competence, such as intellectual property, shall 
occur only when the objectives of the proposed intervention may not be sufficiently 
achieved by Member States' action in the framework of their national constitutional 
system and are therefore to be better achieved by action at the EU level.140 In 
addition, the principle of proportionality, which disciplines the way and intensity of EU 
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 See TEU, Section 5 of Protocol (No 30) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
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intervention, requires that this does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the treaties.141 Furthermore, the form of EU action shall be as simple as 
possible, consistent with satisfactory achievement of the objective of the measure 
and the need for effective enforcement. In addition, all things being equal, directives 
should be preferred to regulations and framework directives to detailed measures.142 
In light of the foregoing, both the primary objective and scope of EU 
intervention in the field of copyright have been compliant with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. However, neither a fully functioning internal market 
nor a digital single market have been completely achieved as yet.  
In relation to the internal market, it is true that - as highlighted by Prof Monti in 
his 2010 report - obstacles to its functioning derive from a series of challenges. 
Among these, there is what the Report referred to as a ‘sense of complacency’, as if 
the single market had been really completed and could thus be put to rest as a 
political priority. Contrary to such a belief, the internal market still needs not only to 
be improved, but also modernised.143 
As regards the digital single market, the Commission has clearly pointed out 
that digital technologies have brought about a number of changes and challenges to 
the way creative content is created, exploited and distributed.144 Differences in the 
laws of EU Member States have thus far impeded the achievement of a digital single 
market and the costs of a fragmented digital market are still to be borne.145  
 
 
II. The ambitiousness of the Commission’s copyright agenda 
 
Before copyright – and, more generally, intellectual property – harmonisation got 
underway, the laws of the Member States had been affected by EU law through the 
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EC treaties’ provisions on competition and free movement of goods, although only to 
a limited extent. It was therefore apparent that in the early days of European 
integration a EU copyright policy as such did not exist. Any intervention in the field of 
copyright had to be justified in light of the broader objective pertaining to the 
realisation of the internal market. However, awareness increased at the EU level as 
to the strategic importance of intellectual property to the overall competitiveness of 
the European economy. Such a role was expressly acknowledged by the 
Commission in its 1988 GPCCT. This marked a shift in the part the EU legislature 
was to play in the field of copyright in subsequent years. No longer was a negative 
approach to copyright adopted, ie legislative intervention aimed at eliminating 
obstacles to the functioning of the internal market, but also a positive approach came 
to play a role, seeking to favour growth and competitiveness throughout Europe, as 
well as to protect the creative efforts of European authors. This approach required 
stronger and more effective enforcement of copyright outside European borders.  
 The shift marked by the GPCCT inaugurated an ambitious agenda, which led 
to the adoption of five directives pertaining to various aspects of copyright over the 
course of the 1990s. Alongside these, awareness continued to increase as to the 
need for a level playing field for copyright to be created, in order to enhance the 
European IP model.  
 In parallel to the implementation agenda set out in 1988, the Commission 
started to address the challenges facing the information society, a term – as 
mentioned above – first used in 1993. In particular, the Commission indicated the 
need to favour both the development and application of information and 
communication technologies, as well as the creation of a common information area. 
This was targeted at enhancing European competitiveness.  
 The documents published throughout the second half of the 1990s continued 
to emphasise the key role copyright plays both in light of the internal market objective 
and the overall competitiveness of the EU. In particular, attention was paid to 
economic rights (reproduction rights, communication to the public and distribution 
right), the harmonisation of which quickly became a priority, not just in Europe, but 
also internationally. 
 From the end of the 1980s until the beginning of 2000s, the EU copyright 
agenda continued to gain momentum and breadth. However, following the adoption 




Strategy – both the scope and results of the various measures adopted were modest. 
In particular, attention focused mostly on enforcement and rights management. 
Inconsistencies in definitions or rules on exceptions and limitations between the 
different directives were deemed to neither be in contrast to the building of an acquis 
communautaire nor to have a harmful impact on the fair balance of rights and 
interests. Moreover, the reviews which were carried out in the mid-2000s concluded 
that no further harmonisation measures were necessary, as differences in the laws of 
Member States were not such as to impair the functioning of the internal market. 
Among the issues outside the current acquis, and for which harmonisation was not 
deemed necessary, was originality. As will be explained below, such an attitude 
caused a marked delay in the harmonisation process and, above all, resulted in a 
legislative gap which was only to be filled by EU judiciary at the end of the 2000s. 
Indeed, the relevance of the originality requirement to the determination of the scope 
of protection has been constantly overlooked, as its role was not understood fully 
until relatively recently. For instance, in his 1978 study on the copyright laws of the 
then nine EC Member States, Prof Dietz did not consider the different thresholds to 
originality in the various national copyright laws, when addressing the ideal standard 
of protectability under EC copyright law. He argued that only the definition of ‘work’, 
which is to include the design, sketch or study (if these on their own have been 
expressed in a sufficiently concrete form and have not merely remained an unformed 
idea), ought to be retained to determine the protectability standard. Any 
characterisation of the originality requirement was to be avoided and left to court and 
jurisprudence to define. According to Dietz, even in those countries (Germany, Italy, 
UK, Ireland in his study) where the law provided additional hints as to the kind of 
‘work’ protected by copyright, the actual meaning could be defined only by courts in 
each individual case.146   
 Lip-service was paid to the promotion of free movement of knowledge and 
innovation. However, there was still no sign of a return to an ambitious harmonisation 
agenda by the second half of the 2000s. As such, the 2008 GPCKE was simply 
aimed at fostering a debate on how knowledge for research, science and education 
could be best disseminated in the online environment. Attention clearly focused on 
copyright exceptions and limitations. However, no actual legislative measures 
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followed the Green Paper, as its 2009 follow-up merely acknowledged the need for 
copyright policy to address the challenges facing the internet-based knowledge 
economy and indicated that the preferred tool for many of the issues raised in the 
Green Paper was a structured dialogue between relevant stakeholders. Similarly, in 
its 2009 Reflection Document, the Commission indicated the issues arising from 
dematerialisation of contents and their exchange and that were such as to call for 
consideration. These only included user-generated content and rights management. 
However, the Reflection Document changed the approach followed by the 
Commission until then. 
 It can be said that from 2009 onwards, the Commission’s copyright agenda 
quite suddenly re-gained momentum, thus marking a shift from the developments (or 
lack thereof) that occurred in the 2000s. In addition to the Reflection Document – 
which, overall, was not particularly ambitious –, the following have contributed to 
reinvigorating discourse around copyright at the EU level. Firstly, the 2010 Monti 
Report. This, while examining the shortcomings of the internal market objective, 
contributed to highlight its political dimension and, alongside this, the role of Member 
States in its relaunch. Moreover, the importance of copyright for this objective was 
highlighted by the Commission in its follow-up to the Monti Report, ie the Single 
Market Act, as well as in its 2011 Communication on A Single Market for Intellectual 
Property Rights. The latter, in particular, confirmed the renewed interest of the 
Commission in pursuing a EU copyright policy. The blueprint contained a fairly 
detailed agenda aimed at realising the broader objective of favouring European 
authors, as well as economic growth and competitiveness, by putting in place an 
integrated and modern single market for IPRs. In addition, following the 
acknowledgement in the Reflection Document of the debate surrounding copyright 
full harmonisation, the 2011 blueprint went further and mentioned the possibility of 
issuing a European Copyright Code, by means of a codification of the copyright 










III. The achievements and merits of harmonisation 
 
As mentioned, the process of copyright harmonisation has resulted in piecemeal 
legislation, which has firstly and primarily occurred where differences in the laws of 
Member States were deemed to impair the functioning of the internal market. Only at 
a later stage did legislative intervention occur for other reasons.  
It has been noted147 that, from the survey of EU directives constituting the 
current acquis communautaire and their implementation trends and pitfalls, there 
emerges a certain lack of consistency in the assumptions underlying current EU 
copyright law policy. In particular, though the harmonisation process has been 
constantly rooted within the notion of ‘adequate legal protection’148 as a means to 
increase production and dissemination of works, this has resulted in harmonisation 
moving upwards, even where economic evidence suggested that this would have led 
to unnecessary monopolies over non-rival resources such as cultural and information 
goods. There is no need to recall the heated debate surrounding the extensions of 
the term of copyright protection, both at the time when the Term Directive149 was 
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adopted and, more recently, with Directive 2011/77/EU, which was adopted on 12 
September 2011.150 This extended the term of protection for performers and sound 
recordings from fifty to seventy years. The main argument against excessive 
extension of the term of protection has been that, as a consequence, access to 
culture is denied, while no incentives to creation of new works are provided.151 
According to some commentators, term extension has contributed to the aggravation 
of issues concerning orphan works, in that it has made it more difficult to locate 
authors and so to seek and obtain licences for using third parties’ works. The results 
is that “[i]f you can’t track down who owns rights in the work, you can’t use it no 
matter how beneficial your use may be and not matter how likely is that the copyright 
owner has lost all interest in exploiting the work.”152  
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As mentioned above, the InfoSoc Directive has not been immune from 
criticism. Some commentators have called it a “badly drafted, compromise-ridden, 
ambiguous piece of legislation”153, which has not only not contributed to improving 
legal certainty – a goal expressly stated at recitals 4,6, 7 and 21 therein –, but was 
the result of “another round of lobbying and infighting at the national level”. This has 
led to additional work for the Court of Justice, which had “to finish the job left largely 
undone by the European legislature.”154 In relation to this last remark, the analysis 
Prof Hungeholtz carried out more than ten years ago is impressively precise. This will 
be seen in relation to the issue of originality, which EU legislature has deemed so far 
not necessary to address and harmonise. 
Such a piecemeal approach has also given rise to concerns re the actual 
consistency of the EU legal framework, both at the level of the acquis and within 
national systems of intellectual property rights.155 This is because: 
 
Although harmonisation of copyright and related rights is the stated aim, the 
existing  directives may in effect also contribute to the preservation and in 
theory even proliferation of  differences between Member States’ laws. One 
reason is that sometimes only a minimum level of protection is prescribed … 
or that Member States may be allowed to introduce new rights … Another 
reason is that rights and limitations may be optional … But harmonisation 
efforts so far have also attracted criticism for other reasons. The 
proportionality principle especially seeks to ensure that a legislative measure 
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is fit for its purpose. Various elements of directives have been criticised for 
failing precisely that test. 156 
 
Although the above lays down the flaws of the copyright harmonisation 
process, it should be pointed out that its merits cannot be underestimated. The 
rationale underlying the entire process has been the removal of barriers that impeded 
the functioning of the internal market. Indeed, the copyright agenda of the 
Commission has always been functional to the broader objective of making a single 
market for copyright works. In addition, the process of harmonisation has favoured 
the emergence of common principles, thus contributing to the creation of a peculiar 
EU copyright, and to strengthened legal certainty in EU commerce.157 Harmonisation, 
where it occurred, was needed since the differences in the laws of Member States 
were at odds with the internal market objective. It is now clear that it could have been 
better, with particular regard to the provisions relating to technology and 
technological impact. These lack the flexibility required in an ever-changing 
marketplace.  
The real question which lies before us is not whether harmonisation was 
necessary in the first place - it was -  but whether, instead, it should go further with 
increased momentum, as recent case law developments and inputs from the 
Commission suggest. The answer to this issue is definitively ‘yes’. This is for two 
reasons. 
The first supports further harmonisation because progress so far has involved 
only specific aspects of copyright. This has left untouched the very basics of 
copyright protection,  for instance the meaning of ‘work’ or ‘original’. These gaps 
have been filled by the Court of Justice. Some commentators (notably Prof Lionel 
Bently of the University of Cambridge) have argued that the harmonising effects of 
CJEU jurisprudence touched upon concepts which could not be possibly harmonised 
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with legislation alone.158 In any case, a EU-wide copyright discourse cannot be 
construed without assigning a EU meaning to very basic concepts of copyright. As 
will be argued below sub Chapter VI, Section II, any legislative intervention aimed at 
harmonising such concepts will be an ex post codification of principles developed by 
the CJEU. 
The second reason supports full harmonisation. As the market for copyright 
works is no longer bound to analogical barriers, but is characterised by instant 
transmission, availability and exploitation of digital works through digital channels, it 
is no longer conceivable that the EU lacks a EU-wide copyright title and remains 
instead a fragmented legal order. This is in contrast to a market (the EU one – to say 
the least) in which no fragmentation is actually supposed to exist. 
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ORIGINALITY AS A POLICY TOOL 








The originality requirement has been traditionally intended differently in continental 
Member States as compared to the UK. While the latter has adopted a loose 
meaning for such a requirement, continental European copyright laws have 
embraced stricter originality standards. 
 The process of EU harmonisation in the field of copyright has brought about 
several changes in the domestic legal systems of the Member States. However, 
originality has been harmonised to a very limited extent. Where this has occurred (in 
relation to computer programs, databases and photographs), originality has been 
interpreted as the author’s own intellectual creation. This meaning of the originality 
requirement is akin to the continental standard. 
 The main purpose of this chapter is to suggest that a narrow approach to EU 
copyright is no longer adequate. Originality, being at the basis of copyright protection, 
plays a fundamental policy role and, therefore, cannot be left outside the 
harmonisation discourse. By referring to the different but equally paradigmatic 
evolutions of the meaning of originality in the US and the UK, it will be shown that this 
concept has changed over time and that, above all, it has been shaped and re-




 This chapter also seeks to analyse critically the evolution of UK case law and 
assess it in the light of both the changes brought about by the process of EU 
harmonisation and those which occurred spontaneously in areas unaffected by EC 
Directives. The objective is to see whether legislative changes have come about  
unexpectedly, or whether, instead, they have been (and are likely to be) the result of 
spontaneous evolutionary patterns, rather than the result of external (EU) influences.  
 This chapter is divided into two parts.  
 The first part will highlight the meaning and role of originality within broader 
concepts such as authorship and creativity. Following a review of the EU approach to 
originality, attention will be dedicated to its legal understanding within continental 
Member States and the UK.  
 The second part will attempt to show the evolution of originality within well-
established legal traditions, such as the US and the UK. The main objective is to 
demonstrate the flexibility of such concept, as well as its fundamental policy role. An 
examination will be undertaken as to whether the meaning of originality has been 
actually constant over time, as claimed by the received wisdom in copyright literature. 
With particular regard to the UK, attention will be devoted to assessing whether (and 
to what extent) the process of EU harmonisation has led towards a different 
approach to originality in the UK, beyond the specific areas affected by EC Directives 








I. On creativity, authorship and originality 
 
Poetic history … is held to be indistinguishable from poetic influence, since 
strong poets make that history by misreading one another, so as to clear 




My concern is only with strong poets, major figures with the persistence to 
wrestle with their strong precursors, even to the death. Weaker talents 
idealize; figures of capable imagination appropriate for themselves. But 
nothing is got for nothing, and self-appropriation involves the immense 
anxieties of indebtedness, for what strong maker desires the realization that 
he has failed to create himself? Oscar Wilde, who knew he had failed as a 
poet because he lacked strength to overcome his anxiety of influence, knew 
also the darker truths concerning influence. The Ballad of Reading Gaol 
becomes an embarrassment to read, directly one recognizes that every lustre 
it exhibits is reflected from The Rime of the Ancient Mariner; and Wilde’s lyrics 
anthologize the whole of English High Romanticism. Knowing this, and armed 
with his customary intelligence, Wilde bitterly remarks in The Portrait of Mr. W. 
H. that: “Influence is simply a transference of personality, a mode of giving 
away what is most precious to one’s self, and its exercise produces a sense, 
and, it may be, a reality of loss. Every disciple takes away something from his 
master.” This is the anxiety of influencing, yet no reversal in this area is a true 
reversal. Two years later, Wilde refined this bitterness in one of Lord Henry 
Wotton’s elegant observations in The Picture of Dorian Gray, where he tells 
Dorian that all influence is immoral: “Because to influence a person is to give 
him one’s own soul. He does not think his natural thoughts, or burn with his 
natural passions. His virtues are not real to him. His sins, if there are such 
things as sins, are borrowed. He becomes an echo of someone else’s music, 
an actor of a part that has not been written for him.159      
 
 As is well known, with his most significant The anxiety of influence, Harold 
Bloom developed the idea that, like criticism, which is either part of literature or 
nothing at all, great writing always strongly (or weakly) misreads previous writing.160  
 However, as pointed out incisively some years later by Roland Barthes, who 
reached the point of declaring the ‘death of the author’161, creativity and originality are 
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concerned with the author’s personal gaze or perspective on objects, no matter if 
these belong to the realm of mundane or to something more elevated. 
 
Representation is not defined by imitation: even if one gets rid of notions of the 
‘real’, of the ‘vraisemblable’, of the ‘copy’, there will still be representation for 
so long as a subject (author, reader, spectator or voyeur) casts his gaze 
towards a horizon on which he cuts out the base of a triangle, his eye (or his 
mind) forming the apex.162 
   
 The very concept of the ‘author’, as an individual who is the sole creator of 
unique works whose originality warrants protection under laws of intellectual property 
is quite a recent one.163 It is traditionally ascribed to the legacy of the romantic age 
and is in particular defined as the conception of the author as a genius who retains 
ownership of the intellectual endeavour on which imparts his personality.164  
 The idea of a isolated genius, who creates solely by way of personal 
inspiration, has been challenged in the past few years, until the point that – as 
previously mentioned – postmodernist critique held it to be socially constructed and 
such as to disregard actual creative practices. It was Michel Foucault, in his seminal 
essay What is an author?165, who effectively suggested such a perspective on the 
rhetoric of authorship. The French philosopher held the view that, albeit the author is 
presented as a genius, as a perpetual surging of innovation, in reality this view of 
authorship is biased by an ideology that has no correspondence to actual creative 
practices. As pointed out by Mark Rose:  
 
Copyright is founded on the concept of the unique individual who creates 
something original and is entitled to reap a profit from those labours. Until 
recently, the dominant modes of aesthetic thinking have shared the romantic 
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and individualistic assumptions inscribed in copyright. But these assumptions 
obscure important truths about the processes of cultural production.166 
 
 From this arises the need to engage with the realities of contemporary, 
polyvocal ways of intellectual production, which are increasingly collective, corporate 
and collaborative, as suggested, inter alia, by Peter Jaszi.167  
 The inaptness of romantic authorship at grasping the complexity of actual 
modes of creation is also emphasised by those scholars who analyse originality in 
the context of psychological theories of copyright. For instance, Prof Jeanne Fromer  
observes that this is the case when creation is collaborative, as it is the case of film 
production, computer software development, or jazz music performance. However, 
she also points out that individuals making up the collaboration still go through at 
least some of the four stages of creativity (these being preparation, incubation, 
illumination, and verification), and as a collective they go through all four.168 More 
radical is the position of Prof Gregory Mandel, who stresses the inaccuracy of the 
common cultural stereotype of artistic creativity. This is because 
 
Artistic creation often involves logical cognition and externally focused 
objectives. This is particularly true if we focus on joint endeavors … As with 
inventors, artists’ own descriptions of their creative processes demonstrate the 
inaccuracies of the common stereotype. Edgar Allan Poe described authoring 
The Raven, one of the most famous poems of all time, as follows: “It was my 
design to render it manifest that no one point in its composition is referable 
either to accident or intuition — that the work proceeded, step by step, to its 
completion with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical 
problem.” Poe goes on to describe how logic dictated his every decision in The 
Raven, from the optimal number of words to the individual words and imagery 
used. While it seems hard to believe that Poe was not exaggerating at least a 
little, it is also evident that logic and reason play a significant role in artistic 
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creativity … Artistic creativity, like technological creativity, depends 
significantly on more holistic, relational creativity as well logical cognition.169  
 
 Although romantic conceptions of authorship (and hence, originality) fail to 
grasp the complexity of the mechanisms pertaining to creativity, this does not mean 
that the very idea of authorship must be rejected tout court. Instead, what is required 
is a new conceptualisation of its meaning and a more sophisticated elaboration of the 
modes of joint authorship. Without authorship, copyright would have to be recast in 
materialist terms. Authorship and creativity would be tantamount to mere investments 
of labour power, with the consequence that the contributor would be entitled not to 
proprietorship but simply to remuneration.170 This would result in copyright being 
given a legal shape that departs from the very idea of property over the results of the 
creative process.171   
 In any case, even by maintaining the concept of authorship, a rethinking of 
what is meant by this would result in a new conceptualisation of copyright. This is 
because “[a] claim that copyright laws sanctify romantic authorship does not require 
an argument that authors retain perpetual right in their creations, or that copyright 
laws protect total ownership.”172 
 The quest for remuneration plays a necessary role in encouraging human 
cultural productions, but non-market rewards, such as recognition, professional 
advancement, credibility, generosity or even simple pleasure, also drive creativity 
and incentivise cultural production.173 Hence, authorship is not just about exclusive 
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rights. It also plays a fundamental role in terms of recognition and, as such, in 
determining the scope of the moral rights authors enjoy in their works.174 Therefore, 
even considering the pitfalls in the romantic theory of authorship, it would be difficult 
to imagine a legal landscape without authorship and, as a consequence, without 
copyright.  
 Any meaning given to authorship is to be read in conjunction with that of 
originality, although authorship as such is not based on originality, but rather entails 
the notions of ‘individuality’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘unique work’.175 This said, the more 
authorship is conceived in romantic terms, the higher the threshold to originality and, 
therefore, to copyright protection will be.  
 
 
II. Difficulties in defining originality 
 
Attempts to analyse originality in a theoretical fashion have been inevitably beset by 
difficulties. These are due to the vagueness of the very concept of originality, as well 
as to uncertainties regarding its scope. As has been incisively pointed out: 
 
The trouble is that a theory of originality seems sometimes to amount to a 
theory of almost everything and sometimes to almost nothing. Worse, we often 
seem to oscillate between two platitudes: that the only constant is change and 
there is nothing new under the sun.176  
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 In addition, the very meaning of originality inevitably differs between works of 
imagination and those of industrious collection. Yet, the legal test to be applied in 
order to determine whether a work is protected by copyright ought to be the same for 
both. Such (voluntary) incapability of copyright, justified by policy reasons177, to 
distinguish what is truly original from what is just industrious has inevitably led 
copyright-protected subject-matter to grow, sometimes even outwith all rational 
justifications. This may be considered as a ‘vice’ of copyright, as Prof Benjamin 
Kaplan suggested, in that “[i]t is a question of sinning against flexibility by 
unwillingness to look closely at the works or to admit considerations of policy beyond 
the immediately obvious.”178 However, as copyright protection is, broadly speaking, 
granted to ‘works’ (often these also have to meet the requirement of being ‘fixed in a 
tangible form’) which are ‘original’, it is apparent that the understanding of the 
originality requirement has the power to shape the breadth of any given copyright 
regime and, along with it, the scope of protection afforded to protected subject-
matter. 
 In any case, as suggested by Richard Posner, any given notion of the 
originality requirement has implications as to the actual relevance of copyright to 
authors. This is because “the less originality is valued, the less valuable to authors 
and readers is copyright protection, which encourages originality.”179 
 While disregarding the philosophical foundations of this concept180, in legal 
terms originality is nowadays understood as falling within four families of standards. 
These, ranging from the most restrictive to the most generous, are the continental 
Europe’s and now the EU’s ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ standard, the US 
standard of a ‘minimal degree of creativity’ pursuant to the decision of the US 
Supreme Court in Feist181, Canada’s CCH182 standard of ‘non-mechanical and non-
trivial exercise of skill and judgment’ and the UK’s ‘skill and labour’ standard.183 
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 Given the scope of the present contribution, in the following paragraphs 
attention will be first dedicated to the legislative evolution (or lack thereof) of 
originality within EU copyright reforms, including the approach adopted in the 
relevant directives. Then, originality will be considered under the lenses of the EU 
continental Member States’ and the UK copyright traditions, respectively.  
 
 
III. Originality in EU reform policy: the invisible man 
 
The 2004 Commission Staff Working Paper on the Review of the EC Legal 
Framework in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights184 was aimed at evaluating 
the coherence of the acquis communautaire in the field of copyright, in light of the set 
of directives which had harmonised some aspects of copyright at the EU level until 
that point.185  
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 The Directives subject to revision in the Working Paper were the following: Council Directive 
91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programmes; Council Directive 
92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to 
copyright in the field of intellectual property; Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 
harmonising the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights; Directive 96/9/EC of the 




 The objective of the review was twofold: firstly, to improve the operation of the 
acquis communautaire and its coherence; secondly, to safeguard the proper 
functioning of the internal market.186 The Working Paper analysed the provisions of 
the early acquis and compared them with the standard set by the InfoSoc Directive. 
 The conclusions of the Working Paper were such as to advocate a minor 
revision of the definition of the reproduction right and an extended application of the 
exception for certain temporary acts of reproduction, under Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive, to computer programmes and databases.187 The Working Paper included 
also a final section188 dedicated to the assessment of issues outside the current 
acquis, such as originality, ownership, the definition of the term ‘public’, points of 
attachment, moral rights and the exhaustion of rights.  
 In particular, as far as originality and moral rights were concerned, the 
Working Paper, while acknowledging the different meanings and scope assigned to 
them by the various Member States’ legislations, assessed such disparities in light of 
the functioning of the internal market. In particular, it recalled that EU legislation 
expressly dealt with the issue of originality whenever it was necessary to take 
account of the special features or the special technical nature of the categories of 
work in question.189 So far, the originality requirement has in fact been referred to 
only in the following: Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer 
programmes (codified version, the ‘Software Directive’); Directive 2006/116/EC on 
the term protection of copyright and certain related rights (codified version, the ‘Term 
Directive’) with regard to photographs; and Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection 
of databases (the ‘Database Directive’).  
 Article 1(3) of the Software Directive provides that “[a] computer program shall 
be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the author's own intellectual creation. 
No other criteria shall be applied to determine its eligibility for protection.” Similarly, 
Article 6 of the Term Directive states that “[p]hotographs which are original in the 
sense that they are the author's own intellectual creation shall be protected in 
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accordance with Article 1.190 No other criteria shall be applied to determine their 
eligibility for protection. Member States may provide for the protection of other 
photographs.” Article 3(1) of the Database Directive provides that “[i]n accordance 
with this Directive, databases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of 
their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation shall be protected as 
such by copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for 
that protection.” 
 From the foregoing, it is apparent that, when harmonised, the originality 
requirement was intended as ‘the author’s own intellectual creation’. This means (as 
will be also explained further below) that the harmonisation of the originality 
requirement for certain categories of works followed the continental model. In 
jurisdictions that conformed their own copyright systems to the French droit d’auteur 
tradition, originality is indeed meant as la marque d'un apport intellectual.191 This 
does not imply that a work, in order to be original, has to show a certain degree of 
novelty, but that the personality of the author has to be visible in the creative result. 
 The Working Paper highlighted that the understanding of originality is indeed 
not unique across the EU, as the legal systems of the various Member States 
interpret its meaning in different ways. As recalled by Prof Silke von Lewinski, the 
differences between Anglo-Saxon and droit d’auteur systems have proved to be a 
major source of problems when discussing and then adopting internationally-binding 
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agreements, or even when pursuing regional harmonisation.192 However, the 
conclusion of the Working Paper was that neither divergent originality requirements, 
nor the different scope of moral rights across Member States, might significantly 
impair the proper functioning of the internal market. Thus, an EU intervention in this 
sense was deemed to be un-necessary at that stage. In particular, there seemed to 
be no evidence that diverging requirements for the level of originality by Member 
States had the potential to create barriers to intra-Community trade. Only divergent 
economic rights might have impaired the proper functioning of the internal market.  
 It is submitted that to adopt this attitude is to neglect the fact that economic 
rights descend, in the first place, from the entitlement to copyright protection. One of 
the basic requirements is that a work must be original to be protected under 
copyright. Therefore, a discussion on copyright limited to the mere harmonisation of 
economic rights (as has happened until very recently) is of reduced relevance, as 
any reform of the details should properly result from a comprehensive knowledge and 
careful analysis of the overall picture. It is regrettably parochial to proceed with a 
reform agenda under the assumption that disparities in the scope of copyright 
protection would harm the efficient functioning of internal market only and expressly 
when such disparities relate to economic rights. 
 
 
IV. The ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ standard in the 
Software, Database and Term Directives 
 
Despite similar wordings, the author’s own intellectual creation standard has been 
said not to have the same meaning within the Software, Database and Term 
Directives. This is because harmonisation of the originality requirement in relation to, 
respectively, computer programs, databases, and photographs was supported by 
different rationales.193 
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As far as computer programs were concerned, the Software Directive was 
aimed at reconciling the stricter continental originality requirement with the more 
generous ‘skill and labour’ standard of UK copyright.194  
Recital 8 in the preamble to the directive made it clear that “in determining 
whether or not a computer program is an original work, no tests as to the qualitative 
or aesthetic merits of the program should be applied.” As recalled by Trevor Cook195, 
the inclusion of this recital was meant to address the consequences of the 1985 
decision of the German Federal Supreme Court in Inkassoprogram196, in which it was 
held that under German law a computer program could be protected by copyright 
only if it displayed a degree of creativity which surpassed the general average of 
ability present in works of that kind.  
In its report on the implementation and effects of the Software Directive, the 
Commission highlighted its striking feature, this being that for the first time the level 
of originality had been harmonised at the Community level for a specific copyright 
subject-matter. As a consequence of this, droit d’auteur countries (in particular 
Germany) were required to lower the protection threshold, whereas the UK and 
Ireland had to ‘lift the bar’.197 Apparently, the Commission did not find any particular 
problems with the practical application of the harmonised originality requirement in 
individual Member States. When implementing the Software Directive, the UK, which 
was one of the Member States most likely to be affected by the adoption of the 
author’s own intellectual creation standard, did not deem it necessary to state 
explicitly what the originality requirement ought to be intended in relation to computer 
programs, on consideration that originality under UK copyright was already 
consistent with the standard adopted in the directive. Although some commentators 
also shared this view198, it is unlikely that ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ was akin 
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to the characaterisation of originality as ‘sufficient skill labour and effort’.199 This has 
now been confirmed by CJEU case law, in particular by the Opinion of AG Mengozzi 
in Football Dataco.200   
As far as the UK is concerned, it should be also noted that the standard 
envisaged in the directive requires that human intellectual effort is exercised in the 
production of a computer program, if that program is to be protected by copyright. 
This implies that computer programs produced without human input may not qualify 
for copyright protection under EU law, although computer-generated works are 
expressly protected under UK law.201  
A somewhat clearer explanation as to why the originality requirement was 
harmonised at the EU level was provided with regard to databases.202 In the report 
containing a first evaluation of the Database Directive203, DG Internal Market and 
Services explained that, prior to the adoption of the Directive, national laws differed 
with respect to the level of originality which was used to determine whether a 
database was protectable under copyright law (in some Member States there were 
also other forms of protection, like the so called catalogue-rule in Scandinavian 
countries).204 In particular, the threshold in common law jurisdictions was lower than 
that prevailing in droit d’auteur Member States. The best known examples of 
compilations of data or information which were granted copyright protection under the 
common law standard (which is defined in the report as ‘sweat of the brow’) were the 
television programme listings which were the subject of the action in Magill.205 The 
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Commission found that differences in legal protection between common law and droit 
d’auteur Member States had negative effects on the free movement of database 
products, the provision of information services and the freedom of establishment 
within the Community.206 Hence, it was necessary to establish a uniform threshold of 
originality for original databases, and the author’s own intellectual creation standard 
was chosen as the harmonised notion of originality. In fact, the Commission 
reasoned that copyright should vest just in databases which were original in the 
continental sense. The introduction of the sui generis right in parallel to the 
introduction of the harmonised originality standard was aimed at compensating for 
the loss of the ‘sweat of the brow’ protection, and was as  such a new form of 
intellectual property over non-original databases.207 
Also in this case, the author’s own intellectual creation standard was probably 
meant as a compromise between continental (in particular German) and UK 
originality requirements.208 It was however in the UK that the harmonised meaning of 
originality for databases had the most dramatic impact, which resulted in the 
abandonment of authorities such as Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) 
Ltd209, as will be said also below sub Section II, §II.2. 
With regard to photographs, although Article 6 of the Term Directive provides 
that copyright vests only in those which are their author’s own intellectual creation, 
Recital 16 in the preamble to the directive clarifies that a photographic work is to be 
considered original if it is the author's own intellectual creation reflecting his 
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personality. It has been argued that this wording seems to imply a stricter test than 
that laid down for software and databases.210 This conclusion would be required to 
comply with the stated intention of the framers of this provision, which was to clarify 
that the normal term of protection does not apply to simple (sub-original) photographs 
which may nonetheless qualify for quasi-copyright or neighbouring right protection, in 
compliance with Member States’ laws.211  
 
 
V. Understanding originality: the continental approach  
 
Whilst common law copyright systems have been traditionally ascribed to incentive-
based views of copyright (although in its early days copyright was intended just to 
protect the rightsholder against unauthorised use or reproduction of his material)212, 
civil law traditions have adopted different approaches to copyright, which descend 
from rights-based views of it. The latter may be traced back to the philosophies of 
Kant213, Fichte214 and Hegel.215  
 As explained by Andreas Rahmatian: 
 
While the Common law copyright systems focus on the work and its potential 
economic value, the author’s rights systems concentrate on the author and 
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protect his work because it bears traces of the author’s personality. It is not the 
work that protects (indirectly) the author/maker and his economic interests, but 
the author’s protection as a person which extends to works emanating from 
that person.216  
 
 Although the differences between copyright and droit d’auteur regimes have 
been scaled down on account of both historical evidence217 and critical assessments 
of relevant legislative developments218, there remain aspects which are reminiscent 
of diverging theoretical approaches. One of them concerns the characterisation of the 
originality requirement.    
 The contemporary continental understanding refers to the personal, individual 
input of the author. In other words, the work has to be an œvre de l’esprit (‘work of 
the mind’)219 – not just the result of skill and labour – to enjoy copyright protection. 
This definition is to be found in the French intellectual property code.220 As a 
consequence of this approach, and contrary to what is the law in the US221, French 
courts have found that copyright subsisted even in very short phrases or titles, such 
as “Les hauts de Hurlevent”222, “Clochemerle”223, “Vol de nuit”224, and Les liaisons 
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dangereous225, whilst protection has been denied, inter alia, to Guele d’amour226, 
Éducation anglaise227, Le Meuf Show228, and Vogue.229 As noted by Lucas and 
Lucas, in instances pertaining to copyright protection of titles, in assessing their 
originality or lack thereof, courts have often employed a language similar to that of 
trademark law.230 This highlights, on the one hand, the difficulties relating to a proper 
and independent understanding of the notion of originality in copyright law and, on 
the other hand, that its appreciation has often relied either on the concept of novelty 
in patent law (as it was, among the other things, in Feist231) or distinctive character in 
trademark law. In France, whilst references to novelty have been made to highlight 
the differences between this and the criterion of originality, trademark law has been 
used to mark the continuity between the notion of originality in copyright and that of 
distinctive character. In other countries, however, a ‘comparative’ approach has been 
sometimes adopted by courts.232 As explained by Sterling, this is said not to be 
dissimilar to “the novelty test in patent law, and looks the question whether the work 
in suit may be regarded as unique.”233   
 Coming to legislative definitions of originality, French law does not contain a 
general reference to the originality requirement, nor do other civil law countries.234 
For instance, the Italian copyright act provides for copyright to vest in opere 
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dell'ingegno di carattere creativo (‘intellectual creations having creative character’)235, 
while German law grants protection to persӧnliche geistige Schӧpfungen (‘personal 
intellectual creation’)236, which is very similar to the relevant provision under 
Portuguese copyright law: criações intelectuais do domínio literário, científico e 
artistico (‘intellectual creations in the literary, scientific or artistic areas’).237  
 Laconic formulas used in continental Member States’ copyright laws, or the 
lack of a specific definition of originality tout court, have led some commentators to 
conclude that courts in Member States cannot give substance to the EU criterion in 
interpreting originality.238 Others239 have suggested that the continental 
understanding of originality is akin to the standard envisaged by the US Supreme 
Court in Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co240, which will be explained 
below sub Section II, §I.  
 Despite these criticisms, one can agree with Lucas and Lucas, who highlight 
how:  
 
Faute de pouvoir scruter les intentions d’un législateur qui semble avoir évité 
soigneusement le débat, on peut tenter de cerner la notion d’œuvre de l’esprit 
en opposant schématiquement deux démarches. Dans une approche 
objective, on dira que le cheminement importe peu et que seul compte le 
résultat. Dans une approche subjective, on mettra l’accent sur le lien entre 
l’œuvre et le créateur … 
Le deux démarches doivent … être combinées. Une œuvre de l’esprit, c’est 
une création intellectuelle …, se concrétisant dans une forme perceptible aux 
sens …241 
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 Understanding the continental meaning of originality as being tantamount to 
‘the author’s own intellectual creation’ (which is to be found expressly under German 
law in respect of computer programs)242 may be considered as a correct assumption, 
although different formulations of originality have been adopted by courts and 
scholars throughout civil law jurisdictions. Sometimes, originality has been defined as 
la marque d'un apport intellectual (‘the mark of an intellectual contribution’)243. Other 
times it has been found to subsist when the work reflected la personalità dell’autore 
(‘the personality of the author’)244; elsewhere, where it was the result of an atto 
creativo (‘creative act’) which had been given an external existence.245 
 
 
VI. Understanding originality: the UK approach 
 
A different concept of originality can be discerned in UK copyright law, which has 
traditionally taken to intend it as synonymous with ‘originating’ from the author.  
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 After the introduction of the prerequisite of originality in statutory copyright law 
in 1911, the authority cited to define its meaning has been consistently University of 
London Press, Ltd  v University Tutorial Press, Ltd246, in which Peterson J held that: 
 
The word ‘original’ does not in this connection mean that the work must be the 
expression of original or inventive thought. Copyright Acts are not concerned 
with the originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought … The 
originality which is required relates to the expression of the thought. But the 
Act does not require that the expression must be in an original or novel form, 
but that the work must not be copied from another work – that it should 
originate from the author.247 
 
 Such a concept of originality has been little challenged since 1911.248 As 
pointed out by Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin, there are two explanations why such a 
requirement to copyright protection has been read in a limited sense. First of all, a 
loose understanding of originality reduces the element of subjective judgment in 
deciding what qualifies for protection to a minimum. Secondly, it allows protection for 
any investment of labour and capital which in some way produces a literary result.249 
 The 1988 Copyright Designs and Patents Act (‘CDPA 1988’) contains a 
laconic reference to the originality requirement. Section 1(1) defines ‘copyright’ as a 
property right which subsists in the following descriptions of work – (a) original 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, (b) sound recordings, films or broadcasts, 
and (c) the typographical arrangement of published editions.  
 Still today, one of the most respected commentaries on copyright in the UK, 
points out that: 
 
A literary, dramatic or musical work is not protected by the law of copyright 
unless it is original. In the case of a literary work (other than a database), a 
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dramatic work or a musical work this means that its author did not merely copy 
it slavishly from elsewhere, but produced it independently by the expenditure 
of a sufficiently substantial amount of his own skill, knowledge, mental labour, 
taste or judgement. However, the amount of skill, labour etc which is required 
to establish a copyright is not large, and essentially it suffices if it is not 
insubstantial. It is not necessary that the work should be the expression of 
inventive thought, because a substantial amount of purely routine mental 
labour may equally well satisfy the statutory requirement; conversely, 
however, skill, knowledge etc may make up for a paucity of mental labour.250 
 
 Because of the loose significance of originality under UK copyright law, a few 
actions have failed in UK courts on the ground that a work was not sufficiently 
original to be protected by copyright. Although originality is relevant to the topic of 
infringement (where there has been incomplete or inexact imitation)251, scrutiny as to 
whether there has been infringement is usually carried out under the lens of 
‘substantiality’, rather than ‘originality’. This is because, to establish infringement, the 
CDPA 1988 requires that a substantial part of the plaintiff’s work has been copied by 
the defendant.252 However, as famously pointed out by Lord Reid in William Hill253, 
“the question whether the defendant has copied a substantial part depends much 
more on the quality than the quantity of what he has taken.”254 Such approach to 
copyright infringement can now be considered as established law. Also recently, 
Kitchin J confirmed that: 
 
In assessing the crucial question as to whether a substantial part has been 
taken, the court must have regard to all the facts of the case including the 
nature and extent of the copying; the quality and importance of what has been 
taken; the degree of originality of what has been taken or whether it is 
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commonplace; and whether a substantial part of the skill and labour 
contributed by the author in creating the original has been appropriated.255 
 
 In relation to the requirement of ‘substantial part of the skill and labour’, the 
precise amount is difficult to define.256 In any case, it is evident that this is a question 
of degree, to be determined on the facts of each case: 
 
What is the precise amount of the knowledge, labour, judgment or literary skill 
or taste which the author of any book or other compilation must bestow upon 
its composition in order to acquire copyright in it … cannot be defined in 
precise terms. In every ease it must depend largely on the special facts of that 
case, and must in each case be very much a question of degree. 257 
 
 Indeed, save where the circumstances make it obvious that the work must 
have been original (or the defendant acknowledges this), originality must be proven 
in a copyright action. However, the CDPA 1988 includes a statutory presumption in 
Section 104(5)(a) that, if the author of the works is dead or his identity cannot be 
ascertained by reasonable inquiry, it shall be presumed that, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, his work is original. However, such presumption does not 
go further than saying that the work as a whole is original. No degree of originality is 
presumed nor is any particular part in isolation presumed to be original.258 
 The meaning of originality in UK copyright has been deemed to be something 
akin to the ‘sweat of the brow’ approach, famously rejected in the US by the decision 
of the Supreme Court in Feist.259 As recalled above, originality under UK law is 
synonymous with a work originating from the author. As will be seen below sub 
Section II, §II, such a conceptualisation is problematic. As explained by Lior Zemer: 
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If I write a poem and did not copy it from another source, then the work does 
not only represent a thing that has been originated in me, but also, due to 
differences between people, it contains a modicum of originality in the sense 
of creating a different substance.260 
 
 In any case, it may be said that the loose understanding of originality in UK 
copyright aims at granting protection to the creative labour (even if minimal) of 
authors. As such, it can be said that overall, labour – rather than creativity – is at the 
basis of copyright protection in UK copyright. 
 Despite the traditional understanding of UK originality, this concept has 
undergone an evolution, which serves the purpose of highlighting the policy role of 
this concept. In other words, it may be wrong to assume that UK originality is just 
sweat of the brow. In any case, although there may be a certain rapprochement 
between UK and droit d’auteur countries in terms of practical outcome, the 
conceptual approaches to originality remain different.261 
  Before turning to the analysis of the evolution of originality in UK copyright, 
the parallel experience of US copyright will be described, as recent studies have 
shown that its evolution has not been as linear as has traditionally been understood.
  In the following pages the policy role of originality will be examined. A study 
will be undertaken as to the evolution of its concept in the US, whose rich case law 
serves the purpose of showing its impact in shaping copyright regimes, and in the 
UK, even prior to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening.262 In particular, the UK 
experience is meant to show that the concept of originality has changed over the 
years and, even before the de facto harmonisation carried out by the CJEU and 
despite received wisdom, the UK bar to originality had been occasionally raised so to 
get closer to the continental standard.  
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I. Following the originality brick road in the US 
 
 
1. The ‘originality’ of Feist 
 
The US Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Feist was deemed to represent a 
shift in US copyright, as it was ruled that copyright protection was not granted to 
works of information which fail to manifest a modicum of creative input in selection or 
arrangement. The Court ruled that copyright does not secure the sweat of the brow 
or the investment of resources in a work of information. In other words, mere industry 
and effort are not sufficient to establish originality.  
 Rural Telephone Service Company was a certified public utility providing 
telephone services to several communities in Kansas. Pursuant to state regulation, 
Rural had published a telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow 
pages. It had obtained data for the directory from subscribers, who had had to 
provide their names and addresses to obtain telephone service.  
 Feist Publications was a publishing company that specialised in area-wide 
telephone directories covering a much larger geographic range than directories such 
as Rural's. When Rural refused to licence its white pages listings to Feist for a 
directory covering eleven different telephone service areas, Feist extracted the 
listings it needed from Rural's directory without Rural's consent.  
 Both the District Court for the District of Kansas and the Court of Appeals for 
the 10th Circuit ruled in favour of Rural, holding that telephone directories were 
subject to copyright protection.  
 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and held 




decision on the text of both Section 102(a)263 of the 1976 Copyright Act, and Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution (the so-called, inter alia, ‘Copyright 
Clause’).264 
 In particular, Justice O’Connor (who delivered the Opinion of the Court) found 
that, as the Copyright Clause mandates originality as a prerequisite for copyright 
protection265, this is to be meant as independent creation plus a modicum of 
creativity. Indeed: 
 
The originality requirement is not particularly stringent. A compiler may settle 
upon a selection or arrangement that others have used; novelty is not 
required. Originality requires only that the author make the selection or 
arrangement independently (i.e., without copying that selection or 
arrangement from another work), and that it display some minimal level of 
creativity. Presumably, the vast majority of compilations will pass this test, but 
not all will. There remains a narrow category of works in which the creative 
spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent … Such works 
are incapable of sustaining a valid copyright.266 
 
 Facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. Therefore, they are not 
original and cannot enjoy copyright protection. Nonetheless, a compilation of facts 
may possess the requisite originality because the author typically chooses which 
facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the data so that 
readers may use them effectively. However, copyright protection extends only to 
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those components of the work that are original to the author, not to the facts 
themselves.  
 The 1976 Copyright Act provides for copyright to subsist in compilations, these 
being intended as works “formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the 
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”267 Therefore, as 
Justice O’Connor found, some ways of selecting, coordinating, and arranging data 
which are not sufficiently original cannot trigger copyright protection.  
 The ‘sweat of the brow’ or ‘industrious collection’ test (adopted by lower 
courts) had extended a compilation's copyright protection beyond selection and 
arrangement to the facts themselves. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the 
lower courts had misconstrued the copyright statute and eschewed the fundamental 
axiom of copyright law that no one may claim copyright in facts or ideas.  
 
 
2. Did Feist raise the bar of protection? 
 
The US Supreme Court held that originality is not something akin to novelty. The 
Congress had previously clarified this when it had expressly stated that the “standard 
[for originality] does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity or esthetic merit, 
and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require 
them”.268 Furthermore, prior to the adoption of the current Copyright Act, the Register 
of Copyrights had taken the opportunity to point out that, in order to be protected, a 
work “must represent an appreciable amount of creative authorship”.269 At the end of 
the day, however, it was deemed preferable not to expand the meaning of originality, 
as there would have been the danger of interpreting it as implying further 
requirements of aesthetic value or novelty. 
 The importance of Feist has been reassessed under various angles. Among 
other things, Miriam Bitton has recently argued that the Supreme Court did not offer 
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any actual guidance to lower courts on the question of creativity of compilations. 270 
This is because the Supreme Court articulated the originality standard by choosing 
the weakest possible case, that of a white-page directory, organised in alphabetical 
order and, indeed, lacking minimal creativity. Feist did not really involve ‘sweat of the 
brow’ or human effort as was historically understood, nor did it exemplify the classical 
free riding scenario. Therefore, its relevance is scaled down due to its fact-specific 
background. Indeed, this finding may be confirmed if one considers that, also on 
account of lack of congressional clarification regarding originality following Feist, ad 
hoc originality standards have been subsequently embraced by US courts in relation 
to various copyright-protected subject-matter.271 
 In addition, the judgment in Feist is said not to have raised the standard for 
copyright protection, since it did not invalidate protection of databases and 
compilations tout court. This interpretation has received judicial confirmation in Key 
Publications, Inc v Chinatown Today Publishing Enters272, in which the Court of 
Appeal for the 2nd Circuit acknowledged that after Feist the scope of copyright 
protection was “thin”, but not “anorexic”.273 Thus, in assessing infringement cases, 
“[t]he key issue is not whether there is overlap or copying but whether the organizing 
principles guiding the selection of businesses for the two publications is in fact 
substantially similar”.274 By clarifying the meaning of originality as not involving any 
requisite novelty or aesthetic merit, the Supreme Court did not threaten to deny 
copyright protection to any work intended as a creative effort by its author.275 In fact, 
as far as databases and compilations are concerned, copyright protection is 
prevented only where the creativity in selection, coordination and arrangement of 
facts is so minimal so as to be non-existent. Thus, it has been said that copyright 
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protection is dictated by the features of the work at stake276 and, therefore, so long as 
the creative effort is more than minimal, copyright protection should be accorded.  
 
 
3. The unveiled story of originality 
 
It has been argued that the decision in Feist should be interpreted in light of earlier 
cases in which the issue of originality had been addressed, and the fact that for most 
of the nineteenth century the notion that copyright embraced an originality 
requirement was fairly unknown to Anglo-American courts. As far as information 
works (such as maps, charts, road-books, directories and calendars) are concerned, 
courts found infringement on the basis of the copying of their actual content and on 
account of the efforts expended in their creation.277   
 In this respect, Feist may be said not to have represented a strong innovation 
in the US concept of originality. However, judgments such as those in Emerson v 
Davies278 and Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographic Co279 were not the only precedents 
as far as originality is concerned. As clarified by Prof Diane Leenher Zimmerman:  
 
The addition in Feist of the creativity requirement seems to make sense only if 
seen as an acknowledgment by the Court that Bleistein and its progeny simply 
express an inadequate understanding of the constitutional requirements for 
copyright and of the modern Court’s understanding of its purposes.280  
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 Seen in this light, the decision in Feist was not aimed at creating a new 
standard for copyright protection. Instead, it simply restated the approach that had 
been followed by the US Supreme Court in decisions such as the Trademark 
Cases281 and Sarony.282  
 The notion of originality in US copyright has thus been subject to different 
evolutions, and has been given different meanings throughout copyright history. 
Indeed, it can be said that the evolution of US copyright is twofold. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, two different approaches co-existed.283  
 
 
4. Originality as creativity 
 
On the one hand, there were cases that supported the originality doctrine, by 
requiring something akin to novelty or merit. For instance, in Clayton v Stone284, in 
which a price catalogue was refused copyright protection, the need for substantive 
merit was held necessary in order to successfully claim protection. This was because 
the Copyright Clause in the Constitution was not intended to protect mere industry, 
unconnected with learning and science. Analogously, in Jolly v Jacques285, which 
involved copyright protection of a composition adapted from a pre-existing tune, 
Justice Nelson held that “[t]he musical composition contemplated by the statute must, 
doubtless be substantially new and original work; and not a copy of a piece already 
produced, with additions and variations, which a writer of music with experience and 
skill might readily make”.286 Therefore, the judge found that no copyright subsisted in 
the musical composition that was adapted from an earlier work. 
 In 1879, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of originality and held that 
Congress did not have the power to regulate trademarks on the grounds of the 
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Constitution’s Copyright Clause.287 The Court held that copyright protection could be 
granted only to works which were “original, and … founded in the creative powers of 
the mind”.288  
 
 
5. Originality as the market-value of a work 
 
As distinct from this first string of cases, there is a line of jurisprudence that shares a 
negative attitude towards the romantic concept of authorship. While rejecting any 
criterion of aesthetic merit, this attitude rooted copyright protection within the market 
value of the work. Accordingly, this should be the sole parameter worth considering 
and includes the time and cost expenditures in producing it.  
 In Emerson v Davies289, a case concerning the infringement of copyright in an 
arithmetic book, Justice Story held that for a work to be original it is sufficient that it 
has not been copied and had been created by relying on one’s own skill, labour and 
financial resources. Indeed, the judge intended the creative process as cumulative, 
the result of continuous borrowing from existing works: 
 
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, 
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. 
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily 
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before. No man 
creates a new language for himself, at least if he be a wise man, in writing a 
book. … The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what 
other men have thought and expressed, although they may be modified, 
exalted or improved by his own genius or reflection. If no book could be the 
subject of copy-right which was not new and original in the elements of which 
it is composed, there could be no ground for any copy-right in modern times, 
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and we should be obliged to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to find a work 
entitled to such eminence.290 
 
 The same minimalist originality standard was adopted by Justice Holmes in 
Bleistein v Donaldson291, a case concerning whether copyright vested in a poster 
advertisement for a circus. Here it was held that if a work is not copied, then it is 
original and deserving of protection. Despite the presence of a dissenting opinion 
arguing that being unable to discover anything useful or meritorious prevents 
granting any protection292, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bleistein showed a 
reductive approach to copyright, in that it was held that copyright subsisted in such a 
work. This was found to be because: 
 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside 
of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of 
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make 
them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their 
author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings 
of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when 
seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures 
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command 
the interest of any public, they have a commercial value,-it would be bold to 
say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value,-and the taste of 
any public is not to be treated with contempt.293 
 
 As pointed out294, the Bleistein decision brought about two sets of 
consequences. Firstly, it eliminated from copyright discourse any reference to the 
promotion of science, as was dictated in the Constitution’s Copyright Clause. 
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Secondly, Bleistein represented the end of any attempt to make originality a 
meaningful threshold requirement to copyright protection.295  
 The issue at stake in Sarony296 was whether copyright could vest in 
photographs.297 Justice Miller, writing on behalf of the Supreme Court, held that the 
Copyright Clause was broad enough to cover an act authorising copyright in 
photographs, in so far as they are the result of “original intellectual conceptions of the 
author”.298 The court located authorship not in the act of capturing the image or in the 
post-photographic manipulation of the photograph, but in its preparatory stages. 
What is important about this decision is that the Court wanted to reach the policy 
objective of granting copyright protection to photographs and, by locating the creative 
moment in pre-shutter activities, it held that photographs could be protected by 
copyright.299  
 When rewriting the Copyright Act in 1909, Congress extended protection to all 
writings by an author.300 Hence, there was less room left for assessing whether a 
work over which copyright protection was sought actually favoured the progress of 
science and useful arts.  
 In light of the foregoing, as well as on a broader scale, from Feist and its 
preceding history three mains threads emerge. 
 Firstly, the meaning of originality has changed over time, as well has having 
had concurrent meanings at any given time.  
 Secondly, any meaning given to originality reflects the one assigned to other 
basic principles, such as authorship. The more this concept is akin to the romantic 
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concept of genius and creativity, the more originality becomes an effective threshold 
to protection.  
 Thirdly, as the decisions in Sarony, Bleistein and Feist in particular show, the 
actual scope of originality can be used as a tool to either grant or deny copyright 
protection. In other words, by relying on originality, courts have achieved and 
continue to achieve policy objectives, thus showing the instrumental role of originality 
in defining the categories of works which can be protected by copyright. 
 
 
II. Originality in UK copyright: a tale of two cities 
 
Any IP textbook301 clarifies that that the originality standard in the UK has traditionally 
been akin to that set forth in the leading case, University of London Press.302  
According to this case, a work is original if it has not been copied from another work 
and shows a certain (modicum) amount of skill, labour and judgment.  
 This said, as highlighted by Lord Atkinson, originality depends largely on the 
facts of the case and must in each instance be very much a question of degree.303 
Such an approach has also been followed more recently in Express Newspaper Plc v 
News (UK) Ltd304, in which V-C Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson decided to follow the 
old case of Walter v Lane.305  There it was held that the originality requirement is met 
whenever a sufficient degree of (above minimal) skill, labour or judgment are to be 
found.  
 As already mentioned306, the limited level of original achievement required in 
order to enjoy copyright protection may be explained in two ways. Firstly it reduces to 
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a minimum the element of subjective judgment in deciding what qualifies for 
protection. Secondly, it allows protection for any investment of labour and capital that 
in some ways produces a literary result. The latter has to be read in conjunction with 
the fact that the UK lacks a law of unfair competition. As such, intellectual property 
rights are used to accomplish this further task, where no other forms of relief are 
available.307 
 As a preliminary remark, it  should be recalled that the concept of originality is 
approached differently depending on the type of work at stake: the treatment 
depends on whether the work is new or derivative, a table, compilation or a  
computer-generated work.308 In particular, as far as the latter two are concerned, the 
standard of originality is that descending from the process of EU harmonisation. In 
order to be deemed original, these works have to be the result of the ‘author’s own 
intellectual creation’. In light of the influence of EU law on UK copyright law, one may 
wonder whether the presence of two different originality standards in UK copyright 
undermines the overall coherence of the system, and, if so, which of the two 
approaches should prevail. However, before moving to this question, it is worth 
addressing a different issue: whether the understanding of originality in UK copyright 
has always been akin to that envisaged in the University of London Press case, in 
which it was held that copyright subsisted in the papers of the matriculation 
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1. Originality over time: hard times 
 
A preliminary point to be stressed is that, despite received wisdom, there is not a 
single UK concept of originality. As highlighted by Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in 
Interlego v Tyco Industries309: 
 
Originality in the context of literary copyright has been said in several well 
known cases to depend upon the degree of skill, labour and judgment involved 
in preparing a compilation … To apply that, however, as a universal test of 
originality in all copyright cases is not only unwarranted by the context in which 
the observations were made but palpably erroneous. Take the simplest case 
of artistic copyright, a painting or a photograph. It takes great skill, judgment 
and labour to produce a good copy by painting or to produce an enlarged 
photograph from a positive print, but no one would reasonably contend that 
the copy painting or enlargement was an "original" artistic work in which the 
copier is entitled to claim copyright. Skill, labour or judgment merely in the 
process of copying cannot confer originality.310 
 
 Lord Oliver went even further and, although he did not accept the defendant’s 
argument that to qualify for copyright protection there must be original creative input 
by the author, he acknowledged that the University of London Press standard was 
incomplete, because “[s]kill, labour or judgment merely in the process of copying 
cannot confer originality”.311 Therefore, the Privy Council (Hong Kong) held that 
copyright protection in engineering drawings could not be sought merely out of 
reproduction of earlier drawings with alterations to the instructions for the 
manufacturing process written thereon. That was because these were not alterations 
to the artistic nature of the drawing: instead, they were of a mere technical nature. 
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  Just as the history of originality in the US is not the result of a single and 
constant evolution, nor is that in the UK.312 It has been pointed out that at the 
beginning of intellectual property history, one of the overriding concerns was with 
creativity:  
 
One of the factors that the various areas of intellectual property had in 
common was not only a concern with creative labour but also a similar image 
of what it meant to create: they adopted, if you like, a shared model of 
creativity. In particular, it is clear that while God may have provided the 
starting blocks for the creative process, it was the contribution made by the 
author, engraver, designer or inventor who individualised the subject matter 
they worked with which the law protected. Put differently, what intellectual 
property law protected was the creative or human element embodied in the 
resulting product.313 
  
 The late Sir Hugh Laddie314 argued that the current view of originality, which 
he traced back to Walter v Lane315, has not always been the law. In fact, in Dick v 
Yates316, the Court of Appeal had to decide whether ‘Splendid Misery’, the title of a 
book, enjoyed copyright protection. Jessel MR stressed the analogies between 
originality in copyright and novelty in patent law, arguing that a title could not be 
considered original as such. Lush LJ concurred by taking it “to be established law 
that to be the subject of copyright the matter must be original, it must be a 
composition of the author, something which has grown up in his mind, the product of 
something which if it were applied to patent rights would be called invention. Nothing 
short of that would entitle a man to copyright.” It was therefore held that no copyright 
subsisted in the title of the book.317 
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 Recent decisions have also shown a different approach to the issue of 
originality. In the Designers Guild case318, the House of Lords was asked to decide 
whether copyright in the artwork for a fabric designed had been infringed by a later 
design. It was held that the test to be followed to assess infringement cases is to see 
whether the alleged infringer has incorporated a substantial part of the independent 
skill, labour and judgment contributed by the original author in creating the work. 
Substantiality is a matter of impression, principally concerned with a work's 
derivation. Therefore, it was decided that, where it was alleged that an entire design 
had been copied, a finding that the similarities between the works were of a sufficient 
extent and nature to support a finding of copying, this was also likely to be 
determinative of the issue of substantiality and, so, of copyright infringement. 
 Furthermore, in The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks & Spencer319, 
Lord Hoffmann not only insisted on the need for original skill and labour but, while 
discussing Designers Guild, he explained that 
 
[The] copying of certain of the ideas expressed in that design which, in their 
conjoined expression, had involved original artistic skill and labour, constituted 
the copying of a substantial part of the artistic work … The notion of 
reproduction … is sufficiently flexible to include the copying of ideas 
abstracted from a literary, musical or artistic work, provided that their 
expression in the original work has involved sufficient of the relevant original 
skill and labour to attract copyright protection.320 
 
 The House of Lords thus held that, whilst copying of a literary, dramatic or 
musical work meant – pursuant to Section 17(2) of the CDPA 1988321 –  reproducing 
the work in any material form, in the case of the typographical arrangement, nothing 
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short of a facsimile copy would suffice for a finding of copyright infringement.  
 In light of the foregoing it has been argued that such an approach would be a 
new one with regard to originality. If further elaborated, 
 
it may get to a clear-creativity test, because ‘original skill and labour’ cannot 
have the same meaning as ‘skill and labour’ … In other words, if ‘original’ 
means something, which it must, it is more than mere skill and labour, and that 
additional element is likely the intellectual creativity which seems to be 




2. UK and EU originality: great expectations? 
 
If we now examine the changes brought about by the implementation of EC 
Directives, as mentioned above, the requirement of ‘the author’s own intellectual 
creation’ is expressly provided with regard to databases, computer programmes and 
photographs. 
 As clarified by Bently and Sherman323, as far as databases are concerned, the 
new originality criterion differs from the traditional UK standard, as envisaged in 
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd324 where football pool coupons 
were granted copyright protection. The new originality requirement, in contrast to the 
traditional UK one, does not permit a court to take into account the creation of the 
information included in a database. In other words, it does not allow copyright 
protection for pre-expressive stages in the creation of a database.  
 With regard to computer programmes, as already mentioned, it was not 
deemed necessary to amend the CDPA 1988, in order to comply with the Software 
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Directive.325 This was because it was thought that the UK position was already 
compliant with the one required by the Directive.326 
 Finally, as far as the protection of photographs is concerned, the discourse 
calls for a preliminary consideration as to the relevant provision in the Term Directive,  
Article 6. With regards to photographs, the position of UK copyright law has always 
been ambiguous, since judicial decisions in this area have given little guidance in 
determining what originality means in this context. Prior to the adoption of the Term 
Directive, the leading authority was deemed to be the Graves’ Case327, in which the 
photograph of the engraving of a painting was held to be deserving of protection. 
However, as highlighted by Bently and Sherman328, it is doubtful whether this case 
could actually be of any help today, as the technological apparatus for taking 
photographs is so different from in 1869. Also, Interlego329 raised doubts as to the 
usefulness of the Graves’ Case as an authority. Similarly, in the US case The 
Bridgeman Art Library Ltd v Corel Corp330, Justice Kaplan considered that because of 
the antiquity of the Graves’ Case it should be overlooked, along with the 
development of the law of originality in the UK. However, despite the dicta in 
Interlego and The Bridgeman Library, subsequent case law has not completely 
abandoned the loose approach to originality as envisaged in the Graves’ Case. So, 
for instance, copyright has been found to subsist in simple photographs of three-
dimensional objects.331 Even after the implementation of the Term Directive, the 
situation, as far as photographs are concerned, remains unclear. In fact, the Directive 
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leaves Member States free to grant protection to unoriginal photographs if they wish, 
thus allowing the UK to maintain its lower standard (as compared to other EU 
Member States).332   
 
 
3. Traditionally intended originality: the old curiosity shop 
 
In light of the foregoing, it is possible to argue that the traditional UK understanding of 
originality, as envisaged in University of London Press, does not represent a 
complete picture. On the one hand, courts have not always been keen, over the 
course of copyright history, to embrace such a standard. On the other hand, recent 
decisions have shown an increasingly restless attitude towards maintaining 
University of London Press as an authority .  
 If the meaning of originality in the UK has changed over time, this has been 
the result of a combined dissatisfaction with the traditional test of the ‘sufficient skill, 
labour and judgment’, and the legislative innovations brought about by the process of 
EU harmonisation. As clarified by MacQueen, Waelde and Laurie333, the 
simultaneous presence of two originality standards in UK copyright forces us to 
reflect on which would be best suited to the digital environment. So far, the 
continental approach has been favoured, particularly because the EC Directives that 
harmonised the meaning of originality with regard to specific subject-matter have 
modelled this requirement in accordance with continental copyright laws. 
 However, what matters most is that it can be shown that even a tradition like 
that of the UK, which has been deemed homogeneous over time, has not in fact 
been so.  
 These findings lead us to welcome the developments of CJEU case law.  The 
de facto harmonisation of the originality requirement provided by the decision in 
Infopaq334 will be explained below sub Chapter III. In any case, it may be anticipated 
that the new EU-wide originality requirement may be such as to permit UK courts to 
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adopt solutions which overcome the problems highlighted above and associated with 
the traditional originality standard in this Member State.  
 Such reflections are to be seen in the context of a more general debate 
concerning the scope of copyright, as well as of its possible reform. In the words of 
Laddie:  
 
Maybe time has come to look forward, rather than backwards. Perhaps we 
should consider whether the current law on originality makes sense or serves 
a useful purpose. To reduce it to its simplest, you can have too much of a 







So far, EU Member States have embraced different originality standards and this has 
been deemed acceptable in so far as it does not create barriers to intra-Community 
trade. In a few cases, EC Directives have harmonised the concept of originality, in 
accordance with that resulting from droit d’auteur traditions. Behind this limited 
harmonisation, there was the belief that such an operation was necessary only with 
regard to technology-related categories of works. As far as traditional copyright 
subject-matter is concerned, Member States have been left free to maintain their own 
originality standards. 
 From the evolution of copyright in the US and in the UK, it has been shown 
that the concept and the scope of originality have changed over time. It has been 
stretched to grant copyright protection to photographs (Sarony) and advertisements 
(Bleistein) and re-interpreted in a restrictive way when it became clear that the 
outcomes descending from the adoption of a broad meaning were undesired (Feist). 
 As can also be seen the history of UK copyright, which has traditionally been 
thought of as understanding originality in a fairly loose way, this too has experienced 
moments when different alternatives were on the table (Dick v Yates). More recently, 
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a certain feeling of dissatisfaction with the traditional standard set up by the 
University of London Press case has arisen (Interlego, The Newspaper Licensing 
Agency, Designers Guild). From these decisions, it is apparent that the originality 
requirement, on account of its flexible nature, has also played a fundamental policy 














ORIGINALITY IN A WORK,  
OR A WORK OF ORIGINALITY 








The issue of further harmonisation of copyright at the EU level is currently at the 
centre of heated debates concerning its desirability and feasibility as such.  
 In the course of 2010 alone, the Wittem Group published its European 
Copyright Code and the Monti Report addressed the role of copyright in light of 
proposing a new strategy for the internal market. However, thus far, no decisive 
legislative actions have been taken at the EU level to address the future of copyright. 
 Despite this impasse, the Court of Justice has acted in a proactive way 
towards the actual harmonisation of copyright. The 2009 decision in Infopaq, as later 
followed in Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, provided the harmonisation of a 
fundamental principle of copyright, ie the originality requirement.  
 The impact of these judgments on the copyright laws of the Member States is 
likely to be relevant, as was made clear (although partially) by the ruling of the High 
Court of England and Wales in Meltwater. This was recently upheld by the Court of 




 However, the actual implications of the CJEU’s decisions have yet to be 
comprehended fully: the Football Dataco reference stood as a demonstration of the 




I. Recalling the debate on copyright in 2010 
 
Copyright has never been as intensely discussed at the EU level as it is now. In 
particular, attention is currently directed at both evaluating the coherence of the 
acquis communautaire and at assessing whether copyright harmonisation should go 
further, to the point of issuing of a EU-wide copyright law. It is sufficient to recall that 
in 2010 alone, two important documents were published.336  
 Firstly, in April, the Wittem Group, composed of leading European copyright 
academics, released a European Copyright Code, which, as was clearly stated 
therein, “might serve as a model or reference tool for future harmonisation or 
unification of copyright at the European level”.337  
 Secondly, in May, Mario Monti addressed the President of the European 
Commission José Manuel Barroso with a Report containing A new strategy for the 
single market at the service of Europe’s economy and society (also known as the 
Monti Report), in which due attention was paid to the issue of further harmonisation 
of copyright.  
 
 
II. A different approach 
 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that in the past few years, as compared to 
positions previously endorsed, the approach to copyright at the EU level has taken a 
different shape. Indeed, a relatively insignificant length of time has passed since the 
publication of the Commission Staff Working Paper on the review of the EC legal 
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framework in the field of copyright and related rights338, which was released in 2004. 
Yet, one can doubt that today a review of the acquis communautaire in the field of 
copyright would reach the same conclusions as contained therein. This is with 
particular regard to the assessment of issues outside the current acquis, such as 
originality.  
 As already mentioned, so far the originality requirement has in fact been 
referred to only in Article 1(3) of the Software Directive in relation to computer 
programs, Article 6 of the Term Directive with regard to photographs and Article 3(1) 
of the Database Directive as regards databases. As recalled by the Working 
Paper339, the originality requirement was harmonised to take account of the special 
features or the special technical nature of the category of work in question and was 
held to be found whenever a work was its ‘author’s own intellectual creation’.  
 Such meaning of the originality requirement is akin to the French (and 
continental) concept of copyright (droit d’auteur), in which protection is granted to 
works which bear ‘l’empreinte du talent créateur personnel’.340  
 With regard to whether the originality requirement should be harmonised 
further, the Working Paper concluded that: 
 
In theory, divergent requirements for the level of originality by Member States 
have the potential of posing barriers to intra-Community trade. In practice, 
however, there seems to be no convincing evidence to support this … [T]here 
are no indications that the lack of harmonisation of the concept of originality 
would have caused any problems for the functioning of the Internal Market 
with respect to other categories of works, such as compositions, films or 
books. Therefore, legislative action does not appear necessary at this 
stage.341 
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 In light of the foregoing, two threads seem to emerge. Firstly, that at the 
moment both academic and political attention is firmly focused on the issue of further 
harmonisation of copyright at the EU level.342 Secondly, that the approach to 
harmonisation has changed, in the sense that the possible implications and 
advantages of this are now openly discussed.343 As was recently stated by Ms Neelie 
Kroes, current Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the 
Digital Agenda:  
 
[T]oday our fragmented copyright system is ill-adapted to the real essence of 
art, which has no frontiers … [W]e must look beyond national and corporatist 
self-interest to establish a new approach to copyright. We want "une Europe 
des cultures" and for this we need a debate at European level.344 
 
 If the full copyright harmonisation project were to be commenced, first of all it 
would be necessary to achieve political consensus as regards to the terms and 
options available for this objective. However, as will be shown below, it seems that 
this process is already in place and, moreover, has taken place by means of neither 
policy reports nor legislative innovations. Indeed, copyright harmonisation has been 
boosted by the jurisprudence of the CJEU which, through the decisions in Infopaq 
International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening345 and Bezpečnostní softwarová 
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asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury346, has de facto 
harmonised the originality requirement at the EU level.  
 
 
III. Precedent in the CJEU 
 
Before turning to the analysis of the decisions of the CJEU which have tackled 
originality, a brief examination as to the value of precedent in the CJEU system shall 
be undertaken. 
Unlike common law jurisdictions, there is no formal system of precedent under 
EU law. This is because there was the fear that a system of binding precedent would 
have been inappropriate in what was meant to be a court of first and last resort, 
many of whose decisions could have been overcome only by amending the treaties, 
thus implying the agreement of and ratification by all the Member States.347 
However, just like courts in civil law countries, the CJEU  tries to maintain 
consistency in its judgments.348 Indeed, the Court seldom departs from its prior case 
law, and even more rarely does so explicitly.349 The latter feature has resulted in 
uncertainties as to under what circumstances the Court may decide to amend its 
previous interpretation.350 
As was first clarified in the Da Costa decision351 and then codified in Article 
104(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court352, the obligation imposed by current 
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Article 234(3) TFEU353 upon national courts or tribunals of last instance may be 
deprived of its purpose by reason of the authority of an interpretation already given 
by the Court under this provision in those cases in which the question raised is 
materially identical with a question which has already been the subject of a 
preliminary ruling in a similar case. According to one of the most authoritative 
textbooks on EU law, the decision in Da Costa initiated what is in effect a system of 
precedent under EU law.354 
Furthermore, there are numerous instances in which the CJEU has employed 
the terminology of precedent and reviewed earlier decisions to confirm or distinguish 
from past cases. The result is that, albeit unofficially, the case law developed by the 
CJEU has increasingly come to resemble a “true case law system relying on 
precedents to take forward new cases.”355  
In any case, as a corollary of the absence of a system of binding precedent, 
any distinction between the ratio decidendi of a case and its obiter dicta, which 
represents a basic feature of the doctrine of stare decisis as developed by English 
courts356, is to be scaled down. Indeed, contrary to decisions in common law 
jurisdictions, in principle everything that is said in a judgment of the CJEU expresses 
the Court’s opinion and has therefore the potential to have some persuasive force.357 
This being the overall value of precedent under EU law, attention will now be 
turned to the decisions of the CJEU which have de facto harmonised the concept of 
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originality at the EU level. As it will be explained below, the harmonising effects of 
CJEU case law have gone far beyond mere compliance with earlier decisions and 
their interpretation of relevant EU law provisions. The Court has indeed kept 
elaborating upon its case law, in a manner which can be rightly (and worryingly) 
considered as being tantamount to actual lawmaking.    
 
 
IV. The Infopaq decision: a coup de main? 
 
This reference for a preliminary ruling was made by the Højesteret (the Danish 
Supreme Court) in the context of proceedings between Infopaq International A/S 
(‘Infopaq’) and Danske Dagblades Forening (‘DDF’), concerning the dismissal of 
Infopaq’s application for a declaration that it was not required to obtain the consent of 
the copyright owners for acts of reproduction of newspaper articles that were 
obtained using an automated process, consisting of the scanning, conversion into 
digital format and electronic processing of the resulting files. 
 
 
1. Facts and questions referred to the CJEU 
 
Infopaq operates a media monitoring and analysis business that mainly involves 
writing up summaries of selected articles from Danish daily newspapers and 
magazines. The selection follows certain subject criteria agreed with customers and 
is carried out by means of a data capture process. This has five stages. Firstly, the 
relevant publications are registered manually by Infopaq employees in an electronic 
registration database. Secondly, the publications are scanned and an image file is 
created for each page of the publication. The image file is then transferred to an 
Optical Character Recognition (‘OPC’) server. Thirdly, the OPC server converts the 
image file into a text file and eventually the original image file is deleted. Fourthly, the 
text file is processed to find predefined search words. Each time a match for the 
search word is found, the relating publication, section and page number on which the 
match is found are indicated, along with a percentage showing how far into the text 




when reading the article, the five words that precede and follow the search word are 
captured (this results in an extract of eleven words). Upon completion of the process, 
the text file is deleted. Finally, a document is printed out for each page of the 
publication in which the search word appears, which contains the extract of eleven 
words. 
 In 2005, the DDF (the professional association of Danish daily newspapers 
whose function is to offer assistance with regard to copyright issues), informed 
Infopaq that it required authorisation from the copyright owners in order to carry out 
its activities. Infopaq therefore brought an action against DDF before the Østre 
Landsret (the High Court of Eastern Denmark) to obtain a declaration that it had the 
right to apply the data capture process without the consent of DDF or its members. 
The court dismissed the action as unfounded and Infopaq appealed the decision 
before the Højesteret.  
 The Højesteret held that it was not disputed that consent from copyright 
owners was not required in press monitoring activities and the writing up of 
summaries which involved the manual reading of each publication, the selection of 
relevant articles on the basis of predetermined search words and the production of a 
manually prepared cover sheet for the summary writers, providing an identified 
search word in an article and its position in the newspaper. Also, the national court 
found that there was no dispute as to the fact that the data capture process involved 
two acts of reproduction: the creation of the image file, when the printed articles were 
scanned; and the consequent conversion into a text file. However, the Højesteret 
noticed that there was disagreement between the parties as to whether this 
amounted to reproduction within the meaning of Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive.358 
The parties also disagreed as to whether, if there was reproduction, the acts in 
question, when taken as a whole, were covered by the exemption envisaged by 
Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive.359 
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 Therefore, the Højesteret decided to stay the proceedings and refer a 
significant number of questions (thirteen in total) to the CJEU. 
 For the purposes of the present contribution, it is sufficient to limit the analysis 
to the first question only, which concerned whether the concept of ‘reproduction in 
part’ as meant by the InfoSoc Directive, was to be interpreted as encompassing the 
storing and subsequent printing out on paper of a text extract consisting of eleven 
words. In this respect, the CJEU held that an act occurring during a data capture 
process, which consisted of storing an extract of a protected work comprising eleven 
words and printing out that extract, was such as to come within the concept of 
reproduction in part within the meaning of Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive, if the 
elements thus reproduced were the expression of the intellectual creation of their 
author. By doing that, and as will be further explained below, the CJEU concretised a 
real revolution in EU copyright. In all likelihood, neither policy papers nor legislative 
instruments have ever been capable of providing such abrupt and radical changes as 
those brought about by the CJEU in the Infopaq decision. 
 
 
2. The InfoSoc Directive and a harmonised concept of originality  
 
As a preliminary matter, the CJEU wanted to make it clear that the InfoSoc Directive 
does not define the concept of either ‘reproduction’ or ‘reproduction in part’. 
Therefore, following Rafael Hoteles360, the CJEU held that such concepts must be 
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defined having regard to the wording and context of Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive, 
where the reference to them is to be found, as well as in the light of both the overall 
objectives of the Directive and international law.361 By following this principle, the 
CJEU provided a teleological interpretation of the InfoSoc Directive, although it did 
that by engaging mostly in a textual interpretation of the relevant recitals and 
provisions.362 
 Firstly, the Court held that, as Article 2(a) of the InfoSoc Directive states that 
authors have the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit reproduction, in whole or in 
part, of their works, the scope of the reproduction right must be intended to cover 
‘work’. 
 As a second step, the Court sought to clarify what is to be meant by ‘work’ 
and, to this end, reverted to Article 2 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act of 24 July 1971), as amended on 28 September 
1979.363 The CJEU thus held that it is apparent that the protection of certain subject-
matter (such as artistic and literary works) presupposes that this amounts to being an 
intellectual creation. However, as pointed out by Isabella Alexander364, the 
proposition that the general scheme of the Berne Convention lays down a standard 
of originality which amounts to intellectual creation is not uncontroversial. In fact, 
even if the Berne Convention implicitly contains an originality standard, nothing 
prevents Berne Union countries from extending protection to works which may not be 
considered original in this respect. This is because the Convention merely sets 
minimum standards. 
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 As a final step, the CJEU had to clarify what the standard threshold for 
protection ought to be. In other words, the meaning of originality. Under Articles 1(3) 
of the Software Directive, 3(1) of the Database Directive and 6 of the Term Directive, 
works such as computer programs, databases and photographs are protected by 
copyright if they are original in the sense that they are their author’s own intellectual 
creation. From this, the CJEU inferred that, in establishing a harmonised legal 
framework for copyright, the InfoSoc Directive was rooted within the same principles 
as these Directives. This is apparent from the reading of recitals 4365, 9 to 11366 and 
20367, as well as the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive. Therefore, the Court 
concluded in the sense that:  
 
[C]opyright within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29 is liable to 
apply only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is 
its author’s own intellectual creation. 
As regards the parts of a work, it should be borne in mind that there is nothing 
in Directive 2001/29 or any other relevant directive indicating that those parts 
are to be treated any differently from the work as a whole. It follows that they 
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are protected by copyright since, as such, they share the originality of the 
whole work … 
[T]he various parts of a work thus enjoy protection under Article 2(a) of 
Directive 2001/29, provided that they contain elements which are the 
expression of the intellectual creation of the author of the work.368 
 
 In three steps, the CJEU achieved the full harmonisation of the originality 
requirement at the EU level.  
 The Court also highlighted that, since newspaper articles are considered as 
literary works within the meaning of the Berne Convention and the InfoSoc Directive, 
they qualify for copyright protection and, as a consequence, also the parts of such 
works (like an extract of eleven words) may be protected by copyright. Indeed, said 
the Court, it is through the choice of words, as well as their sequence and 
combination, that the author achieves a result which is an intellectual creation.369  
 As was interestingly highlighted by Stephen Vousden370, the cumulative test 
(‘choice, sequence and combination’) laid down with regard to newspaper articles is 
not rooted within international law. Instead, a disjunctive test is set out by both 
Articles 2(5) of the Berne Convention and 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. The Author 
therefore suggests that, despite what is stated at paragraph 34 of the decision, most 
of the Infopaq judgment gained inspiration from German copyright law, where the 
same cumulative test is to be found, rather than international law. 
 It is worth noting that, as the InfoSoc Directive has been implemented by all 
EU Member States371, the interpretation given by the Court of Justice of the 
originality requirement is to be followed by national courts, with consequences which, 
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3. Substantial implications of the Infopaq decision 
 
In clarifying the meaning of the originality requirement, the CJEU decided to revert to 
international sources and interpret them by means of a teleological approach. By 
pointing out that the Berne Convention extends protection to subject-matter such as 
artistic and literary works, the Court held that copyright protection is to encompass 
intellectual creations or, better, works which are their author’s own intellectual 
creations.       
 As already said, this meaning of originality is akin to that envisaged in 
continental Member States’ legislations. Therefore, the effects of Infopaq in those 
legal systems are likely to be quite insubstantial, as far as copyright practice is 
concerned. This is true also with regard to the subject-matter for which, so far, 
harmonisation of the originality standard has not occurred. Vice versa, it is in legal 
traditions such as the UK that the Infopaq ruling is to affect the scope of copyright 
protection. 
 As mentioned above, in the UK the concept of originality has traditionally been 
intended as synonymous with ‘originating’ from the author although, as explained 
above sub Chapter II, Section II, §II, such received wisdom is not uncontroversial. 
After the introduction of the requisite standard of originality into statutory copyright 
law in 1911, the authority consistently cited to define its meaning has been University 
of London Press, Ltd v University Tutorial Press, Ltd372, in which Peterson J held that 
a work is original if it has not been copied from another work.373  
 It is indeed in the UK that the Infopaq decision has been criticised from several 
angles. Amongst them, it has been pointed out374 that, if the CJEU has harmonised 
originality in a manner which removes copyright protection from certain works or 
categories of works, this might conflict with the principle of respecting acquired rights 
and legitimate expectations. However, to counter this, it can be submitted that the 
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CJEU case law has been always consistent with the principle laid down in Butterfly 
Music.375 As also recently stated in the Flos decision376: 
  
the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations cannot be extended to 
the point of preventing new rules from applying to the future consequences of 
situations which arose under the earlier rules.377 
 
 Other commentators have adopted a more nuanced view of Infopaq. In 
particular, Prof Tanya Aplin has found that the approach of the CJEU is partly 
consistent and partly inconsistent with UK law. On the one hand, it is consistent 
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because the now UK Supreme Court378 has repeatedly held that whether a 
substantial part of a work is copied is a qualitative assessment which is influenced by 
the skill, labour and judgment of the part which is copied.379 On the other hand, the 
decision in Infopaq could be potentially problematic to the extent that it makes 
originality determinative of whether a substantial part of a work has been reproduced. 
In particular, 
 
UK courts, although they consider originality highly relevant to whether a 
substantial part has been copied, also consider other factors in determining 
this issue … The Infopaq ruling is also potentially problematic because it sets 
the bar of originality at ‘intellectual creation’ rather than ‘skill, labour and 
judgment’. Except in relation to those works whose originality standard has 
been harmonized, UK courts have adopted a ‘skill, labour and judgement’ test 
of originality, rather than one of ‘intellectual creation’. Therefore, a strict 
application of Infopaq may not only indirectly harmonize the standard of 
originality required for protection of all authorial works, but also curb the 
flexibility that UK courts have previously had when it comes to assessing 
whether a substantial part of work has been copied.380 
 
 This said, perhaps too many fears have arisen as a consequence of the 
Infopaq decision, especially in the UK, where its impact has been seen by some 
commentators as “a bomb in the … copyright landscape”.381 However, this does not 
mean that Infopaq will pass unnoticed. 
 In addition, recently some commentators have raised doubts as to whether the 
CJEU actually harmonised the originality requirement for subject-matter other than 
                                                          
378
 The UK Supreme Court was established by Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and 
started work on 1 October 2009, assuming the judicial functions of the House of Lords, which were 
exercised by the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. 
379
 See above, sub Chapter II, Section II, §II.1. 
380
 T Aplin, ‘United Kingdom’, in B Lindner – T Shapiro (eds), Copyright in the Information Society. A 
guide to national implementation of the European Directive (2011) 558, 560. 
381
 Cf E Derclaye, ‘Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08): wonderful or 




photographs, computer programs and databases.382 As will be seen below sub 
Chapter IV, to this it can be objected that in case law subsequent to Infopaq the 
CJEU has not only intended that originality is now harmonised at the EU level for any 
copyright subject-matter, but has gone further than this and elaborated upon the 
meaning of originality provided in Infopaq.  
 
 
V. Applying Infopaq: the originality requirement gets a new 
shape in UK courts 
 
On 26 November 2010, Proudman J handed down her judgment in The Newspaper 
Licensing Agency Ltd and Others v Meltwater Holding BV and Others383, in which 
she assessed the way EU law has been changing UK copyright. 
 The facts of the case were not dissimilar to Infopaq. Meltwater is a Dutch 
multi-national group that provides an online media monitoring service to business 
customers. Customers select search words, in order to then receive reports of 
articles containing such terms (called the ‘Meltwater news’). Each Meltwater news is 
composed of the title of the article - which hyperlinks to the article itself -, its opening 
words and an extract showing the context in which the search word is to be found. 
 The Newspaper Licensing Agency (‘NLA’) is a company formed to manage the 
intellectual property rights of its members by licensing and collecting licensing fees 
for making copies of newspaper content. The other claimants in the case were 
publishers of national newspapers and shareholder members of NLA.384 Due to the 
proliferation of on-line media monitoring services, NLA recently promulgated two new 
licensing schemes for commercial users of these services. NLA, along with UK 
newspaper publishers, decided to sue Meltwater, its UK subsidiary and the Public 
Relations Consultants Association Ltd (‘PRCA’)385 for copyright infringement. In 
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 These were: MGN Ltd, Associated Newspapers Ltd, Express Newspapers Ltd, Guardian News and 
Media Ltd, Telegraph Media Group Ltd and Independent Print Ltd. 
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particular, the issue before the court was whether Meltwater’s end users needed a 
licence from newspaper publishers in order to receive and use Meltwater news. 
Proudman J held that, lacking a licence, end users infringed publishers’ copyright. 
 The judgment is interesting because Proudman J provided a first assessment 
of how and to what extent the decision in Infopaq has affected UK copyright. With 
regard to the scope of the present contribution, it is important to highlight its impact 
on the UK concept of originality. 
 
 
1. From a quantitative to a qualitative test 
 
As a preliminary remark, the judge stated that domestic legislation must be 
constructed in conformity with, and so as to achieve the results intended by, the EC 
Directives.386 She then identified the relevant principle of law to be applied in the 
case at hand, being the test laid down in Infopaq and, in particular, the fact that no 
distinction has to be made between a work and any part thereof. Proudman J 
continued to point out that, unlike the CDPA 1988, Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive 
contains no reference to ‘substantial part’.387 This was highlighted because, as made 
clear by the CJEU in the Infopaq decision, “originality rather than substantiality is the 
test to be applied to the part extracted. As a matter of principle this is now the only 
real test”. 388 
 Proudman J stated that in the UK “the test for quality has been re-stated but 
for the present purposes not significantly altered by Infopaq”389, but at the same time 
conceded that “the full implications of the [Infopaq] decision have not yet been 
worked out”.390  
                                                          
386
 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others v Meltwater Holding BV and Others, cit, 40. 
387
 Article 16(3) CDPA 1988 makes it clear that references to doing an act restricted by copyright refer 
to acts done directly or indirectly and “in relation to the work as a whole or any substantial part of it” 
(emphasis added).   
388
 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others v Meltwater Holding BV and Others, cit, 69. 
389
 Ibid, 81. 
390
 Ibid. As pointed out by T Hoppner, ‘Reproduction in part, cit, 332, in Meltwater the High Court “felt 
bound to incorporate into English law a new, European, test for copyright infringement. The court 
inferred from Infopaq that the copyright protection of works of literature now depends on the 
“expression of the intellectual creation of the author” rather than the common law criterion of the 




 So, Proudman J held that, in some cases, headlines can be considered as 
independent literary works. The judge went on to and, rather bizarrely391, held that 
text extracts can constitute a substantial part of the articles392 if they are tantamount 
to being original. Finally, the judge found that, since Meltwater customers made 
copies of headlines and text extracts when viewing or accessing Meltwater news, this 




2. Proudman J’s views in Meltwater do not melt away before the Court of 
Appeal  
 
On 27 July 2011, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales upheld the ruling of the 
High Court, finding that Meltwater’s end users needed a licence from newspaper 
publishers in order to receive and use Meltwater news. The Chancellor of the High 
Court, together with Jackson and Elias LLJJ, dismissed PRCA’s appeal and praised 
Proudman J’s judgment as being a “clear, careful and comprehensive” one.393 
 Interestingly enough, the Chancellor of the High Court pointed out that, 
although the decision of the CJEU in Infopaq referred to  an ‘intellectual creation’, this 
is to be interpreted in relation “to the question of origin not novelty or merit”.394 
Therefore, the test for what constitutes copyright-protectable subject-matter under 
UK law has not been affected by Infopaq, in that “[t]he word "original" does not 
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connote novelty but that it originated with the author”.395 The Chancellor of the High 
Court also stressed that “[i]t is well established that the test of substantiality is one of 
quality not quantity”.396 
 The Court of Appeal did not add much to the analysis carried out by Proudman 
J and early responses to its decision were characterised by mixed feelings. Among 
those who criticised the ruling of the Court of Appeal, Prof Lionel Bently397 expressed 
his concerns in relation to the fact that granting copyright protection to titles can have 
negative effects on freedom of expression at large, since “[t]hose involved in all sorts 
of businesses which involve reproduction of titles of books, films, sound recordings 
and so on will now be left to wonder in what circumstances, if any, they will be 
infringing copyright.”398 On the other hand, those who welcomed the outcome of the 
case highlighted that simply by putting content on the internet without a paywall, one 
does not waive all copyright to it.399  
 
 
3. The importance of Meltwater 
 
The Meltwater case is interesting because it shows the impact of Infopaq in the UK,  
a jurisdiction where the originality requirement has traditionally been intended loosely 
and where the test for infringement has been considered (despite the dictum of the 
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Court of Appeal) as being characterised by more of a quantitative, rather than a 
merely qualitative, dimension. This is because of the wording of Article 16(3) of the 
CDPA 1988, as well the practical test for the finding of copyright infringement, which 
envisages that the part taken by the alleged infringer must be measured against the 
whole work of the claimant, not simply the work minus the portions which have not 
been copied. 400  
 The Court of Appeal held that Infopaq did not affect the meaning of originality 
under UK copyright. This conclusion is also shared by Justine Pila, who observes 
that “while headlines and other short strings of words may in principle be original 
literary works, and their unauthorised reproduction thus infringing of copyright, in 
practice this has been consistently denied by the courts.”401 Although this reading is 
in line with the findings highlighted above sub Chapter II, Section II, §II, to this it can 
be objected that the courts taking this path did not have to cope with Infopaq and 
subsequent case law. Indeed, the impact of Infopaq and its progeny402 promises to 
be deep. The result can be a change in the scope and meaning of protected subject-
matter, in a way which, in the first place, is likely to affect low-creativity and technical 
subject-matter.403  
 Indeed, Infopaq may well lead to the abandonment of traditional refrains such 
as ‘what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting’404, by establishing a higher 
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threshold to protection.405 Secondly, and rather paradoxically, the test laid down by 
the CJEU might facilitate the finding of copyright infringement406, in that the taking of 
any part of a work of a third party can be sufficient to this end, if that part can be 
considered as its author’s own intellectual creation. One may indeed wonder 
whether, in light of Infopaq, cases such as Francis Day407, Exxon408 or Coffey409  
would have had different outcomes. Although there are a few decisions by UK courts 
which have made it clear that, in general, short verbal texts including book and film 
titles, as well as advertising slogans, will not draw copyright protection, some 
commentators have concluded that the decisions in Infopaq and Meltwater have 
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unsettled this traditional approach and may well lower the bar for the protection of 
short verbal texts.410 
 Finally – and perhaps most importantly – the Court of Appeal, in upholding the 
ruling of Proudman J, referred solely to Infopaq, without taking into due account 
(rectius: without even mentioning) the implications of another important decision of 
the CJEU: Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace.  
 At the beginning of November 2011, the UK Supreme Court granted 
permission to PRCA to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal. The 
Supreme Court is likely to hear the case in early 2013. Although the appeal is just on 
the transient copying exception within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive as transposed into Article 17(6) CDPA 1988, the decision of the Supreme 
Court is keenly awaited, as it will hopefully clarify controversial aspects of the case. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court may take the opportunity to further elaborate on the 
implications of the Infopaq ruling, not only in light of the radically different 
interpretations some national courts have recently given as to whether newspaper 
articles are subject to copyright protection411, but even more importantly regarding 
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VI. The CJEU goes on: the Bezpečnostní Softwarová Asociace 
decision 
 
This reference for a preliminary ruling was made by the Nejvyšší správní soud 
(Czech Supreme Administrative Court) in the context of proceedings between 
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany413 (‘BSA’) and the 
Ministerstvo kultury414 (‘MK’) concerning its refusal to grant BSA authorisation to 
carry out collective administration of copyrights in computer programs. 
 
 
1. Facts and questions referred to the CJEU 
 
In 2001, BSA had applied to the MK, seeking to obtain the authorisation for collective 
administration of copyrights to computer programs, pursuant to Article 98 of the 
Czech Copyright Law. The objective was to secure the right to the collective 
administration of graphic user interfaces (GUIs). The MK refused to grant such 
authorisation and litigation ensued for the following four years, both in courts and 
before the MK itself. Eventually, the Ministry rejected BSA’s application again, on two 
grounds. Firstly, that copyright law protects only the object code and the source code 
of a computer program, but not the result of the display of the program on the 
computer screen, since the graphic user interface is protected only against unfair 
competition. Secondly, that the collective administration of computer programs is 
possible in theory, but that mandatory collective administration is not an option and 
voluntary collective administration serves no purpose.  
 BSA lodged an appeal against such decision, which was dismissed both by 
the MK and courts.  
 A further appeal followed before the Nejvyšší správní soud, which decided to 
stay the proceedings and refer two questions to the CJEU. 
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 By its first question, the Czech court asked whether Article 1(2) of Directive 
91/250/EEC415 should be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of the 
copyright protection of a computer program as a work under that Directive, the 
phrase ‘the expression in any form of a computer program’ also includes the graphic 
user interface of the computer program or a part thereof.  
 Should the answer to that be positive, the national court also asked whether 
television broadcasting, whereby the public is enabled to have sensory perception of 
the graphic user interface of a computer program or part thereof, albeit without the 
possibility of exerting active control over that program, constituted making a work or 
part thereof available to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive.416 
 As far as the scope of the present work is concerned, attention will be limited 
to the answer that the CJEU provided to the first question. 
 
 
2. Originality under the InfoSoc Directive 
 
Article 1(2) of the Software Directive states that: 
 
Protection in accordance with this Directive shall apply to the expression in 
any form of a computer program. Ideas and principles which underlie any 
element of a computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces, 
are not protected by copyright under this Directive. 
 
 Here, the CJEU made it clear that, as the notion of ‘expression in any form of 
a computer program’ is not defined by the Software Directive, its meaning ought to 
be clarified in light of both the overall objectives of the Directive and international 
law.417 
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 The Court then recalled that computer programs, whether expressed in source 
code or in object code, are protected by copyright as literary works within the 
meaning of both the Berne Convention and Article 10(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.418 
It thus follows that the source code and the object code of a computer program are 
forms of expression thereof. As a consequence, they are entitled to copyright 
protection as computer programs. That is because the object of the protection 
conferred by the Software Directive is the expression in any form of a computer 
program (including any preparatory design work capable of leading, respectively, to 
the reproduction or the subsequent creation of such a program)419, which permits 
reproduction in different computer languages, such as the source code and the 
object code.   
 By referring to the opinion of Advocate General Bot420, the CJEU pointed out 
that any form of expression of a computer program must be protected from the 
moment at which its reproduction would engender the reproduction of the computer 
program itself, thus enabling the computer to perform its task. 
 GUIs are parts of a computer program that provide for interconnection and 
interaction of elements of software and hardware with other software and hardware 
and with users in all the ways in which they are intended to function.421 In particular, 
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the graphic user interface is an interaction interface enabling communication 
between the computer program and the user. However, since it does not enable the 
reproduction of that computer program, but merely constitutes one element of that 
program by way of which users make use of the features of that program, the 
interface does not constitute a form of expression of a computer program within the 
meaning of Article 1(2) of the Software Directive. Therefore, a graphic user interface 
cannot be protected specifically by copyright in computer programs by virtue of this 
Directive.422 
 The CJEU did not limit its answer to this, but went further, and deemed it 
appropriate to ascertain whether the graphic user interface of a computer program 
might be protected by the ordinary law of copyright under the InfoSoc Directive.423 
Following Infopaq, the CJEU held that a graphic user interface can, as a work, be 
protected by copyright if it is its author’s own intellectual creation.424 
 Despite being a matter for the national court to decide, the CJEU clarified what 
criteria have to be followed in making such an assessment. It held that the national 
court must take account, inter alia, of the specific arrangement or configuration of all 
the components which form part of the graphic user interface, in order to determine 
which meet the criterion of originality. In this respect, that criterion cannot be satisfied 
by components of the graphic user interface, which are differentiated only by their 
technical function. In fact, in such a situation, the components of a graphic user 
interface do not permit the author to express his creativity in an original manner and 
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3. A one-size-fits-all rule for originality and copyright assessment 
 
As far as originality in EU copyright is concerned, the Bezpečnostní softwarová 
asociace decision is important for two reasons.  
 First of all, by following Infopaq, this judgment confirms that the originality 
requirement is to be considered as harmonised at the EU level.  
 Furthermore, it paves the way towards a different scrutiny for deciding what 
falls under copyright protection. As is well known, while in some member States (for 
instance, the UK) it is necessary that a work falls in one of the categories provided by 
the law to receive copyright protection, in other Member States (such as Germany, 
France and Italy) the list of categories is merely exemplificative. Following the 
reasoning of the CJEU in both Infopaq and Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, it 
appears that copyright protection is to arise anytime a work, which is to be meant as 
‘every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain’426, is its author’s own 
intellectual creation. The consequences of this may be threefold.  
 Firstly, one can have doubts as to whether a system of exhaustive subject-
matter categorisation, such as the one envisaged by the CDPA 1988, is still in line 
with EU law.427 That is because what the CJEU seemed to suggest in the 
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace decision is that if a work is its author’s own 
intellectual creation, then that work is protected by copyright.428  
 This would not be the only problem as far as UK copyright is concerned. In 
fact, if copyright was deemed not to subsist where the expression of a work is 
dictated by its technical function, this could lead to the abandonment of authorities 
such as Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd429, in which it was held that the skill and 
labour exerted by a musicologist in updating musical scores to recreate the music of 
a baroque composer was sufficient for the musicologist to being considered as the 
author of a musical work protected under the CDPA. Contrary to the submission of 
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Mummery LJ430, it may be argued that the idea that even a mere copy can qualify for 
copyright protection if it has required great talent and technical skill to make, is no 
longer sufficient to sustain a valid copyright claim. 
 Finally, copyright assessment is likely become more homogeneous, as there 
will be no need for a determination ex ante of the subject-matter which a work ought 
to belong to (as is the case with all the controversial cases that frequently arise 
copyright litigation).431 
 In any case, further clarification is certainly awaited with regards to what is to 
be meant by a work or production.432 As far as this last point is concerned, a recent 
reference to the CJEU showed how controversial this issue remained in the UK. 
 
 
VII. The Football Dataco reference 
 
On 21 December 2010, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales made a 
preliminary reference433 to the CJEU in the context of proceedings concerning the 
alleged infringement by Brittens Pools, Yahoo! and other betting companies of the 
exclusive intellectual property rights in the annual fixture lists produced and published 
for the purposes of the English and Scottish (football) Premier Leagues and football 
leagues (‘the fixture lists’), which they used without a licence. 
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 In the proceedings at first instance434, the Chancery Division of the High Court 
of Justice of England and Wales was asked to decide whether any, and if so which, 
rights subsisted in the fixture lists. Floyd J, after having considered that the main 
candidates were copyright as a database435 and the sui generis database right436, 
held that the fixture lists were the production of selection or arrangement within the 
meaning of Article 3(1) of the Database Directive, according to which  
 
databases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, 
constitute the author's own intellectual creation shall be protected as such by 
copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for that 
protection. 
 
 That is because the process of selection and arrangement of the contents of a 
database can and often will commence before all the data is created.437 For this 
reason, Floyd J held that the fixture lists were protected by copyright. However, he 
found no sui generis database right to subsist in the fixture lists, because no 
additional efforts had been spent in obtaining, verifying or presenting the 
data content.438  
 On appeal439, Jacob LJ, along with Hooper and Rimer LLJJ, decided to stay 
the proceedings and make a reference to the CJEU on two questions regarding the 
interpretation of Article 3 of the Database Directive.  
 By its first question, the Court of Appeal sought clarification as to what is 
meant by “databases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their 
contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation”. In particular, the Court 
asked whether the intellectual effort and skill of creating data should be excluded, 
whether ‘selection or arrangement’ includes adding important significance to a pre-
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existing item of data (as in fixing the date of a football match), and finally whether the 
‘author’s own intellectual creation’ requires more than significant labour and skill from 
the author and, if so, what. 
 By its second question, the Court asked whether the Database Directive 
precludes national rights in the nature of copyright in databases other than those 
provided for by the Directive itself. 
 As it is apparent from the foregoing, in particular from the first question, the 
Infopaq decision has led to important changes in national legislations and copyright 
litigation. In particular, the fact that doubts persisted as to whether ‘author’s own 
intellectual creation’ meant something different from the traditional UK standard of 
‘significant labour and skill’ is indicative of the fact that the Infopaq ruling has also 
cast doubts on areas of copyright which had been apparently left untouched by it or 




Conclusion    
 
The debate concerning the future of copyright at the EU level has reached a peak in 
recent years. During 2010 alone, two important documents were published: the 
European Copyright Code, and the Monti Report. These two policy instruments were 
concerned with the actual possibility, and desirability as such (at least the Monti 
Report, since the Wittem Group decided not to take any position in this respect440), of 
achieving a full harmonisation of copyright. However, consensus is far from being 
reached on whether and how the copyright laws of the Member States should be fully 
harmonised.  
 Despite this, recent decisions of the CJEU have taken a proactive approach to 
copyright and achieved the harmonisation by means of judicial interpretation of a 
fundamental principle of copyright, the originality requirement. The Infopaq decision 
(as confirmed by Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace) held that a work is original if it 
is its author’s own intellectual creation. By providing a teleological interpretation of 
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the rationale underlying the InfoSoc Directive, the CJEU clarified that, for subject-
matter other than computer programs, databases and photographs, originality is also 
to be given the same meaning as provided by the Software, Database and Term 
Directives.  
 As effectively summarised by Mirelle van Eechoud441, from the rulings in 
Infopaq and Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, three readings stand out. The first is 
that the CJEU recognised that copyright may exist in very short works. The second is 
that the Court has interpreted EU law as containing an autonomous standard of 
originality for copyright works. The third is that the Court of Justice did not just set an 
originality standard, but established that the subject matter of copyright is equally 
harmonised as a domain through ‘intellectual creation’ as an open-ended concept 
covering all conceivable types of authored matter.  
 This said, the implications of the Infopaq decision remain yet to be fully 
understood, as also made clear by the Football Dataco reference 
 There is one aspect, however, where there is no doubt. As will be better 
explained below, the Infopaq judgment has finally urged the need for an exhaustive  
discussion on whether full copyright harmonisation is to be achieved and how to go 
about this. With what can be properly defined as a coup de main, the CJEU achieved 
a revolutionary result. Indeed, the time has come to take a decision in this regard, at 
both political and institutional levels. It is felt that this cannot be further postponed, 
unless a continued delegation of the role of de facto copyright law maker to EU 
judiciary is desired. Most importantly, any intervention in this respect, either in the 
form of a codification of copyright or ad hoc directives, will have to be the result of a 
real desire to provide an actual betterment of copyright and not a mere, even if much 
less inspired, replica of the famous quote from the novel Il Gattopardo: “Se vogliamo 
che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi!”.442 
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THE CJEU GOES AHEAD 
The decisions in Murphy, Painer,  








Following the decision of the CJEU in Infopaq, as later confirmed in Bezpečnostní 
softwarová asociace, debate has arisen as to the actual extent of the harmonising 
effects of CJEU jurisprudence. In particular, these concern both the EU meaning of 
originality for subject-matter other than computer programs, databases and 
photographs, and the understanding of EU copyright architecture, with particular 
regard to subject-matter categorisation. 
The decisions in Murphy, Painer and Football Dataco, and SAS have further 
clarified and enriched the EU meaning of originality and definitely clarified that, 
contrary to UK copyright, subject-matter categorisation is not an exhaustive list within 
EU copyright architecture. 
Following a report on the background to these decisions, this chapter will 
attempt to extract the rationale of CJEU reasoning in relation to the parts of these 
judgments which dealt specifically with the issue of originality, along with their 






I. Murphy: on TV decoders, football matches and the internal 
market  
 
The decision of the CJEU in Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier 
League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice Hellas SA v QC Leisure, David 
Richardson, AV Station plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael Madden, SR Leisure Ltd, 
Philip George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen and C-429/08 Karen Murphy v Media 
Protection Services Ltd443 followed two references from the High Court of Justice of 
England and Wales, Chancery Division444, and the High Court of Justice of England 
and Wales, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court)445, respectively.  
These were made in the context of proceedings concerning the marketing and 
use in the UK of decoding devices which gave access to the satellite broadcasting 
services of a broadcaster, and were manufactured and marketed with that 
broadcaster’s authorisation. They were, however, used outside the geographical area 
for which they had been issued, thereby disregarding the broadcaster’s will (they are 
thus referred to as ‘foreign decoding devices’). 
The UK courts had sought clarification as to the interpretation of provisions in 
Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 
1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional 
access446 (‘Conditional Access Directive’); Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 
September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights 
related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission447; 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of 
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television broadcasting activities448, as amended by Directive 97/36/EC449; the 
InfoSoc Directive; and Articles 34, 36, 56 and 101 TFEU. 
The Grand Chamber published its decision on 4 October 2011, upholding the 




1. Background to the cases: the exclusive licence system 
 
The Football Association Premier League (‘FAPL’) runs the Premier League, which is 
the leading professional football league competition for football clubs in England.  
Among its activities, FAPL arranges the filming of the matches, for which it 
exercises television broadcasting rights. These include making the audiovisual 
content of sporting events available to the public by means of television 
broadcasting.  
FAPL grants exclusive licences obtained under an open competitive tender, in 
respect of those broadcasting rights for live transmissions. The exclusive character of 
such licences is aimed at realising the optimum commercial value of all of the 
rights.451 Broadcasters are prepared to pay a premium to acquire that exclusivity, as 
it allows them to differentiate their services from those of their rivals and therefore 
enhances their ability to generate revenue. The licences are granted for three-year 
terms on a territorial basis. Indeed, such licences – as a rule – are national, as there 
is a limited demand from bidders for global or pan-European rights. This is because 
broadcasters usually operate on a territorial basis and serve the domestic market 
either in their own country or in a few neighbouring countries with a common 
language.  
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To safeguard the territorial exclusivity of the various licences, broadcasters 
take it upon themselves to prevent the public from receiving their broadcasts outside 
the area for which the licence is granted. This is done, in the first place, by means of 
encryption of the broadcasts. In the second place, broadcasters cannot supply 
decoding devices that allow their broadcasts to be decrypted for the purpose of being 
used outside the territory of the licence. 
In addition to the licensing of the broadcasting rights for Premier League 
matches, FAPL is responsible for the transmission of the signal to the broadcasters 
who have acquired the relevant rights. To this end, the images and ambient sound 
captured at the match are transmitted to a production facility which adds logos, video 
sequences, on-screen graphics, music and English commentary. Afterwards, the 
signal is compressed and encrypted, then sent by satellite to subscribers, who are 
able to decrypt and decompress it thanks to a satellite decoder requiring a decoding 
device such as a decoder card for its operation. 
 
 
2. Background to the cases: the breach to market segmentation of licences 
 
In Greece and the UK, the holders of the sub-licences to broadcast Premier Leagues 
matches were, respectively, NetMed Hellas and BSkyB.  
However, in the UK some restaurants and pubs had begun to use foreign 
decoding devices to view Premier League matches. They would buy a decoder card 
and box which allowed them to receive a satellite channel broadcast in another 
Member State, such as the NOVA channels which broadcast them in Greece, the 
subscription to which was cheaper than that of BSkyB. 
As a result, FAPL and others had commenced different proceedings before 
UK courts against suppliers of equipment and satellite decoder cards which enabled 
the reception of programmes of foreign broadcasters, as well licensees or operators 
of public houses who had screened live Premier League matches by using a foreign 
decoding device.  
The plaintiffs had claimed infringement of the rights protected under Section 
298 of the CDPA 1988452, and copyright infringement by creating copies of the works 
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in the internal operation of the satellite decoder and by displaying the works on 
screen, as well as by performing, playing or showing the works in public and 
communicating them to the public, and abetting infringement by third parties to whom 
they supplied decoder cards. 
In the case of Ms Murphy, agents from MPS, a body acting on behalf of FAPL 
to carry out prosecutions against public house managers who used foreign decoding 
devices, found that her public house in Southsea (Hampshire) received broadcasts of 
Premier League matches transmitted by NOVA. Hence, proceedings were brought 
before Portsmouth Magistrates’ Court, which convicted Ms Murphy of two offences 
under Section 297(1) CDPA453, on the ground that she had dishonestly received a 
programme included in a broadcasting service provided from a place in the UK with 
intent to avoid payment of any charge applicable to the reception of the programme.  
Having lost her appeal before the Portsmouth Crown Court, Ms Murphy then 
brought her case before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, which 
decided to stay the proceedings and refer ten questions to the CJEU in Case C-
403/08, seeking clarification as to various issues. These included: whether decoder 
cards purchased in Greece and imported into the UK for use in the UK were ‘illicit 
devices’ within the meaning of the Conditional Access Directive and were therefore 
prohibited; what the meaning of ‘communication to the public’ under Article 3 of the 
InfoSoc Directive was; questions on the interpretation of the provisions in the TFEU 
(Articles 34, 36 and 56) concerning free movement of goods and services in the 
context of the Conditional Access Directive; and a question on the interpretation of 
the treaty rules on competition under Article 101 TFEU. 
In Case C-429/08, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Queen’s 
Bench Division (Administrative Court), decided to stay the proceedings and revert to 
the CJEU for guidance as to eight questions, which were similar to those asked in 
Case C-403/08. 
By order of the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 3 
December 2008, Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 were joined for the purposes of the 
written and oral procedure and the judgment. 
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3. IP at the crossroads with treaty freedoms  
 
As far as the scope of this contribution is concerned, it is sufficient to concentrate 
attention on the analysis carried out by the CJEU as to whether territorial restrictions 
in territorial licensing carried out by FAPL were tantamount to a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services.  
Such issues were dealt with by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion on 3 
February 2011, with a specific focus on whether the territorial exclusivity rights at 
issue had the effect of partitioning the internal market into separate national markets. 
The Advocate General found that a partitioning of the internal market for the 
reception of satellite broadcasts was not necessary in order to protect the specific 
subject-matter of the rights to live football transmissions.454 Therefore, this was not a 
justified restriction of the freedom to provide services. However, the Advocate 
General did not determine whether sporting events are actually capable of intellectual 
property protection.455 
As noted by some commentators, the main premise of AG Kokott’s Opinion 
was based on the assumption that the various national broadcasters should be free 
to compete with each other, the logic of this being that parallel trade in decoder cards 
necessarily benefits consumers. This assumption has been criticised as ignoring the 
actual relationship between rightsholders such as FAPL and licensees (the 
broadcasters). Each broadcaster can offer its services only with the consent of the 
rightsholder, since this controls access to the broadcasting rights and the conditions 
on which access is granted. The truth is that allowing parallel trade does not 
necessarily create competition. Instead, this may simply result in FAPL licensing 
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fewer broadcasters (only in the most lucrative markets in the EU)456 or in altering 
licence terms to make parallel trade unprofitable.457 An alternative consequence may 
be that FAPL begins to market its own subscription channel, effectively by-passing 
BSkyB and other broadcasters.458 
 
 
4. Restrictions imposed by IPRs: pre-condition is that the work is 
protectable  
 
In addressing the issue of whether FAPL’s licensing system was tantamount to a 
restriction to provide services, the CJEU recalled that Article 56 TFEU459 requires the 
abolition of all restrictions on the freedom to provide services, even if those 
restrictions apply without distinction to national providers of services and to those 
from other Member States, when they are liable to prohibit, impede or render less 
advantageous the activities of a service provider established in another Member 
State where it lawfully provides similar services.  
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In any case, pursuant to the ruling in Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional 
and Bwin International460, the freedom to provide services is for the benefit of both 
providers and recipients of services. This said, the Court acknowledged that the 
actual origin of the obstacle to the reception of satellite transmission services like 
those at issue in the main proceedings was to be found in the contracts concluded 
between the broadcaster and their customers, which in turn reflected the territorial 
restriction clauses included in contracts affecting those broadcasters and the holders 
of intellectual property rights. However, as the national legislation concerned 
prevented those services from being received by persons who resided outside the 
Member State of broadcast – and actually required restrictions to be complied with 
on pain of civil law and pecuniary sanctions – the legislation had the effect of 
preventing access to those services. As a consequence, such legislation constituted 
a restriction on the freedom to provide services. This was contrary to Article 56 
TFEU, unless it could be objectively justified. 
FAPL and others, along with the UK, French and Italian Governments, had 
submitted that the restrictions underlying the legislation at issue in the main 
proceedings could be justified in light of the intellectual property rights held by FAPL. 
Such restrictions were necessary in order to ensure that FAPL remained 
appropriately remunerated. In particular, it had been submitted that, should no 
protection of that territorial exclusivity have been available, the rightholder would 
have been no longer able to get appropriate licence fees from the broadcasters, as 
the live broadcasts of sporting events would have in part lost their value. This was 
apparently because broadcasters are not interested in acquiring licences outside the 
territory of the Member State of broadcast, also because of the extremely high costs 
of such licences. They are prepared to pay a substantial premium, provided that they 
are guaranteed territorial exclusivity. 
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As was made clear by the CJEU, when assessing the justification for a 
restriction on fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the TFUE, it is necessary to 
weight this against the public interest. Such a restriction is acceptable in so far as it 
serves overriding reasons in the public interest, is suitable for securing the attainment 
of the public interest objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain it.461 It is settled case law that such a restriction may be 
justified by overriding reasons in the public interest which consist in the protection of 
intellectual property rights.462 
Although the decision is noteworthy for its competition law implications, as well 
as its impact on rights licensing at the EU level463, attention will be paid here to the 
part of the judgment dealing with originality. 
 
 
5. Is Murphy’s originality at odds with Berne?  
 
The CJEU deemed it necessary to determine from the outset whether FAPL could 
invoke such rights capable of justifying the fact that the national legislation at issue in 
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the main proceedings established in its favour protection that was tantamount to a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services. 
The CJEU thus considered whether sporting events per se may be protected 
by copyright. It responded to the question negatively, holding that:   
 
FAPL cannot claim copyright in the Premier League matches themselves, as 
they cannot be classified as works. 
To be so classified, the subject-matter concerned would have to be original in 
the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation … 
[S]porting events cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as 
works within the meaning of the [InfoSoc] Directive. That applies in particular 
to football matches, which are subject to rules of the game, leaving no room 
for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright. 
Accordingly, those events cannot be protected under copyright. It is, 
moreover, undisputed that European Union law does not protect them on any 
other basis in the field of intellectual property.464 
 
It may be argued that the position adopted by the Court did not come as a 
surprise. Even under a loose UK originality standard, live sport could have hardly 
been considered to be a work or qualify for copyright protection as a work.465  
However, the rationale underlying the dictum of the Court is interesting for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, and quite surprisingly, the Court tackled the issue of whether sporting 
events are protectable by copyright by identifying ‘works’ with ‘original’, rather than 
with the prior requirement that a work is a ‘production in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domain’, pursuant to Article 2(1) and (2) of the Berne Convention. The Berne 
Convention implies that originality of a work is a subsequent assessment, undertaken 
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only when a production is found to be in the literary scientific and artistic domain. In 
other words, to constitute a work in law, the intellectual creation must fall within one 
of the (although merely indicative466) normative categories of copyright-protected 
subject-matter. This may be a closed list (as it is in the UK) or a non-exhaustive one 
(as it is in the US and in civil law traditions, such as Germany, Italy and France).467 In 
looking at the issue of sporting rights in this way, the CJEU seems to have changed 
the order implicitly set out in Article 2 of the Berne Convention. Needless to say, 
should this indeed be a correct reading of this part of the judgment, then the activism 
of the CJEU – inaugurated by its decision in Infopaq – may be seen as going well 
beyond the borders of EU law, to the point of actually touching upon international law 
itself. This, though fascinating, may be worrisome, in that it urges a reflection upon 
the actual legitimacy of the EU judiciary in interpreting and re-assessing 
internationally-binding instruments. 
The second reason why this passage from the judgment is relevant is because 
it further clarifies the meaning of ‘intellectual creation’, as adopted as the standard for 
originality under EU law in Infopaq. A creation is to be considered as an intellectual – 
and hence original – one, if it is the result of its author’s creative freedom. By 
adopting such definition of originality (which is akin to that envisaged under German 
law468), the Court added something to the concept of originality in Infopaq. For the 
CJEU, originality seems to be not only about sense, but also about sensibility. This 
finding, as will be explained below, has also been confirmed in later decisions of the 
Court. In any case, such a meaning of originality is to be found in both German and 
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 As explained by S Ricketson – JC Ginsburg, International copyright and neighbouring rights. The 
Berne Convention and beyond (2
nd
 edn, 2006) Vol I, 409, “the words ‘such as’, which precede the 
enumeration, indicate that [the enumeration in Article 2(1)] is not an exhaustive list: the works 
enumerated are only instances of the subject matter that fall within the ambit of the expression 
‘literary and artistic works’. Accordingly, there may be other kinds of work, not enumerated, which 
are still eligible for protection under the [Berne] Convention … Nevertheless, the history of the 
various revisions of the Berne Convention indicates that this proposition has to be treated with 
considerable caution.”  
467
 As pointed out by A Rahmatian, Copyright and creativity, cit, 37, from a property theorist’s 
perspective (which is at the basis of the rationale for copyright protection in common law countries), 
the existence of a non-exhaustive list of categories, or flexibility of categories constitutes a 
weakening of the numerous clausus of property rights or a blurring of the boundary between res 
and non-res, because the compliance with the requirement of copyright ‘work’ is the first step 
towards the creation of the legal concept of copyright-property. 
468
 Pursuant to Section 2(2) UrhG 1965, “Werke im Sinne dieses Gesetzes sind nur persönliche 
geistige Schöpfungen” (“Personal intellectual creations alone shall constitute works within the 




French case law. French courts find originality to subsist in works which ‘reflet de la 
personalité de l’auteur’ or bear his ‘empreinte personelle’.469 Similarly, German courts 
hold a work be original when the spirit of the human author is expressed in the work 
itself or the work shows ‘creative distinctiveness’.470  
 
 
6. What protection for sporting events then? 
 
Although copyright protection is not available for sporting events per se – in that they 
are not conceived as original works –, the Court acknowledged that FAPL could 
“assert copyright in various works contained in the broadcasts, that is to say, in 
particular, the opening video sequence, the Premier League anthem, pre-recorded 
films showing highlights of recent Premier League matches, or various graphics.”471 
In addition, sports may have a unique and original character which can 
transform them into subject-matter that is worthy of protection, in a way comparable 
to the protection of other works. EU law does not prevent per se a Member State 
from protecting sporting events as such, when this is deemed appropriate within the 
legal order of the State. Such a conclusion, according to the Court, descends from 
Article 165(1) TFEU, which states that: 
 
The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by 
encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by 
supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the 
organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity. 
 
As a consequence, nothing prevents Member States from choosing protection 
under intellectual property. This may be done, explained the Court, either by putting 
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 Cf Cass civ1re, 1July 1970: D 1970, 734; Cass civ 1re 13 November 1973. 
470
 Cf BGH GRUR 1998, 916/917 – Stadtplanwerk; BGH GRUR 1994, 206/207f – Alcolix; BGH GRUR 
1986, 739/740 – Anwaltschriftsatz; BGH – Inkassoprogramm, cit. 
471
 Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice 
Hellas SA v QC Leisure, David Richardson, AV Station plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael 
Madden, SR Leisure Ltd, Philip George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen and C-429/08 Karen 




in place specific national legislation, or by recognising, in compliance with EU law, 
protection conferred upon those events by agreements concluded between the 
persons having the right to make the audiovisual content of the events available to 
the public and the persons who wish to broadcast that content to the public of their 
choice.472 However, the Court stressed that any restriction imposed on free 
movement must not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective of protecting 
the intellectual property rights at issue. In particular, derogations from the free 
movement principle are permitted only insofar as they are justified to safeguard the 
rights constituting the specific subject-matter of the intellectual property right 
concerned.473  
With particular regard to intellectual property, settled CJEU case law shows 
that specific subject-matter of an intellectual property right is intended in particular to 
ensure protection to rightsholders, in order to allow them to exploit commercially the 
marketing or the making available of the protected subject-matter, by granting 
licences in return for payment of remuneration.474 This is to be intended not as the 
highest possible remuneration, since Recital 10 in the preamble to the InfoSoc 
Directive475 and Recital 5 in the preamble to Directive 2006/115/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right 
and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified 
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 Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice 
Hellas SA v QC Leisure, David Richardson, AV Station plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael 
Madden, SR Leisure Ltd, Philip George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen and C-429/08 Karen 
Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, cit, 102. 
473
 Ibid, 106, citing Case C-115/02 Administration des douanes et droits indirects v Rioglass SA and 
Transremar SL, [2003] ECR I-12705, 23 October 2003 and earlier rulings (Case C-23/99 
Commission v France, [2000] I-07653, 26 September 2000; Case C-61/97 Foreningen af danske 
Videogramdistributører v Laserdisken [1998] I-05171, 22 September 1998; Case C-10/89 SA CNL-
SUCAL NV v Hag GF AG, [1990] I-03711, 17 October 1990). 
474
 Ibid, 107, citing Musik-Vertrieb membran GmbH and K-tel International v GEMA – Gesellschaft für 
musikalische Aufführungs und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte, cit, and Joined Cases Phil 
Collins (C-92/92) v Imtrat Handelgesellschaft mbH and Phil Collins v Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH and Patricia Im-und Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH and Leif Emanuel Kraul v EMI 
Electrola GmbH, Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92, [1993] I-05145, 20 October 1993. 
475
 “If authors or performers are to continue their creative and artistic work, they have to receive an 
appropriate reward for the use of their work, as must producers in order to be able to finance this 
work. The investment required to produce products such as phonograms, films or multimedia 
products, and services such as ‘on-demand’ services, is considerable. Adequate legal protection of 
intellectual property rights is necessary in order to guarantee the availability of such a reward and 




version)476 envisage only appropriate remuneration for each use of the protected 
subject-matter. Such remuneration is considered to be appropriate if it is reasonable 




7. Is unfair competition the path to follow? 
 
This said, it is not clear what type of intellectual property right may be suitable for 
protecting sport events per se, provided that no copyright protection is available.  
If the originality requirement is seen as now being harmonised, as a result of 
the ruling in Infopaq, the marge de manœvre is indeed very small. It is submitted that 
the only form of protection intellectual property at large may offer is that provided by 
the law of unfair competition. As correctly pointed out, 
 
The higher protection threshold could leave a gap, but continental European 
systems have separate statutes prohibiting parasitical or free-ride unfair 
competition, and while a certain product may not qualify for copyright 
protection, because it does not meet the higher originality requirements (a 
simple register, etc.), its copying without permission, for instance, may still 
constitute a violation of the Unfair Competition Acts. In this way, the economic 
interests of the maker of a certain product/creation are safeguarded.478 
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 OJ 2006 L 376, 28-35. Recital 5 provides that “The creative and artistic work of authors and 
performers necessitates an adequate income as a basis for further creative and artistic work, and 
the investments required particularly for the production of phonograms and films are especially high 
and risky. The possibility of securing that income and recouping that investment can be effectively 
guaranteed only through adequate legal protection of the rightholders concerned.” 
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 Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice 
Hellas SA v QC Leisure, David Richardson, AV Station plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael 
Madden, SR Leisure Ltd, Philip George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen and C-429/08 Karen 
Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, 109, citing Foreningen af danske Videogramdistributører 
v Laserdisken, cit, and Case C-52/07 Kanal 5 Ltd and TV 4 AB v Föreningen Svenska Tonsättares 
Internationella Musikbyrå (STIM) upa, [2008] ECR I-9275, 11 December 2008. In the case of 
television broadcasting, as stated in Case C-192/04 Lagardère Active Broadcast v Société pour la 
perception de la rémunération équitable (SPRE) and Others, [2005] ECR I-7199, 14 July 2005, 
such remuneration must in particular be reasonable in relation to parameters of the broadcasts 
concerned, such as their actual audience, their potential audience and the language version. 
478




As is well known, an unfair competition act does not exist in all the Member 
States. This is the case of the UK, where – quite ironically – the main proceedings 
were to be decided.  
The result of the dictum of the Court might lead to hold that no protection is 
actually available to sporting events in the UK. This is because passing off, due to its 
strict conditions of applicability, would be a harmless tool.479 Copyright, which would 
have been suitable (although not uncontroversially), especially under the traditionally 
loose originality standard, has been swept away by the firm grip of the CJEU in 
Infopaq, as then confirmed in subsequent case law.  
The end result is rather paradoxical: from being a country known for having an 
intellectual property regime shaped with a generous harbour (also because copyright 
law was traditionally intended as a protection against unfair parasitical 
competition)480, the UK – if it does not bring about some changes which are clearly 
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 The passing off action was first developed by English courts to prevent a competitor from passing 
their goods off as if they were the claimant’s. As incisively stated by Lord Halsbury: “nobody has 
any right to represent his goods as the goods of somebody else” (Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 
199, 204, 13 RPC 218, 224; echoing Lord Langsdale MR in Perry v Truefitt (1842) 6 Beav 66, 73). 
It is commonly acknowledged that an action for passing off was first recognised in the Elizabethan 
case of JG v Samford (1618). In the Jif lemon decision (Reckitt & Colman v Borden [1990] RPC 
340 HL) Lord Oliver (499) elaborated the three elements a claimant must show in order to make a 
case of passing off:  “First, he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or 
services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying 
‘get-up’ (whether it consists simply of a brand name or a trade description, or the individual features 
of labeling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, 
such that the get-up is recognized by the public as distinctive specifically of the [claimant’s] goods 
or services. Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public 
(whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services 
offered by him are the goods or services of the [claimant] … Thirdly, he must demonstrate that he 
suffers, or in quia timet action, that he is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous belief 
engendered by the defendant’s misrepresentation that the source of the defendant’s goods or 
services is the same as the source of those offered by the [claimant].” Frequent reference is also 
made in judgments to Lord Diplock’s enumeration in the “Advocaat case” (Erven Warnink BV v 
Towend (J) & Sons [1979] AC 731, 93), of five minimum requirements for the action: “(1) a 
misrepresentation (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, (3) to prospective consumers of his 
or ultimate consumer goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is calculated to injure the 
business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by 
whom the action is brought or (in quia timet action) will probably do so.” On passing-off, see W 
Cornish – D Llewelyn – T Aplin, Intellectual Property, cit, 663 ff and L Bently – B Sherman, 
Intellectual Property Law, cit, 726 ff. 
480
 According to the analysis carried out by W Cornish – D Llewelyn – T Aplin, Intellectual Property, cit, 
424-425, “An exclusive right which strikes only at copying is particularly suited to claims that a 
person is taking something for nothing – that he is reaping fruits sown by the creativity of others. 
Nonetheless UK copyright law has on the whole conformed to the prescription that new rights 
should not be conceded without making a reasoned case and securing legislation. Indeed, statute 
has increasingly been used to define not only the duration of the various copyrights, but their 
subject-matter, the exclusive rights to which they give rise and the exceptions that may be 




necessary to fill out the gaps created by Infopaq – will end up leaving aspiring 
rightsholders without any actual protection.  
In response to call for evidence by the Hargreaves Report, the patent judges 
in England and Wales481 wished for a new UK copyright act based upon a 
comprehensive review to be issued, in replacement to the CDPA 1988. Their 
response focused on the fact that, since the entry into force of the CDPA 1988, both 
technology and business models have changed radically, making it inappropriate and 
inapt to this new environment. In particular, the process of implementation of EU 
Directives has introduced a number of anomalies in the statute, starting with the 
originality standard imposed by EU law with regards to software and databases. The 
CDPA 1988 is said to lack clarity. This, according to the response, gives rise to 
uncertainty on both the side of owner and the alleged infringer. The patent judges, 
however, did not tackle the implications of a EU-wide harmonised concept of 
originality for the UK.  
 
 
8. The response of the High Court 
 
On 24 February 2012, the High Court gave a judgment allowing Ms Murphy’s appeal 
against the dismissal by the Crown Court of Portsmouth.   
Previously, on 3 February 2012 Kitchin LJ published his judgment in Football 
Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice Hellas SA v QC 
Leisure, David Richardson, AV Station plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael Madden, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
misappropriation of ideas means, however, that no limited, short-term form of liability may be 
imposed upon even the most parasitic purveyor of other people’s ideas and enterprise. Accordingly 
there is always some desire to press the existing concepts of copyright into service. Lord Devlin, for 
example, once said: “Free trade does not require that one should be allowed to appropriate the 
fruits of another’s labour, whether they are tangible or intangible. The law has not found it possible 
to give full protection to the intangible. But it can protect the intangible in certain states, and one of 
them is when it is expressed in words or print. The fact that protection is of necessity limited is no 
argument for diminishing it further, and it is nothing to the point that either side of the protective 
limits a man can obtain gratis whatever his ideas of honesty permit him to pick up.” (Ladbroke 
(Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd, cit, 291). 
481
 The response – available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-c4e-sub-thepjew.pdf – was approved 
by Lord Justice Jacob (who at the time was the judge in charge of the intellectual property list in the 





SR Leisure Ltd, Philip George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen.482 Following the 
ruling of the CJEU, the High Court had to determine whether any of the defendants 
had communicated any FAPL copyright-protected works to the public, contrary to 
Section 20 of the CDPA 1988483, and, if they had, whether Section 72 of the CDPA 
1988484 provided them with a defence. Kitchin LJ found that, although FAPL’s 
broadcasts were not copyright-protected subject-matter per se, they nonetheless 
contained an anthem, along with artistic and films works, which enjoyed copyright 
protection. This was said to be in line with the decision of the CJEU.485 In addition, 
Kitchin LJ found that the defendants had infringed Section 20 CDPA, in that they had 
transmitted FAPL's relevant copyright works, including its artistic works, to a new 
public and by electronic means. In relation to the issue as to whether the defendants 
could invoke the defence pursuant to Section 72(1)(c) of the CDPA 1988, Kitchin LJ 
held that the showing or playing of a broadcast in a public house to members of the 
public who have not paid for admission does not infringe any copyright in any film 
included in the broadcast.486 
Although the latter finding of the High Court can be said to be in line with 
recent CJEU case law (which has excluded that the broadcasting of copyright-
protected contents which is free of charge and enjoyed by third parties without any 
active choice on their part infringes the right of communication to the public)487, it is 




 “(1) The communication to the public of the work is an act restricted by the copyright in - (a) a 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, (b) a sound recording or film, or (c) a broadcast. (2) 
References in this Part to communication to the public are to communication to the public by 
electronic transmission, and in relation to a work include – (a) the broadcasting of the work; (b) the 
making available to the public of the work by electronic transmission in such a way that members of 
the public may access it from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.” 
484
 “(1) The showing or playing in public of a broadcast to an audience who have not paid for 
admission to the place where the broadcast is to be seen or heard does not infringe any copyright 
in - (a) the broadcast; (b) any sound recording (except so far as it is an excepted sound recording) 
included in it; or (c) any film included in it.” 
485
 See Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, 
Multichoice Hellas SA v QC Leisure, David Richardson, AV Station plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, 
Michael Madden, SR Leisure Ltd, Philip George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen and C-429/08 
Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, cit, 149. 
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 Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice Hellas SA v QC Leisure, 
David Richardson, AV Station plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael Madden, SR Leisure Ltd, Philip 
George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen, cit, 78. 
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 See Case C-135/10 Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso, [not yet published], 
15 March 2012, in which it was held that the concept of communication to the public for the 




quite disappointing that it did not deal with the issue as to the type of protection 
sporting event may enjoy in the UK should no copyright-protected materials be 
present within them. This increases uncertainties about both the current scope of 
copyright protection under UK law, following recent decisions of the CJEU. 
 
 
II. Painer: no photos deserve more protection than others 
 
The CJEU decision in Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH, Axel Springer 
AG, Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH, SPIEGEL-Verlag Rudolf AUGSTEIN GmbH & Co 
KG and Verlag M. DuMont Schauberg Expedition der Kölnischen Zeitung GmbH & 
Co KG488 followed a reference from the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, 
Vienna), seeking clarification – inter alia – as to whether a photo-fit based on a 
photograph might be published in newspapers, magazines and on the internet 
without the author’s consent.  
 
 
1. Facts and questions referred to the CJEU 
 
The facts in the main proceedings related to the abduction of Austrian girl Natascha 
Kampusch, the search measures conducted by the security authorities in that case, 
and the media reporting after her escape.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property must be interpreted 
as meaning that it does not cover the broadcasting, free of charge, of phonograms within private 
dental practices engaged in professional economic activity, for the benefit of patients of those 
practices and enjoyed by them without any active choice on their part. Therefore, such an act of 
transmission does not entitle the phonogram producers to the payment of remuneration. See a 
contrario Case C-162/10 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland, Attorney General, 
[not yet published], 15 March 2012, in which it was held that a hotel operator which provides in 
guest bedrooms televisions and/or radios to which it distributes a broadcast signal is a user making 
a communication to the public of a phonogram which may be played in a broadcast for the 
purposes of Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the 
field of intellectual property. Therefore, a hotel operator which provides in guest bedrooms 
televisions and/or radios to which it distributes a broadcast signal is obliged to pay equitable 
remuneration under Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115 for the broadcast of a phonogram, in addition 






The applicant in the main proceedings was freelance photographer Eva-Marie 
Painer, who had taken several photographs of Natascha Kampusch. Ms Painer had 
designed the background, decided the position and facial expression of her subject, 
and produced and developed the photographs. In the course of her work, Ms Painer 
labelled her photographs with her own name, by using stickers and/or impressions in 
decorative portfolios or mounts. She sold the photographs she had made, but did not 
confer on third parties any rights over them and did not consent to their publication.  
When Natascha Kampusch was kidnapped in 1998, aged ten, the competent 
security authorities launched a search appeal in which the contested photographs 
were used.  
In 2006, the girl managed to escape from her abductor. Prior to her first public 
appearance, the defendants in the main proceedings (newspaper and magazine 
publishers established in Austria and Germany) published the photographs Ms 
Painer had taken of her, without indicating the name of the photographer, or 
indicating a name other than Ms Painer’s as the photographer. Furthermore, several 
of those publications had also released a portrait (a photo-fit), created by computer 
from the contested photographs, which, since there was no recent photograph of 
Natascha until her first public appearance, represented her supposed image.  
By summons before the Handelsgericht Wien in 2007, Ms Painer had sought 
an order that the defendants in the main proceedings immediately cease the 
reproduction and/or distribution, without her consent and without indicating her as the 
author, of the contested photographs, as well as the photo-fit. She had also applied 
for an order against the defendants for accounts, payment of appropriate 
remuneration and damages for her loss and for an interlocutory injunction, on which 
a ruling had been given by the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) before the 
case reached the CJEU. Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court had found that the 
defendants in the main proceedings did not need Ms Painer’s consent to publish the 
contested photo-fit, in that this was to be considered a free use of her work. 
According to the Handelsgericht Wien, the issue of whether the photo-fit was an 
adaptation or a free use depended on the creative effort in the template. In particular, 
the greater the creative effort in the template, the less conceivable would have been 
a free use of her work. According to the court, in the case of portrait photographs, the 




be narrow and the contested photo-fit based on the template was to be considered 
as a new and autonomous work protected by copyright.  
Despite this, the Austrian court decided to stay the proceedings and seek 
clarification from the CJEU as to four questions, regarding the correct interpretation 
of Articles 6(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (also known as ‘Brussels I’)489 and Articles 1(1)490, 5(3)(d) and (e) and (5)491 
of the InfoSoc Directive. 
For the purpose of this contribution, it is sufficient to limit our attention to the 
answer the Court of Justice provided to the fourth question, which read as follows: 
 
[Is] Article 1(1) of [the InfoSoc] Directive … in conjunction with Article 5(5) 
thereof and Article 12 of the Berne Convention492 … , particularly in the light of 
Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [signed at Rome on 
4 November 1950] and Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union493, to be interpreted as meaning that photographic works 
and/or photographs, particularly portrait photos, are afforded “weaker” 
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 Article 6(1) states that: “A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued … where he is 
one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, 
provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them 
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”. 
490
 Article 1(1) states that: “This Directive concerns the legal protection of copyright and related rights 
in the framework of the internal market, with particular emphasis on the information society.” 
491
Article  5(3)(d) and (e) and (5) states that: “Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations 
to the rights provided for in Articles 2 and 3 in the following cases … (d) quotations for purposes 
such as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a work or other subject-matter which has 
already been lawfully made available to the public, that, unless this turns out to be impossible, the 
source, including the author's name, is indicated, and that their use is in accordance with fair 
practice, and to the extent required by the specific purpose; (e) use for the purposes of public 
security or to ensure the proper performance or reporting of administrative, parliamentary or judicial 
proceedings; … The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only 
be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or 
other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.” 
492
 Article 12 provides that: “Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of 
authorising adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their works.” 
493
 According to Article 17, “(1) Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her 
lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the 
public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair 
compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law 




copyright protection or no copyright protection at all against adaptations 





2. The CJEU follows Infopaq and goes even further … 
 
As pointed out by the CJEU, this question had been raised by the Austrian court in 
order to determine the correctness of the position which determined that the 
defendants in the main proceedings did not need Ms Painer’s consent to publish a 
photo-fit worked up from a portrait photograph. This implied that the scope of the 
protection conferred on such a photograph was restricted, or even non-existent, 
because of the minimal degree of formative freedom allowed by such photographs. In 
other words, the referring court sought clarification as to whether the originality 
standard for photographs – to be found in Article 6 of the Term Directive and 
according to which copyright protection vests in photographs which are their ‘author’s 
own intellectual creation’ – is such as to include portrait photographs. If the answer to 
this had been affirmative, the question which followed was whether the threshold for 
protection should be higher than for other categories of photographs, because of the 
allegedly minor degree of creative freedom such photographs display. 
As regards the question whether portrait photographs deserve weaker 
copyright protection, the CJEU decided to address this by first recalling its earlier 
decision in Infopaq.494 The Court pointed out that copyright protection is to arise in 
relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own 
intellectual creation: a work is original if it reflects the author’s personality. According 
to the Court, 
 
That is the case if the author was able to express his creative abilities in the 
production of the work by making free and creative choices …495  
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The Court held that this was the proper interpretation of the originality 
requirement, by recalling a contrario the reasoning in Murphy, in which it was held 
that sporting events could not be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as 
works within the meaning of the InfoSoc Directive. In particular, football matches, 
being subject to rules of the game, leave no room for creative freedom for the 
purposes of copyright protection.496 
From this, held the Court, it quite easily follows that the author of a portrait 
photograph can also make free and creative choices in several ways and at various 
points in the production. So, by way of exemplification, the Court clarified that, in the 
pre-shooting phase, the photographer can choose the background, the subject’s 
pose and the lighting. In particular, when taking a portrait photograph, he can choose 
the framing, the angle of view and the atmosphere created. Finally, when selecting 
the snapshot, the photographer may choose from a variety of developing techniques 
the one he wishes to adopt or, where appropriate, use computer software. As a 
consequence of such various choices, “the author of a portrait photograph can stamp 
the work created with his ‘personal touch’”.497  
This part of the judgment is reminiscent of the reasoning underlying the 
Opinion of Justice Miller in Sarony498 and also the words of Susan Sontag in her 
seminal work On photography:  
 
While a painting or a prose description can never be other than a narrowly 
selective interpretation, a photograph can be treated as a narrowly selective 
transparency. But despite the presumption of veracity that gives all 
photographs authority, interest, seductiveness, the work that photographers do 
is not generic exception to the usually shady commerce between art and truth. 
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 Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and 
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Even when photographers are most concerned with mirroring reality, they are 
still haunted by tacit imperatives of taste and conscience.499 
 
What results from the decision in Painer is that portrait photographs may not 
only enjoy copyright protection, but that such protection is no weaker than that 
granted to other types of photographs. Hence, under Article 2(a) of the InfoSoc 
Directive, the author of a portrait photograph is equally entitled to, amongst other 
things, the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit its direct or indirect, temporary or 
permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part.  
 
 
3. … Clarifying the meaning of originality … 
 
As far as the construction of EU copyright is concerned, the ruling in Painer 
represents another step in the clarification of what is now a EU-wide originality 
standard and, hence, copyright. Holding that a work is original if it shows the author’s 
‘personal touch’ makes the decision in Painer more akin to the notion of originality 
adopted in Murphy, rather than the that of ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ 
envisaged in Infopaq and Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace. 
The question which arises following the judgment is whether these definitions 
are mere synonyms, or whether they do instead differ from the originality standard 
adopted in the Software, Term and Database Directives (and if so, in what 
respect).500  
Drawing from the construction of the judgment, the answer seems to indicate 
that these definitions are synonymic. However, the recent decision of the Belgian 
Supreme Court in Artetessuto501 may suggest the contrary. In this case, the Belgian 
court held that a literary or artistic work is protected by copyright on condition that it is 
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original solely in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation. It is not 
required that the work carries the stamp of the author’s personality.502 
Despite this, the ‘personal touch’ requirement serves the purpose of clarifying 
what is to be intended by the ‘author’s personality’ and, with it, ‘intellectual creation’, 
which is the sole criterion for copyright protection, as clarified by recital 17 of the 
Term Directive.503 In any case, this finding confirms how deeply bound the recent 




4. … Playing a requiem for subject-matter categorisation, and … 
 
The decision in Painer is not surprising. Should the Court have decided otherwise 
and stated, for instance, that portrait photographs deserve narrower protection than 
other types of photographs, the result would have been difficult to comprehend and 
apply in practice. Who would think that the photographs on display at the National 
Portrait Gallery in London, and competing for the Taylor Wessing Photographic 
Portrait Prize, deserve weaker protection than other types of photographs, or are not 
worthy of copyright protection at all?  
However, if this was the sole reason why the decision is relevant, it would be 
barely worth mentioning in the context of the debate at hand. Instead, what matters 
most for our current purposes is that, by addressing the issue posed by the Austrian 
court, the CJEU followed an alternative path of reasoning to a subject-matter 
categorisation. Indeed, having recalled the standard for originality required under 
Infopaq, the Court held that, whenever the author of a work has been able to express 
his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative 
choices, then that work is protected by copyright. Such a finding confirms what was 
only briefly touched upon in Infopaq and Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, but was 
clearly implied in Murphy.  
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What Painer suggests is indeed that subject-matter categorisation is out of 
sight in the CJEU interpretation of copyright architecture. Therefore, not only has the 
Court de facto harmonised the originality requirement, but it appears to have also 
paved the way to a EU copyright architecture which, similarly to the continental 
model and contrary to UK copyright law, does not require that a work falls under one 
of the categories provided for by the law to receive protection. Getting rid of 
exhaustive subject-matter categorisation may help overcome the difficulties 
associated with it, and also favour more homogeneous copyright assessments. 
 
 
5. Making it clear that copyright is not a story of the prince and the pauper 
 
In denying any a priori difference in the degree of protection enjoyed by portrait 
photographs and other types of photographs, the CJEU stressed the need to focus 
on the actual originality of the work at stake, rather than on the alleged subject-matter 
this ought to belong to. The Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, which was 
published on 12 April 2011504, had also adopted such a view. By relying upon a literal 
interpretation of Article 6 of the Term Directive, AG Trstenjak had clarified that  
 
The relevant factor under the first sentence of Article 6 is whether the photos 
are original in the sense that they are the author’s own intellectual creation. 
The second sentence of Article 6 of that directive provides that no other 
criteria may be applied to determine their eligibility for protection … According 
to the first sentence of Article 6 … only human creations are therefore 
protected, which can also include those for which the person employs a 
technical aid, such as a camera … Furthermore, the photo must be an original 
creation. In the case of a photo, this means that the photographer utilises 
available formative freedom and thus gives it originality … Other criteria are 
expressly irrelevant …505 
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So, if this is the state of the art in relation to photographs, one may argue that 
– after the decision in Painer – no distinctions ought to be made between different 
types of photographs. Real life reportages by Cartier-Bresson or fashion photographs 
by Helmut Newton are no different, as far as copyright is concerned, from portraits by 
Hoppé.  
 To decide whether a work enjoys copyright protection, what is required is not 
that it belongs to specific copyright subject-matter, but that it is sufficiently original. 
 
 
III. Football Dataco: farewell to the arms (of UK copyright)? 
 
Following the Opinion of AG Mengozzi on 15 December 2011506, on 1 March 2012, 
the CJEU published its judgment in Football Dataco507, another reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the UK, this time from the Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales (Civil Division).508 The reference sought clarification – inter alia – as to the 
correct reading of Article 3(1) of the Database Directive509, as mentioned above sub 
Chapter III, §VII.  
 
 
1. Background to the case 
 
Football Dataco and the other applicants arrange the English and Scottish football 
leagues. In that context, they draw up and make public a list of all the fixtures to be 
played each year in those leagues (‘the fixture lists’). The opposing parties, Yahoo! 
and other undertakings, used those schedules to provide news and information 
and/or to organise betting activities.  
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 Article 3(1) states that: “In accordance with this Directive, databases which, by reason of the 
selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation shall be 





Football Dataco and the other applicant companies sued Yahoo! and other 
undertakings back in 2009, claiming the alleged infringement of exclusive IPRs in the 
fixture lists, which the defendants used without a licence.  
In the first instance proceedings510, the Chancery Division of the High Court of 
Justice of England and Wales was asked to decide whether any (and if so which) 
rights subsisted in the fixture lists. As it has been correctly pointed out511, this 
represented the first judicial appraisal in the English and Welsh courts on copyright 
protection of databases, pursuant to Article 3 of the Database Directive.  
Floyd J, after having considered that the main candidates were copyright as a 
database and the sui generis database right, found that the fixture lists involved the 
production of selection or arrangement within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the 
Database Directive. This was because the process of selection and arrangement of 
the contents of a database can and often will commence before all the data is 
created.512 For this reason, Floyd J held that the fixture lists were protected by 
copyright. With particular regard to the interpretation of the ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’, Floyd J referred with approval to the following passage from Laddie 
Prescott & Vitoria, which found that: 
 
More fundamentally the database must, when these two factors [selection and 
arrangement] are considered, constitute its author's own intellectual creation. 
This imposes a significant qualitative factor on the test. It would appear to 
exclude computer-generated databases. It is submitted that there must be 
something which has had the author's creativity stamped upon it. By this we 
mean that it must be something which could not be something which could 
fairly be said to be something which could have been created by many others. 
There must be some 'subjective' contribution. A 'sweat of the brow' collection 
will not do.513 
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Despite a lack of precedents from the CJEU, Floyd J drew from German case 
law514 to distinguish between what parts of a database are purely deterministic and 
what allows sufficient room for individual creative work. Copyright protection only 
exists for the latter. However, the decision left some unresolved questions, such as 
what level of originality is required to qualify for database copyright.515 Finally, by 
referring to the decision of the then ECJ in William Hill516, he held that no sui generis 
database right subsisted in the fixture lists, because no additional efforts had been 
spent in obtaining, verifying or presenting the data content.517 
On appeal, Jacob LJ, along with Hooper and Rimer LLJJ ruled out any 
possibility of protection based on the sui generis right, as the Grand Chamber of 
Court of Justice had made it plain that no such right subsisted in things like football 
fixture lists. In particular, it had done so in its 2004 decisions in Fixtures Marketing518, 
William Hill519, Svenska Spel520 and OPAP.521  
Indeed, since the introduction of the Database Directive, the CJEU has 
attempted to clarify the meaning of its provisions on several occasions. In its 2004 
decisions, it restricted the scope of the sui generis right, holding that the investment 
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in the creation of the contents of a database does not qualify as investment for 
obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-use of a 
whole or of a substantial part of the database, whether evaluated qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Directive. In 2008, in Directmedia 
Publishing522, the Court interpreted ‘extraction’ within the meaning of Article 7 and 
adopted a broad interpretation, covering the transfer of material from a protected 
database to another database, independent of a technical process of copying the 
contents of the protected database. In 2009, the decision in Apis523 clarified the 
concept of ‘permanent transfer’ and ‘temporary transfer’ in Article 7, and held that 
whether there has been extraction and/or re-utilisation of a substantial part of the 
contents of a database (evaluated quantitatively), within the meaning of such 
provision ought to be compared to the total contents of that module, in order to 
determine if the latter constitutes, in itself, a database which fulfils the conditions for 
protection by the sui generis right.524 
Despite the rich case law, as pointed out by the Court of Appeal, whether 
fixture lists deserve protection under copyright remained an unsolved issue. Creation 
of the fixture lists does involve considerable skill and judgment, as well as labour, 
and is not just a mechanical process. However, it was uncertain whether such skill 
and judgment were of the right kind for the purposes of Article 3 of the Database 
Directive. Therefore, as mentioned above sub Chapter III, §VII,  the Court of Appeal 
decided to stay the proceedings and make a reference to the CJEU on the following 
questions regarding the interpretation of the Database Directive:  
 
1.     In Article 3(1) of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases 
what is meant by “databases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement 
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of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation” and in 
particular: 
(a)      should the intellectual effort and skill of creating data be excluded? 
(b)      does “selection or arrangement” include adding important significance 
to a pre-existing item of data (as in fixing the date of a football match)? 
(c)      does “author’s own intellectual creation” require more than significant 
labour and skill from the author, if so what? 
2.      Does the Directive preclude national rights in the nature of copyright in 
databases other than those provided for by the Directive? 
 
As is apparent, particularly from the first question referred by the Court of 
Appeal, the impact of Infopaq525 has been so substantial on national copyright laws 
that its implications were still to be assessed. In particular, as mentioned above sub 
Chapter III, §VII, the fact that doubts persisted as to whether ‘author’s own 
intellectual creation’ meant something else than the traditional UK standard of 
‘significant labour and skill’ stands as a demonstration of the fact that the Infopaq 
ruling cast doubts also on areas of copyright which had on the surface been left 
untouched by it, or for which harmonisation had already occurred (such as 
databases).526 In addition, uncertainties existed as to the criteria to be used in 
considering whether a database is the author's own intellectual creation.527 
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The Court of Appeal’s reason for seeking clarification as to the standard of 
originality required for obtaining copyright protection was that Article 3 of the 
Database Directive 
 
requires that the work of selecting and arranging be the “author's own 
intellectual creation.” Whilst that would exclude mere mechanistic “sweat of 
brow” work such as that involved in compiling a telephone book (in the old, 
pre-computer, days that was a lot of work), it is far from self-evident that other, 
truly creative but not artistic, work is excluded. Quite what the meaning and 





2. Copyright in databases: what type of originality? AG Mengozzi explains 
 
As is well known, under the Database Directive, a database may be subject to two 
distinct types of protection: copyright (Article 3) and the sui generis right (Article 7). 
According to AG Mengozzi, in order to assess under what conditions a 
database may be protected by copyright (which in essence is the content of the first 
question posed by the Court of Appeal), it was necessary to first review CJEU case 
law on football fixture lists – in particular the 2004 decisions mentioned above – and 
then determine the relationship between copyright and the sui generis right. 
In relation to CJEU case law, the Opinion states that the 2004 rulings made it 
clear that football fixture lists must be regarded as databases for the purposes of the 
Directive. Despite this, and as correctly recalled by the Court of Appeal, they cannot 
be protected under the sui generis right, in that they do not require any substantial 
investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents.529  
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Coming to the relationship between copyright and the sui generis right, 
clarifying that the concept of ‘database’ is the same in both the cases, AG Mengozzi 
recalled that the two types of protection must be regarded as mutually independent in 
all respects. This is because their very object is different. Indeed,  
 
protection under the copyright focuses essentially on the structure of the 
database, that is, the way in which it has actually been put together through 
the selection of the data to be included or the way in which they are presented 
… The ‘sui generis’ protection, on the other hand, is simply a right to prohibit 
extraction and/or re-utilisation of the data contained in the database. That right 
is conferred, not to protect the originality of the database in itself, but to 
compensate the effort expended in obtaining, verifying and/or presenting the 
data contained therein.530 
 
Having clarified this, the AG further observed that the idea of using copyright 
to protect football fixture lists seemed peculiar, given the scope of copyright 
protection. In fact Yahoo! and the other defendants used the data developed by the 
companies which organise the leagues, in a form other than that by which those 
companies make the data public. In any case, should protection under copyright be 
available for football fixture lists, this would not be likely to impede the activities of 
Yahoo! and the other defendants, because such activities appear to be confined to 
the use of raw data (the dates, times and teams for the various matches), not the 
structure of the database. 
From the foregoing it follows that the efforts expended in the creation of the 
data cannot be taken into account for the purposes of assessing eligibility for 
protection under the copyright (these cannot be taken into account for the sui generis 
protection either). 
In relation to sub-question 1(b), the Court of Appeal sought clarification as to 
whether the ‘selection or arrangement’ of the contents of the database, such as 
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permitting protection under copyright, could also involve adding specific 
characteristics to an item already included in a database. According to AG Mengozzi, 
in abstract terms the answer would be affirmative. This is because adding important 
significance to pre-existing items of data may constitute an arrangement of contents, 
which may qualify for copyright protection. If this is the answer in general terms, in 
the specific case, the elements which characterise the matches of a football league 
are all basic data that do not qualify for copyright protection per se. 
What matters most is in fact the answer provided to sub-question 1(c). This is 
because the response makes it clear, once and for all, that Infopaq has actually 
altered the meaning and scope of the originality requirement in the UK. 
 
 
3. An intellectual creation in not just labour and skill 
 
In essence, by sub-question 1(c), the Court of Appeal asked whether the originality 
standard set out in Infopaq ought to be read as being different (stricter) to the 
traditionally loose originality standard of ‘significant labour and skill’.  
According to AG Mengozzi, the answer to such a question ought to be 
affirmative, in that:  
 
copyright protection is conditional upon the database being characterised by a 
‘creative’ aspect, and it is not sufficient that the creation of the database 
required labour and skill.531 
 
This is because the Database Directive adopted a concept of originality which 
requires more than a mere mechanical effort to collect the data and enter them into 
the database. In order to be protected by copyright, a database must be an 
‘intellectual creation’ of its creator. What an ‘intellectual creation’ is depends, 
according to the AG, on an assessment to be undertaken by national courts in light of 
the circumstances of each individual case.  
However, the AG indicated that the expression ‘intellectual creation’ adopted 
by the Directive echoes a formula which is typical of continental copyright laws and 
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sets a higher threshold to protection than what is under UK copyright. Indeed, it was 
felt that 
 
a work is an intellectual creation if it reflects the personality of its author, which 
is the case if the author was able to make free and creative choices in the 
production of the work … [T]he necessary originality will be absent if the 
features of a work are predetermined by its technical function.532 
 
This finding would not be surprising at all, if it was limited to the sole subject-
matter of databases. It is in fact well-known that in countries such as the UK 
decisions such as Football League Ltd v Littlewoods Pools533 no longer constitute a 
valid precedent which courts may rely upon.  
Albeit that AG Mengozzi referred expressly to the originality standard under 
the sole Database Directive, it would be parochial to argue that his opinion was 
limited to this. This is made clear by the fact that, in explaining what meaning 
‘intellectual creation’ ought to be given, he referred to judgments concerning not to 
the Database Directive, but the InfoSoc Directive.  
 
 
4. There is little to do if copyright cannot do 
 
By its second question, the Court of Appeal sought clarification as to whether 
protection provided under the Database Directive on the basis of the copyright is the 
only type of protection available to a database or if, on the contrary, national law may 
confer similar protection on databases which do not meet the necessary conditions 
under the Directive.  
AG Mengozzi addressed this issue by referring especially to Article 14, a 
provision which contains special transitional arrangements for databases formerly 
protected by copyright under national rules that do not meet the requirements for 
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copyright protection under the Directive. Article 14 provides that such databases are 
to retain copyright protection for the remainder of the term of protection afforded 
under the national arrangements preceding the Directive. It is clear that this provision 
would make no sense if, after the entry into force of the Directive, Member States 
were allowed, without any limitation in time, to protect a database which does not 
meet the conditions set out in the Directive. Therefore, copyright cannot be vested in 
databases which do not meet the requirements for copyright protection as laid down 
in Article 3 of the Directive.  
 
 
5. The decision of the CJEU 
 
On 1 March 2012, the CJEU published its decision, substantially reflecting the 
Opinion of AG Mengozzi. 
In providing its response to the first question, the Court noted that there was 
no controversy as to whether a football league fixture list constituted a ‘database’ 
within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Database Directive. Indeed, in Fixture 
Marketing534, the Court held that the combination of the date, time and identity of the 
two teams playing in both home and away matches had autonomous informative 
value which rendered them ‘independent materials’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) 
and that the arrangement, in the form of a fixture list, of the dates, times and names 
of teams in the various fixtures of a football league met the conditions set out in 
Article 1(2) as to the systematic or methodical arrangement and individual 
accessibility of the data contained in the database.  
This said, it was also undisputed that, from both a comparison of the terms 
used in Article 3(1) and Article 7(1) of the Database Directive, and from other 
provisions or recitals therein (in particular Article 7(4) and Recital 39), copyright and 
the sui generis right are different and mutually independent rights, also with respect 
to their object and conditions of application. This implies that, even if a database did 
not meet the conditions of eligibility for protection under the sui generis right, it could 
be nonetheless protected by copyright as per Article 3 of the Database Directive. 
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This is the case if the database, by reason of the selection or arrangement of its 
contents, constitutes the author’s own intellectual creation.  
 
 
5.1. The requirements for copyright protection under the Database Directive 
 
At paragraph 30 and the subsequent paragraphs of the decision, the CJEU offered a 
thorough explanation of the meaning of originality within the Database Directive and, 
more generally, of the overall EU understanding of originality. In assessing the 
requirements for copyright protection pursuant to Article 3 of the Database Directive, 
the Court first considered the meaning of ‘selection or arrangement’ and then the 
concept of the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’. 
First of all, the Court made it clear that Article 3(2), if read in conjunction with 
recital 15535 of the Database Directive, provides for copyright  protection to vest in the 
structure of the database, not its contents nor, therefore, the elements constituting its 
contents. This reflects Articles 10(2) TRIPS and 5 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 
which provide for copyright protection to be available to compilations of data which, 
by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual 
creations. Protection does not extend to the data itself, although copyright may 
subsist in that data.  
The selection and arrangement referred to in Article 3(1) of the Database 
Directive is the means through which the author of the database gives the database 
its structure. Such concepts do not extend to the creation of the data contained in 
that database. As a consequence, explained the Court, the intellectual effort and skill 
involved in creating the data is not relevant for the assessment of the eligibility of the 
database itself for copyright protection under the Directive. This finding is confirmed 
by Recitals 9, 10 and 12. The adoption of the Database Directive was justified by the 
objective of stimulating the creation of data storage and processing systems. This 
was necessary to contribute to the development of an information market against the 
background of the exponential growth in the amount of  information  generated  and  
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processed  annually  in  all  sectors  of  activity536, not to protect the creation of 
materials to be collected in a database.  
Having clarified this, the Court considered whether the fixture lists were such 
as to enjoy copyright protection. The Court observed that the intellectual resources in 
the main proceedings were deployed for the purpose of determining, in the course of 
arranging the leagues concerned, the date, time, and identity of teams corresponding 
to each fixture of those leagues. This was done in accordance with a set of rules, 
parameters and organisational constraints, as well as the specific requests of the 
clubs concerned. Those resources related to the creation of the same data that is 
contained in the database in question. Because of this, they were of no relevance in 
order to assess the eligibility of the football fixture lists for the copyright protection 
provided for by the Database Directive. 
Having considered the meaning of ‘selection or arrangement’ within Article 
3(1) of the Database Directive, the Court turned to consider the other requirement 
under that provision: whether the database was ‘the author’s own intellectual 
creation’. 
Recalling recital 16 of the Directive537, as well as relevant case law538, the 
CJEU held that the notion of the author’s own intellectual creation refers to the 
criterion of originality. As regards the setting up of a database, the Court held that 
 
that criterion of originality is satisfied when, through the selection or 
arrangement of the data which it  contains, its author expresses his creative 
ability in an original manner by making free and creative choices … and thus 
stamps his ‘personal touch’ …  
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By  contrast,  that  criterion  is  not  satisfied  when  the  setting  up  of  the  
database is dictated by technical considerations, rules or constraints which 
leave no room for creative freedom … 
As  is  apparent  from  both  Article  3(1)  and  recital  16  of  Directive  96/9,  
no  other criteria  than  that  of  originality  is  to  be  applied  to  determine  the  
eligibility  of  a database for the copyright protection provided for by that 
directive.539  
 
This said, the CJEU clarified two additional points. 
Firstly, for the purpose of assessing whether a database is eligible for 
copyright protection, it is irrelevant whether the selection or arrangement of the 
contents includes ‘adding important significance’, as mentioned in Question 1(b) of 
the Court of Appeal. The only requirement is and ought to be that the selection or 
arrangement of the data is an original expression of the creativity of the author of the 
database. 
Secondly, and most importantly as far as UK copyright is concerned, 
 
the fact that the setting up of the database required, irrespective of  the  
creation  of  the  data  which  it  contains,  significant  labour  and  skill  of  its 
author, as mentioned in [Question 1](c) …, cannot as such justify the 
protection of it by copyright under Directive 96/9, if that labour and that skill do 
not express any originality in the selection or arrangement of that data.540  
 
In light of the foregoing, the answer to the first question of the Court of Appeal 
is that Article 3(1) of the Database Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a 
database is eligible for copyright protection, provided that the selection or 
arrangement of the data which it contains amounts to an original expression of the 
creative freedom of its author, which is a matter for national courts to determine.  
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5.2. Might there be other rights in databases? 
 
By its second question the Court of Appeal had asked whether the Database 
Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that grants databases 
copyright protection even beyond the conditions set out in Article 3(1) of the 
Directive. 
The CJEU first highlighted that the rationale underlying the Database Directive 
was to remove differences that existed between Member States as to the legal 
protection of databases, in particular with regard to the scope and conditions of 
copyright protection.541 
Article 14(2) of the Directive provided that, where a database protected under 
copyright arrangements in a Member State on the date of publication of the Directive 
(27 March 1996) did not meet the eligibility criteria for copyright protection laid down 
in Article 3 (1), the entry into force of the Directive would not have resulted in a 
curtailing in that Member State of the remaining term of protection afforded therein. 
However, subject only to that transitional provision, Article 3(1) is such as to preclude 
national legislation from granting databases protection under conditions which differ 
from those envisaged in that provision. 
 
 
6. The implications of the Football Dataco decision 
 
As is apparent from the foregoing, the CJEU decided to follow the Opinion of AG 
Mengozzi. The implications of the decision are three-fold.  
First of all, it is confirmed that originality is to be considered as harmonised at 
the EU level and given a meaning akin to that set out in those Directives which 
provided a common originality standard in relation to specific subject-matter.  
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In addition, not only has the CJEU harmonised the originality requirement and, 
with it, the standard protection under EU copyright for any subject-matter other than 
that for which harmonisation had occurred by means of ad hoc Directives, but also 
ruled out any possible alternative protection (except for sui generis right where 
applicable).542 This finding is likely to result in serious controversies at the national 
level. This is because the stance adopted by the CJEU in Football Dataco goes well 
beyond the sole category of databases and indeed implies a strict understanding of 
the author’s own intellectual creation standard.543 This may lead to the exclusion of 
sub-original (at least in the EU sense) works which have been traditionally protected 
also under continental copyright laws. Indeed, as explained by Andreas Rahmatian, 
at the national level the understanding of the originality requirement as being akin to 
‘the author’s own intellectual creation’ has been “watered down remarkably and 
accommodates very low versions of artistic creativity.”544 Under German and other 
continental Member States’ copyright laws, the originality requirement is in fact 
qualified by the principle of ‘kleine Münze’ or ‘petite monnaie’ (‘small change’), ie “the 
idea of a relaxed originality threshold in relation to works which constitute simple 
creations of daily use where only a minimum notional creative input is required for 
protection, such as catalogues, price lists, collection of recipes.”545 The small change 
principle has been deemed applicable to information works which are of high 
economic significance, but irrelevant from a cultural-artistic standpoint.546 In addition, 
copyright protection is said to be justified in consideration of the fact that such works 
would not eligible for other types of protection, such as design law.547 Following 
CJEU case law, it is doubtful whether such categories of works can still qualify for 
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copyright protection or whether, instead, relief is to be sought (but this is not 
uncontroversial) under other types of intellectual property rights or, more generally, 
the law of unfair competition (where applicable).548    
In any case, it is not difficult to see that the conclusion of the CJEU implies 
that copyright is totally harmonised at the EU level. As a consequence, any 
discussion on the feasibility of creating an optional unitary copyright title on the basis 
of Article 118 TFEU should necessarily lead to the recognition that this process has 
been not only commenced, but is actually at a very advanced stage. A EU copyright 
title would then be a sort of codification of the acquis communautaire and, above all, 
of the interpretation the CJEU has given of it.   
The final consideration (which will be developed further below sub Chapter V) 
concerns the UK. From the string of decisions which have followed Infopaq549, it is 
apparent that precedents such as University of London Press550 are no longer valid. 
As pointed out by Trevor Cook551, this is because the test for a work’s originality can 
no longer be simply a matter of degree dependent on the amount of skill, judgment, 
or labour involved in its making.552 Contrary to this conclusion, a reductionist 
interpretation of these decisions has been advanced. According to Mirelle van 
Eecoud, the distinction between continental Europe and UK approaches to originality 
is to be scaled down. This is because the distinction between the two legal traditions  
seems inspired by a fairly schematic view of Anglo-Saxon versus continental 
European notions of originality.553  
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Although some UK-based commentators have saluted the decision as “a 
welcome development as there is still misinterpretation and confusion in the English 
courts on this point even at the appellate level”554, amongst other things, uncertainty 
remains as to the answer provided by the Court to Question 2. In particular, as 
mentioned, it is not clear whether databases may still enjoy protection against 
parasitism or slavish copying, which many national laws provide in their tort or 
focused unfair competition statutes. This is because the Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales had asked the Court more specifically whether the Directive precluded 
national rights in the nature of copyright in databases, other than those provided for 
therein. According to Estelle Derclaye, although the Court’s answer is not entirely 
clear on this point, if anything, “it is fair to assume that that sort of protection is also 
out of the window. Indeed, it would adversely affect the functioning of the internal 
market and free movement of goods and services if databases could obtain quasi-
copyright protection through unfair competition law provisions.”555  
 
 
IV. SAS: Shake-and-Strain the scope of copyright protection 
 
The reference for a preliminary ruling in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming 
Ltd556 was made by the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Chancery 
Division)557, which had sought clarification, inter alia, as to whether the functionalities 
of a computer program and programming language are protected by copyright 
pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Software Directive. As mentioned above, this provision 
reads as follows:  
 
Protection in accordance with this Directive shall apply to the expression in 
any form of a computer program. Ideas and principles which underlie any 
element of a computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces, 
are not protected by copyright under this Directive. 
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The question was therefore whether the very functionalities of a computer 
program may be considered as the ‘expression in any form’ of the computer program, 
or whether, instead, they are just ‘ideas and principles which underlie any element of 
a computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces’, within Article 1(2). 
 
 
1. Background to the case 
 
The claimant in this case, SAS Institute, is a developer of analytical software known 
as SAS (also the ‘SAS System’). This is an integrated set of programs which enables 
users to carry out a wide range of data processing and analysis tasks, in particular 
statistical analysis. The core component of the SAS System is Base SAS, which 
enables users to write and run application programs (‘scripts’) to manipulate data. 
Such applications are written in a language known as the SAS Language. The 
functionality of Base SAS may be extended by the use of additional components. 
Also, SAS Institute’s customers have written, or have had written on their behalf, 
several application programs in the SAS Language. Prior to the events giving rise to 
this dispute, the SAS Institute’s customers had no alternative but to continue to 
acquire a licence to use the SAS components in order to be able to run their existing 
application programs in SAS language, and to create new ones. A customer wishing 
to change software supplier would thus need to re-write its existing application 
programs in a different language. 
The defendant, World Programming (‘WP’), created a product called World 
Programming System to offer alternative software which would be able to execute 
application programs written in the SAS Language. To do this, WPL sought to imitate 
many of the functionalities of the SAS components, so that the same inputs would 
result in identical outputs. In order to achieve this result, no evidence was produced 
that WPL had had access to or copied any of the text or structural designs of the  
source code of the SAS components. 
In September 2009, SAS commenced proceedings before the High Court of 
England and Wales, claiming copyright infringement of its software and of its own 
manuals, as well as a breach of its licence terms with regards to the learning edition 






2. The findings of the High Court and the reference to the CJEU 
 
As far as the scope of the present contribution is concerned, it is sufficient to limit our 
analysis to the issue relating to copyright protection for programming languages, 
interfaces and functionality.  
To address these elements, Arnold J deemed it necessary to revert to Article 
1(2) of the Software Directive, which is to be read in accordance with Articles 9(2) 
TRIPS558 and 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. The wording of the latter559 is similar 
to Article 1(2) of the Software Directive and Section 102(b) of the 1976 US Copyright 
Act.560 However, the term ‘expressions’ contained therein appears to be less 
restrictive as compared to its counterpart (‘tangible medium of expression’) in Section 
102(a)561 of the US Copyright Act.562 
By referring to the decision in Navitaire v easyJet563, Arnold J recalled that 
Article 1(2) of the Software Directive had been interpreted by Kitchin J in Nova v 
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Mazooma564 as meaning that copyright in computer programs does not protect 
programming languages, interfaces or the functionality of a computer program. Such 
a reading of Article 1(2) was upheld by the Court of Appeal (Civil Division).565  
Hence, in UK copyright566 it is not an infringement of the copyright in the 
source code of a computer program for a competitor of the copyright holder to study 
how the program functions, and to subsequently write its own program and imitate 
such functionality. 
With regard to interfaces, the Software Directive does not exclude them from 
copyright protection. It only excludes the ideas and principles which underlie the 
interfaces. Indeed, it has been observed567 that in Total Informatics Processing 
Systems Ltd v Daman Ltd568, a leading case in which UK courts considered the 
problems of interface programs, Judge Paul Baker QC expressly referred to the 
distinction between ideas and their expression in refusing to treat an interface file as 
a separate copyright work. 
Despite consistent case law in this area, Arnold J agreed with Kitchin J that 
the correct interpretation of Article 1(2) of the Software Directive in relation to 
programming languages was not an acte clair and that a reference to the CJEU was 
needed in order to receive guidance as to the proper reading of the provision. In 
addition, even if Kitchin J was right in holding that programming languages are not 
protectable per se, there was room for debate as to how broadly the concept of a 
programming language should be construed in this respect.569  
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Due to these points and other doubts as to the interpretation of EU law, Arnold 
J decided to stay the proceedings and refer nine questions to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling. Of particular interest for the present contribution are questions 
from 1 to 3. Accordingly, analysis will be limited to the points raised therein: 
 
1. Where a computer program (“the First Program”) is protected by 
copyright as a literary work, is Article 1(2) [of Directive 91/250] to be 
interpreted as meaning that it is not an infringement of the copyright in the 
First Program for a competitor of the rightholder without access to the source 
code of the First Program, either directly or via a process such as 
decompilation of the object code, to create another program (“the Second 
Program”) which replicates the functions of the First Program? 
2.      Is the answer to question 1 affected by any of the following factors: 
(a)      the nature and/or extent of the functionality of the First Program; 
(b)      the nature and/or extent of the skill, judgment and labour which has 
been expended by the author of the First Program in devising the functionality 
of the First Program; 
(c)      the level of detail to which the functionality of the First Program has 
been reproduced in the Second Program; 
(d)      if the source code for the Second Program reproduces aspects of the 
source code of the First Program to an extent which goes beyond that which 
was strictly necessary in order to produce the same functionality as the First 
Program? 
3.   Where the First Program interprets and executes application programs 
written by users of the First Program in a programming language devised by 
the author of the First Program which comprises keywords devised or selected 
by the author of the First Program and a syntax devised by the author of the 
First Program, is Article 1(2) [of Directive 91/250] to be interpreted as meaning 
that it is not an infringement of the copyright in the First Program for the 
Second Program to be written so as to interpret and execute such application 





As clarified by AG Bot570, through questions 1 to 3 the referring court was 
essentially asking whether Article 1(2) of the Software Directive is to be interpreted 
as meaning that the functionalities of a computer program and the programming 
language therein are to be regarded as the expression of that program, and thus 
whether they qualify for copyright protection pursuant to that directive. 
 
 
3. The Opinion of Advocate General Bot 
 
Having recalled that, pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Software Directive, Member 
States shall protect computer programs as literary works and that protection by 
copyright applies to the expression in any form of a computer program and not to the 
ideas and principles which underlie any element therein, AG Bot referred to Recital 
14 in the preamble. This states that, in accordance with that principle of copyright, to 
the extent that logic, algorithms and programming languages comprise ideas and 
principles, those ideas and principles are not protected under the Software Directive. 
The Software Directive does not define the meaning of ‘expression in any form 
of a computer program’. This was a deliberate choice in the drafting of the Directive, 
and was meant to avoid the risk that legislative definitions became obsolete with 
technological progress. In any case, it was indicated that: 
 
the elements of creativity, skill and inventiveness manifest themselves in the 
way in which the program is put together. The programmer defines the tasks 
to be performed by a computer program and carries out an analysis of the 
possible ways to achieve those results. The author of a computer program, 
like the author of a book, selects the steps to be taken and the way in which 
those steps are expressed gives the program its particular characteristics of 
speed, efficiency and even style. 
Consequently, protection for a computer program is conceivable only from the 
point at which the selection and compilation of those elements are indicative of 
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the creativity and skill of the author and thus set his work apart from that of 
other authors.571 
 
By referring to the ruling in Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace572, AG Bot 
pointed out that the protection of a computer program is not limited to the literal 
elements of that program, these being the source code and the object code, but 
extends to any other element expressing the creativity of its author.573 
He therefore considered whether the functionality of a computer program (this 
being the set of possibilities offered by a computer system, or the actions specific to 
that program) and the programming language may be regarded as elements which 
express the creativity of their author. AG Bot concluded in the sense that these 
cannot, as such, form the object of copyright protection under the Software Directive. 
In achieving this conclusion, AG Bot seemed to have in mind the factual background 
and reasoning of Pumfrey J in Navitaire.574 However, he raised an important point of 
distinction in this respect, and held that copyright protection may well arise where 
there are many means to achieve the actual expression of those functionalities. This 
is because, 
 
creativity, skill and inventiveness manifest themselves in the way in which the 
program is drawn up, in its writing. The programmer uses formulae, algorithms 
which, as such, are excluded from copyright protection because they are the 
equivalent of the words by which the poet or the novelist creates his work of 
literature. However, the way in which all of these elements are arranged, like 
the style in which the computer program is written, will be likely to reflect the 
author’s own intellectual creation and therefore be eligible for protection.575 
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So the AG, relying on the idea/expression dichotomy576, found that, whilst 
there are functionalities that have merely a technical nature and for which no 
copyright subsists, there are other functionalities that are indeed the expression of 
individual creation and are as such deserving of copyright protection.  
So far, so good. However, a significant problem remains: what test is to be 
applied in order to distinguish the various functionalities of the computer program? 
This was not explained by AG Bot, who just recalled the decision of the CJEU 
in Infopaq577, in which it was held that the various parts of a work enjoy protection 
under Article 2(a) of the InfoSoc Directive, provided that they contain some elements 
which are the expression of the intellectual creation of the author of the 
work. According to Gervais and Derclaye, it may be more appropriate to say that the 
creative choices that generate such originality are what copyright protects, but only 
up to a certain level of abstraction (where expression becomes idea). The concept of 
‘creative choices’, which the CJEU developed notably in Painer, is defined as follows: 
 As a rule of thumb, creative choices are those that one can isolate by asking 
whether two authors in similar situations (tools, direction, budget, etc.) would 
likely have produced essentially the same thing. It is those choices that create 
protectable expression and that, at bottom, copyright is meant to incentivise 
and protect. The rule is somewhat different from the traditional skill, labour and 
judgment test, but the differences only affect a few mostly marginal cases. In 
the SAS case, one would have to find that the code (not formats or a language 
per se) which the Court of Justice found potentially protectable embodies such 
choices.578 
In any case, the Opinion makes it clear that the nature and extent of a 
functionality of a computer program reproduced in another computer program, or the 
level of detail to which that functionality has been reproduced, do not have an impact 
on such an analysis. This is because Article 1(3) of the Software Directive provides 
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that a computer program is to be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the 
author’s own intellectual creation and no other criteria shall be applied in determining 
its eligibility for protection. Indeed, said the Advocate General, to establish whether a 
computer program is an original work, no tests as to the qualitative or aesthetic 
merits of the program should be applied. Rather, to determine whether a computer 
program is eligible for legal protection under copyright, account should be taken not 
of the time and work devoted to devising the program nor of the level of skill of its 
author, but of the degree of originality of its writing. 
The problem indeed lies therein. According to AG Bot, ‘originality of its writing’ 
is to be intended as something which combines both the UK standard test for 
infringement (which relies upon substantiality) and the new (at least for the UK) test 
laid down in Infopaq.579 These are different, as was also acknowledged (although 
rather ambiguously) by Proudman J in Meltwater.580 For the Advocate General, 
instead, the two types of scrutiny are intertwined: 
 
[I]t will be for the national court to examine whether, in reproducing the 
functionalities of the SAS components, WPL reproduced, in its WPL System, a 
substantial part of the elements of those components which are the expression 
of the intellectual creation of the author of those components.581 
 
Having examined the issue concerning software functionalities, AG Bot 
assessed whether the programming language of a computer program may be 
protected by copyright under the Software Directive.  
The Opinion recalls that the source code of a computer program is written in a 
programming language which acts as a translator between the user and the 
computer, enabling the user to write instructions in a language that he himself 
understands. Therefore, programming language is a functional element which allows 
instructions to be given to the computer. In other words, it is the means by which 




 “[O]riginality rather than substantiality is the test to be applied to the part extracted. As a matter of 
principle this is now the only real test”, said the judge at paragraph 69 of The Newspaper Licensing 
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expression is given, not the expression itself. Accordingly, no copyright protection 
vests on the programming language. 
This conclusion, according to AG Bot, is not called into question by the fact 
that recital 14 of the preamble to the Software Directive states that, to the extent that 
logic, algorithms and programming languages comprise ideas and principles, those 
ideas and principles are not protected under the Directive. This is because the 
intention of that recital is to simply restate the principle that copyright protects the 
expression of ideas, rather than ideas themselves.  
 
 
4. The decision of the CJEU 
 
On 2 May 2012, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU published its decision in SAS, 
which did not diverge substantially from the findings of AG Bot reported above.  
 By questions 1 to 3, which the Court decided to examine along with questions 
4 and 5582, the core issue to address was whether the Article 1(2) of the Software 
Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the functionality of a computer 
program, the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer 
program in order to exploit certain of its functions, constitute a form of expression of 
that program and may, as such, be protected by copyright in computer programs for 
the purposes of that Directive. To respond to the questions asked by the referring 
court, the CJEU relied upon the idea/expression dichotomy. To this end, it first 
reverted to legislative sources, in particular Recitals 14 and 15 in the preamble to the 
Software Directive, Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 9(2) of the 
TRIPS Agreements. The Court then referred to the decision in Bezpečnostní 
softwarová asociace583 and held that the object of protection under the Software 
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Directive includes the forms of expression of a computer program and the 
preparatory design work capable of leading, respectively, to the reproduction or the 
subsequent creation of such a program. Since a GUI does not enable the 
reproduction of the computer program, but merely constitutes one element of that 
program by means of which users make use of the features of that program, the 
CJEU held that no protection subsists in GUIs pursuant to the Software Directive. 
This said, the CJEU pointed out that protection pursuant to the InfoSoc 
Directive could vest in those parts of computer functionalities which are their author’s 
own intellectual creation. In particular, though neither the functionality of a computer 
program per se, nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a 
computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions, constitute a form of 
expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of the Software Directive, 
this finding “cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format of 
SAS Institute’s data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 
2001/29 if they are their author’s own intellectual creation”.584 Regrettably, the CJEU 
did not go into detail as to how such scrutiny should be carried out and the most 
authoritative source in this respect still seems to be the (ambiguous) Opinion of AG 
Bot.  
Albeit in a much more concise manner, the CJEU also confirmed the findings 
of AG Bot with respect to the test for copyright infringement in the case of 
reproduction, in a computer program or a user manual for that program, and of 
certain elements described in the user manual for another computer program 
protected by copyright. Recalling the decision in Infopaq, the Court held that the 
various parts of a work enjoy protection under Article 2(a) of the InfoSoc Directive, 
provided that they contain some of the elements which are the expression of the 
intellectual creation of the author of the work. The CJEU found that it is for national 
courts “to ascertain whether the reproduction of those elements constitutes the 
reproduction of the expression of the intellectual creation of the author of the user 
manual for the computer program at issue in the main proceedings. In this respect, 
the examination … of the reproduction of those elements of the user manual for a 
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computer program must be the same with respect to the creation of the user manual 
for a second program as it is with respect to the creation of that second program.”585 
 
 
5. Problems with the interpretation of Advocate General Bot, as confirmed 
by the CJEU 
 
In relation to questions 1 to 3, the position of AG Bot, as approved by the CJEU, 
might give rise to problematic interpretations. This is in respect of copyright 
protection for functionalities, rather than the programming language. In particular, the 
Opinion calls for further reflection from three different angles.  
The first may perhaps be the least problematic. The position of AG Bot paves 
the way to a distinction between the parts of the program and the program as a 
whole. Such a distinction, as was made clear in Infopaq, is to be found neither in the 
InfoSoc Directive nor in any other relevant copyright directive.586 Albeit true that 
some functionalities – in the same manner as single words in newspaper articles – 
cannot, as such, be considered as an intellectual creation of the author of the 
program, it is not disputed that it is through the choice, sequence and combination of 
those elements that the author may express his creativity in an original manner and 
thus achieve a result which is an intellectual creation. Furthermore, in Bezpečnostní 
softwarová asociace587, the CJEU held that the object of the protection conferred by 
the Software Directive is the expression in any form of a computer program (including 
any preparatory design work capable of leading, respectively, to the reproduction or 
the subsequent creation of such a program) which permits reproduction in different 
computer languages. This criterion was not followed by AG Bot when drawing a 
distinction between protectable and non-protectable functionalities, although the 
CJEU referred to it in its decision.588 
This leads to the second point. By distinguishing between protectable and 
non-protectable functionalities, it is arguable that the test for copyright protection will 
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now focus on the functionality per se, rather than the way this is combined with other 
elements of the program. This can be seen as a rather worrisome implication of the 
Opinion and, now, of the judgment itself. In particular, it has been argued that 
competition and innovation in the software industry in the EU as a whole would be 
seriously undermined through this finding. This is because both the text and 
legislative history of the Software Directive, in line with international sources, should 
be understood as providing protection to the literary aspects of programs, but not to 
functionality, languages and data interfaces.589 This is important to safeguard the 
legality of reverse engineering and interoperability of computer programs.590 
However, this said, the Software Directive does not require that in the process of 
ascertaining the existence of copyright protection in relation to computer programs, 
one must have complete disregard of certain elements thereof irrespective of the 
degree to which they are expressed (such as, functionality, programming languages 
and the format in which data files are read and written).591 
The final angle from which SAS may analysed is the peculiar test for 
infringement which AG Bot envisaged therein. Neither the Software Directive nor the 
InfoSoc Directive contain references to a ‘substantial part’. On the contrary, the 
Infopaq decision adopted a test for copyright protection (and so infringement) which 
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The decisions in Murphy, Painer, Football Dataco and SAS have further clarified and 
developed the EU concept of originality. The notion of ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’, which is to be found in the Software, Database and Term Directives and 
was adopted as the standard for originality in Infopaq, is to be understood as 
involving ‘creative freedom’ (Murphy), ‘personal touch’ (Painer), ‘free and creative 
choices’ (Football Dataco). Put it differently, originality is not a matter of sense, but 
also sensibility, although it may be difficult to agree on this conclusion in respect of 
copyright protection for newspaper extracts. This last consideration raises some 
doubts as to the actual consistency of these decisions with Infopaq. In particular, it is 
questionable whether the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ requirement envisaged 
in Infopaq is reconcilable with the additions brought by Murphy, Painer and Football 
Dataco.  
Furthermore, this string of cases has called into question whether a system of 
closed subject-matter categorisation (as it is under UK law) is still in line with EU law. 
Following Murphy, Painer and SAS, EU scrutiny for determining whether a work may 
qualify for copyright protection seems to require solely that the work is original. This 
may be at odds also with the Berne Convention, which appears to imply any 
assessment of the originality requirement (which, however, is not expressly required 
as a precondition of protection)593 to follow that of the work being a production in the 
literary scientific and artistic domain (while it is a matter for national legislation to 
prescribe that works in general or any specified categories of works shall not be 
protected unless they have been fixed in some material form).594 
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Finally, as was made clear in Football Dataco, not only has the CJEU 
harmonised the originality requirement and, with it, the standard protection under EU 
copyright, but it has also ruled out any possible alternative (quasi-copyright) 
protection for subject-matter such as databases. This may give rise to problematic 
gaps in a country (such as the UK) which lacks a law of unfair competition, but also 
raise controversy in those Member States which are familiar with the principle of 
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As demonstrated above sub Chapters III and IV, recent CJEU decisions tackling, 
among the other things, the issue of originality appear at odds with the traditional UK 
understanding of this concept. In particular, the rulings in Infopaq, Bezpečnostní 
softwarová asociace, Murphy, Painer, Football Dataco, and SAS, besides originality, 
have cast shadows of doubt onto another important element of the UK copyright 
structure: closed subject-matter classification under the CDPA 1988. 
By raising the bar of originality to its continental understanding, a somewhat 
paradoxical side-effect has occurred. In parallel to this, the bar to copyright 
infringement has been lowered accordingly. This will be explained below by referring 




Collections Ltd v New English Teas Ltd and Nicholas John Houghton595 (the so 
called ‘Red Bus’ decision). 
With regards to subject-matter categorisation, this may be said to be outwith 
the scope of EU copyright. In Painer, the Court of Justice made it clear that to claim 
copyright protection successfully, it is sufficient to establish that the author has been 
able to express his creative abilities in the production of a work by making free and 
creative choices. This appears to be the sole criterion, also calling into question 
whether UK copyright is in line with EU law from this point of view. Indeed, one may 
wonder whether the UK Supreme Court would have ruled the same way in Lucasfilm 
Ltd and Others v Ainsworth and Another596, if it had been called to decide the case 
after the aforementioned string of CJEU decisions. 
 
 
I. The ‘Red Bus’ decision 
 
On 12 January 2012 Judge Birss QC gave judgment in Temple Island Collections Ltd 
v New English Teas Ltd and Nicholas John Houghton. This was an action for 
copyright infringement brought by the owner of copyright in a photograph of a red 
London Routemaster bus travelling across Westminster Bridge in London. Apart from 
the red bus, the rest of the photograph was black and white. The Houses of 
Parliament and the bridge itself were shown in grey, against the backdrop of a white 
sky, with no clouds visible.  
 
 
1. Background to the case 
 
The photograph at stake in the present case was taken in 2005 by the managing 
director of Temple Islands.  
He manipulated the photograph on his computer using Photoshop software, 
taking the idea of making the red bus standing against a black and white background 
from 1993 Steven Spielberg’s film Schindler's List. In particular, the photograph was 








subject to the following manipulations: firstly, the red colour of the bus was 
strengthened; then, the sky was removed completely by (electronically) cutting 
around the skyline of the buildings; thirdly, some people present in the foreground of 
original photograph were removed, and the rest of the image was turned to 
monochrome, save for the bus; finally, the whole original image was stretched 
somewhat to change the perspective so that the verticals in the buildings were truly 
vertical. The photograph was published in 2006.  Since then, it has been used by the 
claimant on souvenirs, becoming very well-known in the claimant’s industry. 
The defendants are tea producers. Following a previous settlement with the 
claimant over an allegation of copyright infringement, they produced an image 
portraying grey scale Houses of Parliament and a red bus on the bridge, believing 
that the claimant's copyright did not prevent them from doing so.  
The image was the result of manipulation of four different photographs by one 
of the defendants and an iStockphoto image of a Routemaster bus. Three of the 
photographs by one of the defendants were of different aspects of the Houses of 
Parliament and the fourth was a picture of a red Routemaster bus while it was 
stationary on the Strand in London. The final image was obtained by resizing the bus 
to fit and the road marks were changed to be consistent.  
This being the background to the case, Judge Birss QC made it clear that the 
cases involved “a tricky area of law: i.e. copyright in photographs; and, in the end, 
turns on a disputed qualitative judgment.”597 
 
 
2. Originality in photographs 
 
Having recalled that copyright subsists in original artistic works, pursuant to Section 
1(1)(a) of CDPA 1988, Judge Birss QC assessed the way in which EU law has 
affected UK copyright. In particular, he found that the decision of the CJEU in 
Infopaq598, as later followed with specific regard to photographs in Painer599, 
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suggested that copyright subsists in a photograph which is its author's own 
intellectual creation.600  
The counsel for the claimant referred to a 2003 decision of the Austrian 
Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court)601, which had tackled issues similar to those 
at stake before the Patents Court. In that case, it was held that photographs are 
protected by copyright if they are the result of the creator's own intellectual creation, 
with no specific measure of originality being required. What was decisive, according 
to the Austrian Supreme Court, was for the photographer's personality to be reflected 
in the arrangements (motif, visual angle, illumination, etc) selected specifically for the 
shot.  
Judge Birss QC found that there was no difference in substance between the 
interpretation provided by the Austrian Supreme Court and the law in the UK, in that: 
 
A photograph of an object found in nature or for that matter a building, which 
although not natural is something found by the creator and not created by him, 
can have the character of an artistic work in terms of copyright law if the task 
of taking the photograph leaves ample room for an individual arrangement. 
What is decisive are the arrangements (motif, visual angle, illumination, etc.) 
selected by the photographer himself or herself.602 
 
As is also made clear by a most influential commentary603, in photography 
there is room for originality in three respects. Firstly, originality which resides in such 
specialties as angle of shot, light and shade, exposure and effects achieved with 
filters, developing techniques, etc. Secondly, originality relating to the creation of the 
scene to be photographed. Finally, originality where a scene that is unlikely to recur 
is captured or recorded, thereby creating a worthwhile photograph.604 Hence, held 
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Judge Birss QC, the composition of a photograph may also constitute a source of 
originality: 
 
The composition of an image will certainly derive from the “angle of shot” … 
but also from the field of view, from elements which the photographer may 
have created and from elements arising from being at the right place at the 
right time. The resulting composition is capable of being the aggregate result 
of all these factors which will differ by degrees in different cases. Ultimately 
however the composition of the image can be the product of the skill and 
labour (or intellectual creation) of a photographer and it seems to me that skill 
and labour/intellectual creation directed to that end can give rise to 
copyright.605 
 
In particular, the judge found that this case illustrated what could be a fourth 
category of originality as regards photography: the computerised manipulation of a 
photograph to the extent that this has an effect on the composition itself, since in the 
case at hand the image of individual persons were actually removed from the 
foreground. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
was tantamount to taking a substantial part from his photograph. The Court of Appeal dismissed 
the action, holding that, whilst the relative position of objects depicted in an artistic work could be 
described as substantial where the work was a painting, the same could not always be said where 
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In light of the foregoing, the judge found that copyright subsisted in the 
claimant’s photograph. This fact a given, he then turned to consider whether the 
defendant had infringed such copyright. 
 
 
3. Reading too much into Infopaq and Painer: aesthetic merit and visual 
significance as originality? 
 
After having recalled that, pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of CDPA 1988, copyright is 
infringed by reproducing the whole or a substantial part of a work in a material form 
and that a ‘substantial part’ is a matter of quality not quantity, Judge Birss QC made it 
clear that “one can reproduce a substantial part without necessarily producing 
something that looks similar even though of course it may do so.”606 
He then reverted to the decision of the Privy Council in Interlego607 to 
determine the amount of skill and labour which is relevant to the originality of an 
artistic work and found that this is the skill and labour which is visually significant. 
Visual significance must also be relevant to infringement and to the question as to 
whether a substantial part of an artistic work has been taken. According to Judge 
Birss QC, 
 
What is visually significant in an artistic work is not the skill and labour (or 
intellectual creative effort) which led up to the work, it is the product of that 
activity. The fact that the artist may have used commonplace techniques to 
produce his work is not the issue. What is important is that he or she has used 
them under the guidance of their own aesthetic sense to create the visual 
effect in question.608  
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Although copyright protection for artistic works is provided under the CDPA 
1988 irrespective of their artistic quality609, this does not mean that one ignores what 
such a work look like and focuses only on the effort which went into creating it. 
This said, although it is still unclear whether direct lifting of the actual image 
needs to be proven in order to establish infringement under UK copyright law610, the 
judge considered whether the defendants’ work had derived from the claimant’s 
photograph. He found that the defendants did not have a case of independent design 
at all. It was sufficient to ascertain which publicly available works they had derived 
their image from. Then, from the evidence submitted, Judge Birss QC inferred the 
following. Firstly, that the Houses of Parliament, Big Ben, the Routemaster bus, etc, 
are iconic images of London; secondly, that the idea of putting such iconic images 
together is a common one; thirdly, that the technique of highlighting an iconic object 
like a bus against a black and white image was not unique to the claimant; and 
finally, that whether anyone had ever produced a black and white image of Big Ben 
and the Houses of Parliament with a red bus in it before the claimant was not clear.  
To establish whether the defendant had infringed the claimant’s copyright, 
Judge Birss QC held that the following elements needed to be taken into account. 
Firstly, the composition of the image: not just the Big Ben, but a substantial frontage 
of the Houses of Parliament and the arches of Westminster Bridge. The bus is on the 
central left side near a lamppost. It is framed by buildings behind it. People can be 
seen on the bridge and some are in front of the bus, but they are not prominent. 
Portcullis House is visible as well as the river itself. Secondly, the visual contrasts: 
one between the bright red bus and the monochrome background, and the other 
between the blank and white sky and the rest of the photograph. According to the 
judge, these elements “derive from and are the expression of the skill and labour 
exercised by [the author], or in Infopaq terms, they are his intellectual creation.”611 
It is apparent that for the judge the traditional requirement of sufficient skill and 
labour appears to be akin to the standard envisaged by the CJEU in Infopaq. 
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However, in establishing infringement, he focused more on the elements that he 
found to constitute the claimant’s intellectual creation, rather than the traditional test 
of substantiality. In doing so, the judge applied (quite confusingly) both the Infopaq 
qualitative test and the traditional ‘substantial taking’ test.  
First of all, he held that that comparisons with other similar works are irrelevant 
as a matter of law in terms of originality, even if they might serve to illustrate how 
different choices made by different photographers lead to alternative visual effects.  
Judge Birss QC then addressed the issue of copying and found that the 
common elements between the defendants' work and the claimant's work were 
causally related. Indeed, according to the judge, it was apparent that it was not a 
coincidence that both images showed the Big Ben and the Houses of Parliament in 
black and white with a bright red bus driving from right to left and a blank white sky. 
Evidently, the reason why the defendants' image was composed in this manner was 
that they had seen the claimant's work, even before having seen any other similar 
images.  
This said, the judge considered if the reproduction from the claimant's work 
represented a substantial part of that work. To address that issue, he deemed it 
necessary to ascertain what had in fact been reproduced. He found that both 
elements of the composition and the visual contrast features had been copied from 
the claimant’s image. Although some important and visually significant elements of 
the claimant’s original artistic work had not been reproduced by the defendants, it is 
not that infringement can only be found where facsimile copying has occurred. The 
question was instead whether, without the parts which had been reproduced by the 
defendants, what was reproduced amounted to a substantial part of the claimant's 
work. This was because the elements which had been reproduced included the key 
combination of the visual contrast features alongside the basic composition of the 
scene itself. It was this combination which made the claimant’s image visually 
interesting and, therefore, original in the sense of Infopaq. Indeed, in reaching this 
conclusion, the judge found it decisive that the claimant’s image was not a mere 
photograph, ie the result of happening to click his camera in the right place at the 
right time. Instead, the picture was the product of deliberate choices and intentional 
manipulations made by the author. So, even if the image might have looked just like 







4. Is a cropped portrait version equally infringing? 
 
Having held that the defendants had infringed the claimant’s copyright, Judge Birss 
QC then considered whether a cropped version of the defendants' image which had 
been printed in portrait format would have been considered as infringing of the 
claimant’s photograph. The judge recalled that the cropping (which had occurred 
either to fit the image onto the short side of a tea tin, with the landscape version on 
the long side, or else to fit it onto a smaller tin) had been carried out in such a way so 
as to discard only the least significant parts of the original image. So, the cropped 
portrait version had lost about half the riverside facade and the edge of Portcullis 
House, which appeared instead in the landscape version. According to Judge Birss 
QC, these elements were of limited importance in comparison to the elements of the 
claimant’s work that featured in the cropped version. 
Therefore, he found that the cropped portrait version still reproduced a 
substantial part of the claimant’s work and would have been tantamount to an 
infringement of its copyright. 
 
 
5. The implications of the decision 
 
Although not binding on the High Court of England and Wales, the ‘Red Bus’ decision 
has been seen as a worrisome development in UK copyright law, not least because it  
may increase uncertainties regarding the (already complicated) relationship between 
basic principles such as the idea/expression dichotomy and originality. 
First of all, the decision has been found612 to mark a significant departure from 
the US decision in The Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd  v  Corel Corp. This was a case 
concerning whether exact photographic reproductions of public domain images could 
be protected in the US.613 In dismissing the action, Justice Kaplan tackled the issue 
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of whether these would have been protectable under UK law. While finding that the 
authority of the old Graves’ Case614 was of dubious usefulness, as recalled above 
sub Chapter II, Section II, §I, the judge referred to the second edition of Laddie, to 
point out that no copyright protection would have been available to such photographs 
under UK law: 
 
It is obvious that although a man may get a copyright by taking a photograph 
of some well-known object like Westminster Abbey, he does not get a 
monopoly in representing Westminster Abbey as such, any more than an artist 
would who painted or drew that building. What, then, is the scope of 
photographic copyright? As always with artistic works, this depends on what 
makes his photograph original. Under the [CDPA] 1988 … the author is the 
person who made the original contribution and it will be evident that this 
person need not be he who pressed the trigger, who might be a mere 
assistant. Originality presupposes the exercise of substantial independent skill, 
labour, judgment and so forth. For this reason it is submitted that a person 
who makes a photograph merely by placing a drawing or painting on the glass 
of a photocopying machine and pressing the button gets no copyright at 
all; but he might get a copyright if he employed skill and labour in assembling 
the thing to be photocopied, as where he made a montage.615  
 
Secondly, the ruling in Temple Islands raises doubts as to the actual degree of 
protection now enjoyed by photographs in the UK.616 In particular, if it is true that the 
bar to originality has been traditionally intended in the UK to be lower than in 
continental traditions, the fact that Judge Birss QC decided nonetheless to apply (and 
even go beyond) the originality standard envisaged in Infopaq617 and Painer618 urges 
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a reflection as to the relationship between UK copyright and Article 6 of the Term 
Directive. This, while expressly providing for protection pursuant to Article 1 of the 
same Directive to vest in photographs which are original in the sense that they are 
the author's own intellectual creation, allows Member States to protect other (simple) 
photographs.619 This means that the UK could have continued to protect non-original 
(at least in the EU sense) photographs, as was also implied in the Painer 
judgment.620 Apparently, following the decision by Judge Birss QC, this is no longer 
the case. Therefore, decisions such as Antiquesportfolio.com621, in which copyright 
was held to subsist in sub-original (at least in the Painer sense) photographs, may be 
considered no longer as valid precedents. As is well known this case held that 
copyright subsisted in simple photographs of three-dimensional objects because 
taking of such photographs involved judgment, ie the positioning of the object, the 
angle from which the picture is taken, the lighting, and the focus.622 
Thirdly, doubts have been raised as to the overall merit of the analysis of 
Judge Birss QC. In particular, it has been argued that a case like the one at stake 
before the Patents Court might have had a different outcome, even if decided in 
continental Member States. In France, for instance, the Court of Cassation623 has 
recently denied that copyright could vest in a photograph depicting two gurnards on a 
plate covered with saffron. These were positioned on the plate with their heads and 
tails meeting and such as to form an arc along the edge of the plate. The Court found 
that the photograph did not reveal, in its various constituent elements, any aesthetic 
pursuit, and that it was merely the result of know-how underlying a technical service. 
Therefore, it did not show the personality of the author. Doubts have been raised also 
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as to whether a photograph like the one discussed before Judge Birss QC would 
have been held to enjoy copyright protection in Germany.624 In Italy, it is arguable 
that a case like the one of the ‘Red Bus’ would have had best chances of success on 
the grounds of unfair competition. This is because of the loose significance of ‘unfair 
competition’ under Article 2598 of the Italian Civil Code.625 However, also a copyright 
claim might have been invoked successfully.626 
Finally, the reasoning of Judge Birss QC shows the difficulties the UK is facing 
in understanding fully the implications of the string of cases following Infopaq.627 
According to the judge, skill and labour were tantamount to intellectual creation. This 
is not the case, as made clear in Painer628 and – even more thoroughly – in Football 
Dataco.629 Although the judge applied the Infopaq test of originality quite correctly, 
the decision failed to follow the conceptual and logical implications of Infopaq 
consistently. Indeed, as made clear by AG Mengozzi, originality as ‘intellectual 
creation’ implies that copyright protection is conditional upon copyright subject-matter 
being characterised by a ‘creative’ aspect. In other words, it is not sufficient that the 
creation of the work required labour and skill630, nor that the author used his aesthetic 
sense to create certain visual effects. In addition, the Infopaq decision and 
subsequent CJEU case law do not envisage any test for substantial taking, for the 
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II. The Lucasfilm decision: a different outcome if decided today? 
 
On 27 July 2011, the recently established UK Supreme Court published its decision 
in Lucasfilm Ltd and Others v Ainsworth and Another.631 Lords Walker and Collins 
(with whom Lord Phillips and Lady Hale agreed) delivered the judgment.  
 
 
1. Background to the case 
 
The case concerned intellectual property rights in various artefacts made for use in 
the first Star Wars film in 1977 (Star Wars IV – A New Hope), in particular the 
Imperial Stormtrooper helmet.  
The trial judge (Mann J) so described the Imperial Stormtroopers:   
 
One of the most abiding images in the film was that of the Imperial 
Stormtroopers. These were soldiers clad in white armour, including a white 
helmet which left no part of the face uncovered … The purpose of the helmet 
was that it was to be worn as an item of costume in a film, to identify a 
character, but in addition to portray something about that character – its 
allegiance, force, menace, purpose and, to some extent, probably its 
anonymity. It was a mixture of costume and prop.632 
 
The film's storyline and characters were conceived by George Lucas between 
1974 and 1976. Lucas’s concept of the Imperial Stormtroopers as threatening 
characters in fascistic white-armoured suits was given visual expression in drawings 
and paintings by an artist and three-dimensional form, amongst the others, by 
Andrew Ainsworth, who was skilled in vacuum-moulding in plastic. Eventually, 
Ainsworth produced fifty helmets for use in the film. 
In addition to the commercial success of the Star Wars films, over the course 
of the years, Lucasfilm has built up a successful licensing business, including the 
licensing of models of Imperial Stormtroopers and their equipment.  








In 2004, Ainsworth used his original tools to make versions of the Imperial 
Stormtrooper helmet and armour, and other artefacts for sale to the public.  
The following year Lucasfilm successfully sued Ainsworth in the US District 
Court, Central District of California, although the whole judgment remained 
unsatisfied. 
In parallel to this, Lucasfilm also commenced proceedings before the 
Chancery Division of the English High Court, claiming – among the other things633 – 
copyright infringement in the Stromtrooper helmets under the CDPA 1988. This is 
because the aforementioned events took place in England and because George 
Lucas lived in England while the film was being made at Elstree (a village north of 
London).  
In 2008, Mann J of the Chancery Division dismissed the claim based on UK 
copyright infringement, holding that the helmet was not a work of sculpture as per 
Section 4 of the CDPA 1988. As a consequence, the issue of whether Ainsworth 
could successfully invoke defences under Sections 51634 and 52635 CDPA 1988 did 
not need to be addressed. The judge also dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim 
based on his own claim to copyright in the helmet.  
In 2009, the Court of Appeal636 dismissed the appeal and confirmed that any 
intellectual property rights in the helmet belonged to Lucasfilm. Appeal to the 
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Supreme Court was however granted. The issues this had to address concerned, 
inter alia, whether the helmet was a sculpture and whether defences under Sections 
51 and 52 CDPA 1988 Act applied. 
 
 
2. Whether the Stormtrooper helmet is a sculpture 
 
As is well known, copyright subsists in original artistic works. Among these are 
sculptures which, pursuant to Article 4(2) of the CDPA 1988, include “a cast or model 
made for purposes of sculpture”.  
The rationale underlying Sections 51 and 52 CDPA 1988 is to limit the 
influence of literary or artistic copyright on other persons' freedom to make and 
market three-dimensional objects. In particular, Section 51 applies where the end-
product of a design document or model is not an artistic work. Section 52 applies 
where there is an artistic work, but where that work has been exploited (with the 
consent of the copyright owner) by the industrial production of copies to be marketed. 
The Copyright (Industrial Process and Excluded Articles) (No 2) Order 1989637 
provides that an article is made by an industrial process if it is one of more than fifty 
articles which are to be treated as copies of a particular artistic work (and are not 
together a set). The Order also clarifies that “works of sculpture, other than casts or 
models used or intended to be used as models or patterns to be multiplied by any 
industrial process” are outwith the scope of Section 52. 
Having recalled the legislative evolution concerning copyright protection for 
sculptures, the Supreme Court reverted to relevant decisions of the Court of Appeal 
for New Zealand638 and the House of Lords for guidance. In George Hensher Ltd v 
Restawile Upholstery (Lancs) Ltd639, Lord Reid held that a work is artistic if it 
genuinely admired by a section of the community on the basis of the emotional or 
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intellectual satisfaction its appearance gives. That the author did not consciously 
undertake to create a work is not determinative.640 Contrary to Mann J (who had 
discussed this decision at some length), the Supreme Court briefly referred to this 
decision, just to establish that, when interpreting statutory provisions, it is necessary 
to start with the ordinary meaning of the words contained therein.641  
From such authorities, Mann J had derived what he called guidelines, not rigid 
requirements, as to the meaning of sculpture within the CDPA 1988.642 These were 
then approved by the Court of Appeal. Before these courts, the arguments had 
centred on the correct approach to three-dimensional objects that have both an 
artistic purpose and a utilitarian function, such as the Stromtrooper helmet. Before 
the Supreme Court, the appellants challenged the reasoning of both the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal, claiming that it had been outlandish of Mann J to describe 
the helmet's purpose as utilitarian. They submitted that the Court of Appeal could 
equally have found it to have a functional purpose if they had treated it as having the 
same features of real helmet, albeit for use within the confines of a film. 
According to the Supreme Court, this was quite a puzzling point, as the Star 
Wars films are set in an imaginary, science-fiction world of the future, and are a 
mixture of costume and prop in order to contribute to the artistic effect of the film.   
This said, 
 
It would not accord with the normal use of language to apply the term 
"sculpture" to a 20th century military helmet used in the making of a film, 
whether it was the real thing or a replica made in different material, however 
great its contribution to the artistic effect of the finished film. The argument for 
applying the term to an Imperial Stormtrooper helmet is stronger, because of 
the imagination that went into the concept of the sinister cloned soldiers 
dressed in uniform white armour. But it was the Star Wars film that was the 
work of art that Mr Lucas and his companies created. The helmet was 
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utilitarian in the sense that it was an element in the process of production of 
the film.643 
 
In addition, the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of an emerging 
legislative purpose of protecting three-dimensional objects in a graduated way, quite 
unlike the protection afforded by the indiscriminate protection of literary copyright. It 
found that:  
 
Different periods of protection are accorded to different classes of work. 
Artistic works of art (sculpture and works of artistic craftsmanship) have the 
fullest protection; then come works with “eye appeal” …; and … a modest level 
of protection has been extended to purely functional objects (the exhaust 
system of a motor car being the familiar example). Although the periods of 
protection accorded to the less privileged types have been progressively 
extended, copyright protection has always been much more generous. There 
are good policy reasons for the differences in the periods of protection, and 
the Court should not, in our view, encourage the boundaries of full copyright 
protection to creep outwards.644 
 
As no copyright was held to vest in the Stromtrooper helmets, Lords Walker 
and Collins did not deem it necessary to address whether Ainsworth had a defence 
under Sections 51 and 52 of the CDPA 1988.  
 
 
3. Would have an originality-based approach led to a different solution? 
 
As is apparent from the foregoing, the UK Supreme Court rejected the idea that 
copyright could vest in the Stromtrooper helmet, on the (perhaps overly-formalistic) 
assumption that this could not be considered as a sculpture pursuant to Section 4 of 
                                                          
643
 Lucasfilm Ltd and Others v Ainsworth and another, UKSC, cit, 45. 
644




the CDPA 1988.645 As made clear by the Court of Appeal, legislative history is such 
that ‘sculpture’ cannot be held to encompass a work like the Stromtrooper helmet, as 
this cannot be intended to be a work of art. As such: 
 
The first point concerns the normal use of the word “sculpture”. Most of the 
cases proceed on the footing that one should not stray too far from the 
ordinary meaning of the word but there is considerable disagreement as to 
what that is. One of the difficulties is that the word can be used to describe 
both the physical process of moulding or carving necessary to create the 
finished object and that object itself. Copyright has, of course, to exist in the 
product of one's skill and labour. Not in the skill and labour itself. In looking 
therefore at the finished article, it seems to us wrong to interpret the use of the 
word sculpture in the 1911 Act (and therefore in succeeding Copyright Acts) 
divorced from the earlier legislative history. The 1814 Act was clearly 
concerned to identify sculpture as an artistic work. Its transposition into a wider 
category of "artistic work" under the 1911 Act does not mean that one can 
ignore that context. Although some of the items included in the list such as a 
map or diagram may have a high level of functionality that should not be used 
as a guide to the interpretation of every item which the statutory definition 
contains. Sculpture, like painting (however good or bad it may be), does 
connote the work of the artist’s hand and the visual purpose attributed to it by 
the judge in this case. Put simply, it has, broadly speaking, to be a work at 
least intended to be a work of art.646 
 
This is a somewhat odd interpretation, in that it carves out copyright with 
subjective connotations. Indeed, the implication of holding that a work is a sculpture if 
it was created with the intention to be a work of art would be difficult to prove and 
would be also inconsistent with relevant case law. In  addition to originality, it would 
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also be required to know what the original author’s (rectius: artist, in a truly romantic 
sense moreover) intention was whilst realising the work.647  
Most importantly, neither the Supreme Court nor the High Court and the Court 
of Appeal addressed the issue of whether the Stromtrooper helmet could have been 
considered as sufficiently original for copyright protection to apply. It is arguable that, 
should have the Supreme Court assessed the Stromtrooper helmet in light of its 
actual originality, copyright might have been held to vest in it. In addition, in the UK 
there are precedents which might have supported a result contrary to the Lucasfilm 
decision. For instance, in Shelley Films648, it was arguably held that copyright 
subsisted in latex prostheses, which had been designed for use in film, as sculptures.  
Although the CDPA 1988 requires for a subject-matter to be both original and 
fall within one of the categories of ‘artistic work’ to qualify for copyright protection649, it 
is doubtful that this part of the CDPA 1988 is still in line with EU law. Indeed, as 
explained above sub Chapters III and IV, it seems that following the decisions of the 
CJEU, especially in Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace650, Murphy651 and Painer652, it 
is no longer necessary to scrutinise what subject-matter category a work belongs to.  
Originality, not subject-matter categorisation, is the test for copyright protection under 
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Both the ‘Red Bus’ decision and the judgment in Lucasfilm are exemplificative of the 
challenges currently facing UK copyright. 
The recent and much criticised ‘Red Bus’ decision stands as a demonstration 
of the difficulties and the associated need to provide protection in a consistent 
manner, whether it be through copyright, passing off, or (hopefully in the near future) 
unfair competition. In addition, an identification of labour and skill within the meaning 
of originality provided in Infopaq, as was carried out by Judge Birss QC, 
demonstrates that the full implications of this string of decisions of the CJEU are yet 
to be worked out. 
Additionally, the decision in Lucasfilm is relevant in that it shows that UK 
copyright architecture requires updating in order to be in line with EU law. Above all, 
a closed system of subject-matter categorisation does not appear to be of much 
assistance when it comes to determining whether copyright subsists in a work, since 










THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT  
AT THE EU LEVEL 








As has been said, the issue of further harmonisation of copyright at the European 
level is currently at the centre of one of the most interesting debates on the future of 
intellectual property law.  
 Over the last few years, copyright has been subject to numerous criticisms.  
While some claim that it has been reformed contrary to its historical rationale, others 
critique its lack of flexibility, which is deemed necessary to accommodate the new 
demands brought about by technological development.  
 As a result, a lively debate has ensued as to possible solutions and 
improvements, at both the national and international levels. One of the most 
engaging discussions concerns the possibility (and desirability as such) of reforming 
copyright thoroughly by means of new codifications. Such projects are regarded with 
particular interest in the US and EU.  
 The first part of this Chapter will revisit the terms of such debate concerning 




to the analysis of the fate of copyright at the EU level. As such, it will attempt to 








I. The US debate on the future of copyright 
 
As far as the US debate is concerned, it is sufficient to recall the proposal launched 
by Prof Pamela Samuelson, directed at a radical revision of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
which she has defined as “akin to an obese Frankensteinian monster”.653 Prof 
Samuelson has argued that current US copyright law is too lengthy, complex and 
unbalanced in many respects, and that it lacks normative heft, since it is difficult to 
extract rationales of protection – and corresponding limitations – from the overly 
detailed provisions contained in the Act. Thus, she has suggested the idea of drafting 
a model law or principles project, as a platform from which to launch specific 
copyright reforms aimed at restoring a positive and more normatively appealing 
vision of copyright than exists today. In the view of Prof Samuelson, a model 
copyright law must include the following core elements: subject-matter, eligibility 
criteria for specific people and works, exclusive rights, duration, limitations and/or 
exceptions to those exclusive rights, infringement standards and remedies.654  
 Criticisms to the current US copyright statute have also been raised more 
recently by Prof Jessica Litman655, who has highlighted its flaws with respect to the 
core objectives of any copyright system, these being production, dissemination, and 
enjoyment of works of authorship. In particular, she has objected to the 1976 Act, as 
it is said to create high entry barriers for creators, impose problematic impediments 
on intermediaries, and inflict burdensome conditions and hurdles on users of 
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copyright-protected materials. Prof Litman believes that the 1976 Act is “old, 
outmoded, inflexible, and beginning to display the symptoms of multiple systems 
failure”.656 Similarly, she sees Title 17 of the United States Code as a “swollen, 
barnacle-encrusted collection of incomprehensible prose.”657 As a consequence, US 
copyright  law as a whole is found to be “long, complex, counterintuitive and packed 
with traps and pitfalls”658, some of which are aimed at tripping unwary new entrants, 
hapless authors, or pesky potential competitors. As a consequence, copyright 
legislation has been used as a means to erect market barriers to block nascent 
competition with respect to existing players. Prof Litman has advocated, inter alia, a 
simplification of current copyright law, so that “most creators will not need to consult 
a copyright lawyer before making and exploiting works of authorship, and most 
readers, listeners, and viewers will not need to consult a copyright lawyer before 
enjoying them.”659 Moreover, she has suggested a radical rethinking of copyright’s 
economic rights, on the basis that:  
 
The law now on the books divides copyright into reproduction, derivative work, 
public distribution, public performance, and public display rights, and  
encourages  authors to dispose of them separately and piecemeal. In many 
copyright industries, it  has become conventional for different copyright rights 
to be separately controlled by different intermediaries. As new opportunities to 
exploit works have arisen, those intermediaries have insisted that the new 
uses impinge on the rights they control instead of or as well as the rights 
controlled by other intermediaries. Meanwhile, the  distinctions among different 
exclusive copyright rights have come to seem increasingly inapposite to a 
networked digital world.660 
 
                                                          
656
 Ibid, 3. 
657
 Ibid, referring to 17 USC Sections 110(2), dedicated to limitations on exclusive rights for certain 
acts concerning performance or display of a work, and 114, tackling the scope of exclusive rights in 
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works. 
658
 Ibid, 33. 
659
 Ibid, 40. 
660




 In her view, the proposed solution to copyright over-stratification may be a 
unitary commercial exploitation right.  She has submitted that: 
 
If simplicity, legitimacy, and author- and reader-empowerment were [US 
copyright’s] only goals, untempered by past practice, vested rights, and 
international obligations, [the US] could do worse than to recast copyright as a 
single exclusive right with carefully drawn boundaries. If [the US] chose to 
define a single core copyright right, the most promising candidate for that right 
… would be a right to control commercial exploitation. Limiting the scope of 
copyright to commercial exploitation would be simpler than the current array of 
five, six, seven, or eight distinct but overlapping rights. Copyright defined as 
control over commercial  exploitation, moreover, would accord with what [the 
US] know of the public’s understanding of what copyright law does, and 
should, reserve to the author. It  would  also  preserve  for  readers, listeners, 
and viewers the liberty to enjoy works in non-exploitative ways without seeking 
licenses for each.661 
 
 As observed by Prof Giovanni Sartor, Litman’s proposal has the potential to be 
fairly radical, in that it could pave the way to the recognition of the lawfulness of peer-
to-peer file sharing for non-commercial purposes. 
 
 
1. The 2010 CPP 
 
In 2007, the Copyright Principles Project (CPP) was formed. This 20-member group, 
was composed of leading US academics (including Samuelson and Litman), legal 
practitioners and industry executives (comprising companies such as Walt Disney, 
IBM and Warner Bros) alike. The formation of the CPP was the result  “of a collective 
sense among its members that although copyright law today works reasonably well in 
some domains, it can be improved and should be refined in light of dramatic 
technological advances.”662 Given the growth of user-generated content and its 
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copyright implications663, the widespread use of peer-to-peer file-sharing 
technologies to exchange copyright-protected materials, and technological 
advancements could have not been anticipated in the mid-1970s (when the current 
Copyright Act was adopted). As such, 
 
The goal of the CPP was to explore whether it was possible to reach some 
consensus about how current copyright law could be improved and how the 
law’s current problems could be mitigated.  
Copyright law is, for many reasons, under considerable stress today. The most 
obvious and perhaps most significant source of this stress is the radical 
transformation of public access to information that has been brought about by 
changes in computing and communications technologies and accessibility of 
information through global digital networks. The Internet and World Wide Web, 
in particular, have destabilized many copyright industry sectors as the 
economics of creating, publishing, and disseminating information-rich works 
have dramatically changed. New business models have not always proven 
successful. It may take some time and  patience  to allow  disrupted copyright 
sectors to consider, experiment with, and develop other or more refined 
models and approaches with  which they will be  reasonably comfortable.664 
 
 Although the CPP does not offer a comprehensive and detailed set of reform 
proposals to ameliorate US copyright, it articulates some principles of what is called a 
‘good’ copyright law, in order to appreciate whether and to what extent current US 
copyright law conforms to such principles. The CPP therefore seeks to recommend 
changes to US copyright law, which would bring it into greater conformity with the 
principles set out therein. 
 Highlighting that discourse about copyright in the past fifteen years has been 
burdened by rhetorical excesses and an unwillingness of those with opposing 
viewpoints to engage in rational discourse665, the very existence of the CPP has 
proven that it is indeed possible for persons from different backgrounds and with 
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diverse perspectives and economic interests to engage in a thoughtful, civil, 
discourse concerning even the toughest and most controversial copyright issues.  
 Reaffirming the core objective of copyright, ie enhancing the creation and 
dissemination of new works, the CPP contains a series of principles aspiring to such 
an overarching aim. Further, the Project assesses various aspects of US copyright in 
light of this aim.  
 
 
2. Originality and fixation as pre-requisites to protection. Reinvigorating the 
role of formalities 
 
With particular regard to the subject-matter of copyright, the CPP praises  
 
the simplicity and elegance of that part of U.S. copyright law that extends 
copyright protection  to authors of newly created works of authorship that have 
been fixed in a tangible medium of expression. These works must be “original” 
not only in the sense that they owe their origin to the person claiming to be the 
author, but also in the sense that they exhibit some creativity in the expression 
of whatever ideas or information the works embody.666 
 
 With this said, the CPP then considers the role of formalities667  following an 
assessment of copyright duration.668 In particular, it highlights how the current lack of 
obligations upon authors to give notice to the world about their claim to copyright – 
either by placing notices on individual copies of their works or by registering their 
claims of copyright with a government office – has contributed to substantial 
difficulties in tracking down who owns which rights in what works. These difficulties 
have been impeding many socially desirable uses, including some that would be 
licensed if it were easier to find the appropriate rightsholder.  
 As is well known, the abolition of formalities occurred quite recently in the US.  
For two hundred years previously, US law had required authors to give public notice 
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of their claims of copyright, register those claims and deposit copies of their works 
with a centralised government office. It was only in 1908, at the Berlin revision 
conference of the 1886 Berne Convention, that formalities were prohibited in 
international copyright law. Indeed, it was at that time that the following provision, 
which was then incorporated in Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, was adopted:  
 
The enjoyment and the exercise of [the rights specially granted by the Berne 
Convention] shall not be subject to any formality …  
 
When the US joined the Berne Convention in 1989, the US formalities had to be 
adapted, at least in so far as they affected the protection of foreign works. However, 
the US lawmaker chose to employ a minimalist approach.669  
 Even today, as pointed out by the CPP, the fact that many creators continue to 
employ some form of copyright notice despite its optional nature indicates that it is 
important for authors and owners to give practical signals to the world about their 
claims of ownership.  
 Therefore, the CPP suggests that registration, notice, and similar opt-in 
features to US copyright law should be reinvigorated. This would also help to make 
US law more compatible with good copyright principles, since deposit requirements 
are held to be consistent with the preservation of cultural heritage and with 
copyright’s constitutional purpose to ‘promote the progress of science’.  
 Other commentators670 have also recently argued in favour of the re-
introduction of some formalities. They have observed that while the public’s exposure 
to copyright infringement was in the past limited, due to the short copyright term 
coupled with formalities and the supply chain restraints which arose in the hard-copy 
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world (eg, the costs associated with production and distribution of works), nowadays 
contravention is facilitated by the increased duration of copyright protection, the 
absence of formalities and instant global distribution. It is argued that formalities are 
necessary to ensure copyright owners can protect their investment for a reasonable 
period of time and to make sure that the public does not inadvertently partake in 
copyright infringement.671  
 
 
3. Difficulties in assessing infringement cases: the idea/expression 
dichotomy, exceptions and limitation, safe harbour reform 
 
After considering exclusive and moral rights (the latter are deemed to be worthy of 
wider protection)672, the CPP highlights how the idea/expression dichotomy offers 
little help in assessing infringement cases.673  
 Although it is a basic principle that copyright protects the way in which authors 
express themselves in their works, but not the ideas, facts, or functional designs 
depicted therein, the concept of ‘expression’ has expanded through strands of case 
law that may be deemed incoherent and somewhat confusing. US courts use several 
different tests for determining when a work is similar enough to a prior creation to 
constitute an infringement.  
 If we turn now to the fair use doctrine674, the CPP finds that this is generally 
consistent with good copyright principles675, although some fine-tuning of fair use 
may be warranted to ensure that courts recognise fair use as serving a broader array 
of policy purposes than those which are currently acknowledged. This is also 
because the existing set of exceptions and limitations to US copyright is deemed to 
be more a product of legislative compromise than that of a principled assessment of 
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how far the law should extend to regulate certain uses of copyright-protected 
materials.  
 With particular regard to Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA)’s safe harbours, it is asserted that these are an important legal device, 
which can be used both to limit liability in an appropriate manner and to encourage 
service providers to help reduce widespread infringement.676 As is well known, the 
US Supreme Court in the Sony Betamax case created the first safe harbour, 
concerning the manufacturers of technologies having substantial non-infringing 
uses.677 The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), as part 
of the DMCA, introduced four other safe harbours specifically concerning ISPs into 
US copyright law in 1998.678 While holding that current safe harbours are generally 
consistent with good copyright principles, the CPP advocates that US Congress 
considers creating a new safe harbour aimed at insulating firms which undertake 
reasonable measures to prevent copyright infringement from copyright liability. In any 
case, no duty should be imposed on technology developers or service providers to 
adopt such measures.679 In support of this argument, the CPP shows awareness that 
since the enactment of the DMCA, technological progress has proceeded speedily.  
This means that  filtering tools capable of assessing how much of copyright-protected 
material is contained in a given online file are now possible.680 
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4. CPP’s proposals. Reforming Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act but 
neglecting originality 
 
Following the assessment of the current copyright scenario, the CPP sets forth 
twenty-five proposals to reform and improve US copyright. Among them, and in 
addition to the issues highlighted above, CPP’s Proposal No 16 is worthy of attention, 
insofar as it concerns the present contribution. 
 The proposal reads as follows:  
 
More elements in copyrighted works than just ideas and information should be 
excluded from the scope of copyright’s protection for original works of 
authorship.  
 
 To achieve this, the CPP does not suggest raising the bar to copyright 
protection by making the originality requirement more stringent. Instead, it advocates 
a re-writing of Section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act on copyright-protected 
subject-matter. The provision, currently provides that copyright protection “[i]n no 
case …extend[s] to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” The CPP deems it to a be a partial 
embodiment of good copyright principles, insofar as it characterises ideas, concepts, 
and principles, along with procedures, processes, and methods of operation, as un-
protectable elements of copyright-protected works. However, it should be amended 
so as to reflect the many elements of works that copyright law does not, and indeed 
should not, protect.  
 It is suggested by the CPP that a revised version of Section 102(b) should 
read as follows:  
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Copyright protection extends to an author’s expression, but not to any (a) 
ideas, concepts, or principles; (b) facts, data, know-how, or knowledge; (c) 
stock elements typical in works of that kind; (d) laws, regulations, or rules; (e) 
systems, processes, procedures, methods of operation, or functions, 
regardless  of how  any of these elements may be embodied in protected 
works. Nor is copyright protection available to a work or an element of a work 
if there is only one or a very small number of ways to express that idea or 
other unprotectable element. Elements identified in (a) through (d) should be 
regarded as in the public domain and available for free copying and reuse 
when the work has been made available to the public such that it cannot be 
claimed as a trade secret. The elements identified in (e) may also be in the 
public domain after publication of a work in which they are explained or 
embodied unless protected by a utility patent.681 
 
 In this proposed revised formulation of Section 102(b), there is no mention of 
the requirement for a work to be original in order for it to be protected by copyright. 
Certainly, the originality requirement cannot be identified with protection being 
excluded from works or an element of a work where “there is only one or a very small 
number of ways to express that idea or other unprotectable element”.  
 In other words, there is something missing in the CPP’s proposed amendment 
of Section 102. As acknowledged by the CPP elsewhere in its set of proposals, the 
policy role that originality plays, as discussed above sub Chapter II, cannot be 
neglected. Indeed, it may be argued that an even more suitable revision to the 
wording of Section 102(b) should include the following additional clarification:  
 
A work is original not only if it owes its origin to the person claiming to be the 
author, but also in the sense that it exhibits some creativity in the expression 
of whatever ideas or information the work embodies.682  
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II. How to reform copyright: a view from the EU 
 
The protection of intellectual property rights has also been at the centre of attention 
in the EU context in recent years, as laid out above, especially sub Chapter I. In 
particular, interest in copyright has grown through an increased emphasis on its 
fundamental role as a legal tool to protect and enhance creativity. Additionally, the 
importance of copyright for realising the goal of internal market integration has only 
gained prominence relatively recently, although this has been a fundamental 
objective since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957.  
 Having a strong harmonisation law is said to enhance legal security and 
transparency, as well as reduce transaction costs. If construed as taking precedence 
over national titles, a EU copyright would remove the inherent territoriality that comes 
with state-made copyright rules, thus contributing to the full integration of the internal 
market. As pointed out by Viviane Reding, former EU Commissioner for information 
society and media and current Commission’s Vice-President, it would be a means to 
enhance the IT skills and expertise of European businesses and societies.683 Also 
William Hague, appointed foreign secretary by UK Prime Minister David Cameron, 
used unusually positive language about the European Union with respect to 
copyright. Although is well known that UK conservative party have traditionally 
adopted rather sceptical views on the advantages of European integration, in an 
article published in Europe’s World, Hague linked the growth of European economy 
to further integration of the internal market, highlighting in particular the role that 
innovation and copyright play in such a process.684  
 Despite the positive remarks about harmonisation in theory, thus far the 
unitary protection of copyright across the EU is viewed as being less viable than for 
trademarks and (even) patents. As pointed out by Trevor Cook685, this is because 
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copyright and related rights subsist automatically in all EU Member States, 
independent of registration and by virtue of the membership of such States to various 
international conventions. The result is that there exists no mechanism for choosing 
whether to seek protection on a EU-wide rather than, or in addition to (as is the case 
for trademarks), a national basis. 
 
 
1. The Wittem Group and the project of a European copyright code 
 
As previously mentioned, the issue of further harmonisation of the copyright laws of 
the Member States has also received attention in academic circles. In 2002, leading 
copyright scholars from across Europe assembled in the so-called Wittem Group and 
launched a Project aimed at drafting and proposing a European Copyright Code. 
 On 26 April 2010, the long-awaited European Copyright Code was published.  
 So far as the drafting procedure was concerned, each chapter was drawn up 
by one or two members of the Drafting Committee, acting as rapporteurs. The draft 
chapters were then discussed in plenary with the members of the Wittem Advisory 
Board and other experts invited ad hoc. As a last step, the Code was finalised by a 
Drafting Committee.  
 Certainly, what can be said for the Wittem Group Project and the resulting 
code is that the goals it aimed at realising were both numerous and ambitious.  
 
 
2. The objectives of the Project 
 
The Preamble to the Code recognises the importance of copyright in the process of 
market-building at the European level. It states that: 
 
[T]he establishment of a fully functioning market for copyright protected works 
in the European Union, as necessitated in particular by the Internet as the 
primary means of providing information and entertainment services across the 




integrate both civil and common law traditions of copyright and authors’ right 
respectively.686 
 
The Wittem Project was clearly aimed at promoting transparency and consistency in 
European copyright law.687 This was because the members of the Group shared a 
serious concern, ie that “the process of copyright law-making at the European level 
lacks transparency and that the voice of academia all too often remains unheard”.688 
Indeed, recommendations of academics have been ignored too many times. 
Numerous legislative choices endorsed by EC Directives have been criticised by both 
legal academics and economists as either being contrary to the rationale of copyright 
protection, or for departing from the criteria of economic efficiency. However, it would 
seem that EU legislators have never attempted to address such criticisms nor to 
provide solutions that could resolve them. Therefore, doubts may arise as to the 
effective impact that this European Copyright Code will ever have on the future of EU 
copyright policy, despite the belief that a code “drafted by legal scholars might serve 
as a model or reference tool for future harmonisation or unification of copyright at the 
European level”.689  
 This observation, as discussed below, is not the only one which questions the 




3. Congenital weaknesses ... 
 
The European Copyright Code is drafted in the form of a legislative instrument, thus 
exceeding the level of detail normally associated with the drafting of simple common 
principles of law. So, from this point of view, the Project is valuable, as it may serve 
as a framework for an actual codification of copyright at the EU level. However, the 
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Code is far from being complete. This is due to a variety of reasons, although two 
criticisms in particular are worth highlighting. 
 The first criticism concerns what can be defined as the ‘original sin’ of the 
Code itself, which diminishes the overall value such a project could have had. From 
reading the legal solutions provided by the Code, one has the impression that there 
is a gap between the Project’s ambitious objectives and the actual positions ensued 
therein, which are somewhat weakly endorsed. The most serious example of this 
dichotomy can be found in the Introduction. After having pointed out that the aim of 
the Wittem Project and the Code is to promote transparency and consistency in 
European copyright law, it is clarified that the members of the Wittem Group shared a 
concern that the process of copyright law-making at the European level lacks 
transparency and that the voice of academia often remains unheard. Thereof, the 
belief that a copyright code drafted by academics might serve as a reference tool for 
future legislative action. So far, so good. However, directly after laying out these 
beliefs and objectives, the following disclaimer is expressed: “[T]he Group does not 
take a position on the desirability as such of introducing a unified European legal 
framework”.690 
 It is arguable that such an attitude diminishes the importance and the political 
value of this work, as the current problem is really whether or not the process of 
harmonisation of the copyright laws of the Member States should go further and  
realise of the objective of the unification of European copyright laws. Providing an 
answer to such a question would really have made the Wittem Project invaluable, as  
having a definitive position of leading European academics in this respect would not 
only have given the entire project a stronger impact, but would also certainly have 
made it more capable of influencing and orientating European law-making in the field 
of copyright.  
 Moving to a closely related second criticism of the Wittem Project, the 
structure of the Code itself is not as comprehensive as one might have hoped. In 
fact, attention is paid only to the main elements of copyright. The Code is composed 
of five chapters, respectively dedicated to the subject-matter of copyright (Chapter 1), 
authorship and ownership (Chapter 2), moral rights (Chapter 3), economic rights 
(Chapter 4), and limitations (Chapter 5). It may well be interesting to compare the 






structure of the European Copyright Code with the model copyright law proposed by 
Pamela Samuelson691, as she considers the elements included in her proposal to be 
core components which cannot be omitted from any model copyright law. As 
mentioned above sub Section I, §I, these elements are: subject-matter, eligibility 
criteria for specific people and works, exclusive rights, duration, limitations and/or 
exceptions to those exclusive rights, infringement standards and remedies. Indeed, it 
seems that topical and highly controversial issues have been left outwith the Code. In 
particular, it does not provide an answer to either the problem of the legal protection 
of technical measures, or to the issue of copyright liability or enforcement.692 Relating 
to this point, it is worth recalling that the Enforcement Directive was prompted not 
only by the awareness of the importance of providing effective enforcement to 
intellectual property rights693, but also by the fact that 
 
the disparities between the systems of the Member States as regards the 
means of enforcing intellectual property rights are prejudicial to the proper 
functioning of the Internal Market and make it impossible to ensure that 
intellectual property rights enjoy an equivalent level of protection throughout 
the Community.694  
 
 The exclusion from the Project of such relevant themes is even more 
problematic if one takes into account the duties imposed, at an international level, by 
the WIPO Internet Treaties695, as well as the criticisms which have been raised with 
regard to the implementation of their provisions into domestic laws.696 Therefore, it is 
difficult to understand the reasons for not including such important market integration 
issues in the Code. This gap is especially puzzling in light of the Preamble of the 
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Code itself, which expressly links the need for common rules on copyright in the EU 
to the project of market-building, “as necessitated in particular by the Internet as the 
primary means of providing information and entertainment services across the 
Members States”.697 It goes without saying that providing for the sound regulation of 
the means through which access and enjoyment of protected works may be granted 
is a matter of fundamental importance. This should go alongside a clarification of the 
conditions under which direct and, moreover, indirect, liability for copyright 
infringement arise. Thus far, no satisfactory legal framework has been provided. 
Furthermore, the coupled issues of legal protection of technical measures and 
secondary liability call for a rethinking of the very basics of copyright, such as the 
territoriality principle. Including provisions on these two issues within the Code would 
perhaps have provided some clarification of the meaning and scope of the 
territoriality principle, which is at the core of the copyright unification project at the 
European level, but which, paradoxically, has not yet been fully explored.698  
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Code does not provide a precise 
duration for economic rights.699 This is because “[i]t was generally felt by the 
members of the Group that the current term of protection of the economic rights is 
too long. However views diverged as to the appropriate term”.700 There is no need to 
recall that the term of copyright protection has been of topical interest in recent years, 
and has attracted a series of criticisms.701 Such criticisms have been revamped 
recently in the context of the EU discussion on extending the term of protection for 
sound recordings, which eventually led to the adoption of Directive 2011/77/EU of the 
European Parliament and Council. As previously mentioned, this has extended the 
term of protection over sound recordings from fifty to seventy years, despite wide-
spread concerns in the form of academic critiques702, policy recommendations and 
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the recently published Hargreaves Report in the UK703, which all questioned the  
desirability of such an extension. The latter in particular highlighted the influence of 
lobbying on copyright reforms, finding that much of the data needed to develop 
empirical evidence on copyright is privately held and enters the public domain chiefly 
in the form of evidence supporting the arguments of lobbyists, rather than as 
independently verified research conclusions. Prof Hargreaves called such état de fait 
‘lobbynomics’.704 This phenomenon is said to have played a consistent role in 
extending copyright duration, the most recent example being the UK decision to 
support the EU process to extend the rights of owners of sound recordings from fifty 
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to seventy years705, despite contrary recommendations such as those contained in 
the 2006 Gowers Review.706  
 In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the debate over the ideal duration of 
copyright is far from settled. Hence, a contribution from leading academics in this 




4.  ... But a Sensible Approach 
 
Despite the criticisms raised above, the Code is the product of sound drafting 
techniques and the provisions contained therein do achieve a fair balance between 
common and civil law approaches to copyright. This was not an easy task, as 
 
Any endeavour to meld civilian and common law approaches to copyright may 
inevitably dissatisfy all sides at least sometimes … [T]he drafters therefore 
deserve applause for persevering in an attempt some might consider quixotic 
and others (from both ends of property rights/users’ rights spectrum) might 
view with some suspicion.707 
 
 As highlighted, the Code pays due regard to the legacy of the legislative 
choices of the Directives which have, to date, harmonised specific aspects of 
copyright. As mentioned above, many of the provisions of those Directives have been 
subject to criticism, standing accused of providing legal solutions which were (and 
are) unable to maintain a proper balance between the protection of the interests of 
authors and owners, and the interests of the public at large to access, build upon, 
and use copyright protected works. This fundamental objective of copyright 
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protection, which finds its roots historically in the first legal instruments regulating 
copyright (such as the 1709 Statute of Anne and the Copyright Clause of the US 
Constitution), is strongly re-affirmed in the European Copyright Code. Indeed, and 
notwithstanding the final outcomes achieved by EC Directives, the legal solutions of 
the Code have been reformulated in this well-balanced legal framework, which 
manages to reconcile authors’ rights with the public interest. 
 
 
5. Integrating copyright and droit d’auteur traditions  
 
Coming to specific topics, it is of particular relevance to analyse issues which, so far, 
have been left outside the acquis communautaire. The originality requirement, in 
particular, has been subject to only limited harmonisation with regard to specific 
categories of works (computer programs, photographs and databases), with full 
harmonisation being deemed unnecessary, since differences in the meaning of 
originality across Member States do not impair the proper functioning of the internal 
market. The same conclusion has been reached with regard to differences in the 
scope and duration of moral rights. We will now consider these issues in turn. 
 It is interesting to note that, as far as originality is concerned, the meaning 
given by Directives which dealt expressly with the issue of originality and adopted its 
continental meaning (an ‘authorial standard’, in the words of Jane Ginsburg708), have 
been endorsed by the Code. In fact, despite the fact that the Code does not use or 
define the term ‘original’, Article 1.1(1) expressly states that “Copyright subsists in a 
work, that is to say, any expression within the field of literature, art or science in so 
far as it constitutes its author’s own intellectual creation”. It is also pointed out that 
this  
 
can be interpreted as the ‘average’ European threshold, presuming it is set 
somewhat higher than skill and labour. This is possible if emphasis is put on 
the element of creation. For factual and functional works, the focus will be 
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more on a certain level of skill (judgment) and labour, whereas for productions 
in the artistic field the focus will be more on personal expression.709  
 
 Contrary to the InfoSoc Directive710 and the subsequent Commission review of 
the acquis communautaire711, the Code sets forth a specific and interesting 
regulation of moral rights. In particular, in contrast to dualistic droit d’auteur 
regimes712, the Code provides for their duration to be limited in time. Indeed, not only 
are moral rights to last for a limited number of years, but the Code provides that their 
duration should differ depending on which right is at stake. So, for example, the right 
of divulgation is said to last for the life of the author713, while the rights of attribution 
and integrity are said to last “for the life of the author and until … years after his 
death”.714 This because “[i]t was generally felt by the members of the group that not 
all the moral rights merit the same term of protection, and that the right of divulgation 
might expire following the death of the author, whereas other moral rights could 
remain protected for a certain period post mortem”.715 This approach to moral rights 
departs greatly from dualistic droit d’auteur traditions and, if adopted in the future by 
EU legislation, may be likely to face criticism and resistance. In fact, unlike concepts 
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whose meanings have always been fairly vague (such as the originality requirement 
itself), moral rights have traditionally been considered as the true foundations of any 
copyright structure realised in a dualistic droit d’auteur fashion. In other words, moral 
rights in continental countries have never (or have very seldom) been subject to 




6. Copyright limitations: an inspiration for reform  
 
With regard to copyright limitations (Chapter 5), the European Copyright Code sets 
forth its own provisions. These achieve a sensible balance between a US style open-
ended system of limitations and a civil law style exhaustive enumeration. In fact, 
copyright limitations are divided into several categories, according to which interest is 
given primacy over normal copyright protection. However, it is made clear that: 
 
[T]he categories do not … prejudice as to the questions, what interests do, or 
should, in a particular case or even in general, underlie the limitation. In 
practice, this might be a mixture of several of the interests indicated. The 
weakness in a particular case of the interest which the applicable limitation 
has been categorized does not prejudice as to the (non-)applicability of the 
limitation. However, the concrete examples enumerated under those 
categories do have a normative effect, since art. 5.5 extends the scope of the 
specifically enumerated limitations by permitting other uses that are similar to 
any of the uses enumerated, subject to the operation of the three-step test.717 
 
 Thus, the Code contains an open clause: Article 5.5 extends the scope of the 
limitations listed in specific provisions, by allowing other uses which are comparable 
to any of the uses enumerated. It stipulates that: 
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[P]rovided that the corresponding requirements of the relevant limitation are 
met and the use does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author or 
rightholder, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
 
 As observed by Jonathan Griffiths718, this proposed provision seems to be 
directed at national legislators, permitting the creation of new exceptions where these 
would: (i) be compatible with existing statutory exceptions; and (ii) comply with a 
redrafted, less restrictive version of the Berne three-step test.719 Moreover, if such a 
provision was to be adopted, the added flexibility which it bestows might allow for a 
rapid and proportionate response to be provided in case of altered circumstances. 
 As far as UK copyright is concerned, it is worth highlighting that the set of 
limitations introduced by the Code is in line with the recommendations contained the 
2006 Gowers Review of Intellectual Property. The Gowers Review expressed the 
concern that the UK system of exceptions was too narrow and that this might have 
stunted new creators from producing work and generating new value.720 UK copyright 
law provides for a limited set of exceptions, meaning that it is only disapplied in 
specific situations provided for in legislation. To address this, the Gowers Review 
suggested the introduction of new exceptions in order to bring the UK system up to 
date and make it more flexible. 
 However, despite the opportunity provided by the passage of the Digital 
Economy Act in 2010 (as recently upheld by the Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales)721, the British Parliament has addressed neither the concerns of the Gowers 
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Review, nor the problems that can arise (or have already arisen) with respect to the 
competitiveness of UK copyright internationally.  
 As mentioned, the European Copyright Code seems to have, in contrast, 
welcomed the analysis carried out by the Gowers Review. Indeed, it sets forth a 
system of exceptions which is in line with the recommendations contained therein. 
For instance, Article 5.1 expressly allows the making of a back-up copy of a work by 
a person having a right to use it and insofar it is necessary for that use722; Article 5.2 
creates an exception for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche723; Article 5.3 
expressly allows use for the purpose of non-commercial archiving by publicly 
accessible libraries, educational establishments or museums, and archives.724  
 In light of the foregoing, the set of exceptions provided by the Code is worthy 
of praise. In fact, the final result is not only a balanced compromise between open-
ended and exhaustive systems of copyright limitations, but can actually serve as a 
valuable model for reforming the CDPA 1988 in compliance with the 
recommendations contained in the Gowers Review. 
 Thus, it can be seen that despite its flaws, the Code has indeed some positive 
features that are worthy of praise. In particular, from a thorough reading of the 
provisions, one gets the impression that the drafters have actually managed to 
combine common and civil copyright traditions in a fair way. Furthermore, the 
traditional view of copyright as a mechanism for balancing authors’ and the public’s 
rights is respected within the general architecture of the Code. Indeed, the choices 
made in relation to issues such as the originality requirement and moral rights are 
certainly to be applauded. Above all, the meaning given to the originality requirement 
has the potential to create an effective boundary to the currently over-extended 
scope of copyright protection. Furthermore, the Code serves as a model for reform of 
domestic copyright laws, particularly with respect to the legal regulation of limitations 
to copyright. 
 In light of the foregoing, the Code can be a staging post in the debate which 
focuses, on the one hand, on the need to balance authors’ and public’s rights and, on 
the other, to integrate common and civil law traditions. Paradoxically, this need has 
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often been left to one side in EU law-making. Beyond being a simple legislative 
instrument, the Code is moreover noteworthy for being the first document of its kind 
at European level to provide for such a balance.  It can be hoped that, as such, it 








I. EU copyright harmonisation: how? 
 
As seen above sub Chapter I, EU intervention in the field of copyright has gone 
through different phases and has been characterised by different intensities. 
However, over the past couple of years, it could well be said that discourse around 
full harmonisation has been revived in both political and academic circles. In 
particular, not only is the desirability of such a unification now openly discussed, but 
debates on how this is to be best achieved are also at the centre of attention.  
 After the entry into force of the Lisbon Reform Treaty, there may be finally both 
the political will and legal instruments to achieve the full harmonisation of the 
copyright laws of the Member States. As already mentioned, new Article 118(1) 
TFEU could provide the legal basis for the full harmonisation of the copyright laws of 
the Member States. This provision stipulates that: 
 
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall establish measures for the creation of European 
intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property 
rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide 





 Nonetheless, as illustrated by Cook and Derclaye725, there may be four viable 
options for tackling further (full) copyright harmonisation at the EU level: unification, 
through a regulation pursuant to Article 118 TFEU; further harmonisation, through ad 
hoc directives; guidance, through non-binding recommendations; or, simply doing 
nothing. 
 Considering the first option (a copyright regulation), this would have the 
primary merit of overcoming problems relating to the issue of territoriality. This 
peculiar feature of copyright, which the then ECJ expressly acknowledged in the 
Lagardère ruling726, has impaired the process of EU harmonisation. This, amongst 
others, was also highlighted by Prof Hugenholtz, who also recently defined 
territoriality as “the real Achilles heel of harmonization”.727  He observed that:  
 
Basing its harmonisation agenda primarily on disparities between national 
laws, the European legislature has been aiming, as it would seem, at the 
wrong target. Disparities between national laws by themselves hardly amount 
to impediments of the free movement of goods or services, given that 
copyrights and related rights that reflect these disparities are drawn along 
national borders. Indeed, for as long as the territorial nature of copyright and 
related rights is left intact, harmonisation can achieve relatively little.728 
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 Furthermore, a EU regulation may help solving issues concerning applicable 
law, as well as reducing costs and lengthy procedures associated with the 
implementation of EU directives by Member States.729 Additionally, a regulation 
pursuant to Article 118 TFEU would no longer require unanimity to be adopted (as it 
was before the amendments brought about by the Lisbon Treaty), but just a qualified 
majority. 
 It is therefore apparent that a copyright regulation might be a feasible and 
desirable option, if not a mandatory one, in that: 
 
it is permissible to think that the Union is even obliged to adopt such a 
Regulation, at least if adopting such a copyright Regulation is necessary 
for the functioning of the internal market, as … [A]rticle [118 TFEU] uses the 
term “shall”.730  
 
 Despite this, the peculiarities of copyright, in particular the fact that – unlike 
patents and trademarks – copyright is not a registered right, may make a unitary EU 
copyright difficult to establish. This is also because the introduction of a EU copyright 
would make it necessary to determine whether national copyrights are to continue to 
exist alongside the EU one (as this is currently the case with trademarks), or not.  
Indeed, “it is hard to envisage how a unitary EU copyright could subsist in parallel 
with national copyrights, with the two rights coming into effect simultaneously and in 
parallel every time a new work is created and then enduring for life plus 70 years.”731 
  In addition, it is not clear what standards a hypothetical EU copyright 
regulation should try to adhere to. Probably neither complex legislative techniques, 
nor over-stratified legislations should be endorsed at the EU level. As was suggested 
by Prof Dietz back in 1978, a model European copyright regulation could rest just on 
three more or less independent sections: firstly, copyright law itself; secondly, law on 
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copyright contracts, and thirdly the law of the collecting societies.732 As to the latter, it 
is worth recalling that the EU is currently committed to adopt measures aimed at  
harmonising and, possibly, improving their structure and governance.733    
 Should a EU copyright regulation not be considered as a feasible option, 
alternatives would be to enact directives (ie continue with ad hoc harmonisation of 
Member States’ copyright laws), or adopt recommendations. As soft law instruments 
and not binding as such, the latter would have limited importance, but may still be a 
good starting point for harmonisation. 
 Nonetheless, it is to be noted that further copyright harmonisation may well be 
obtained without legislative input, whether this is due to the activity of the EU 
judiciary or by way of national courts following each others’ decisions. This would 
signal a continuation of the evolutions brought about by the activism of the CJEU 
over the past couple of years, as explained above. However, it is observed that: 
 
While this is welcome, this “do nothing” approach is the most minimalist and 
probably the least satisfactory in terms of cost and legal certainty. Indeed, one 
needs to wait for litigation to occur and for the willingness of national courts to 
refer questions. Until then, the law is unclear and it is costly for those litigating. 
It is also in some way discriminatory because private parties bear the cost 
which should be borne by all.734 
 
 In light of the issues highlighted for each of the three alternative instruments 
for bringing about EU copyright harmonisation, and the fourth laissez faire approach, 
it seems that the first option, ie a EU copyright regulation, remains the most 
preferable.  This conclusion is reached by looking at the increased legal certainty and 
overall increased competitiveness that it provides, even despite there being a risk 
that a EU regulation would undermine the benefits arising from competition in law-
making by EU Member States. Indeed, it has been argued that a system of 
centralised EU-wide authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements may 
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deprive the EU of the value of legislators and civil servants in EU Member States 
trying to develop new laws to facilitate innovation.735  
 
 
II.  EU copyright harmonisation: when if ever? 
 
This contribution, while being concerned primarily with the process of EU 
harmonisation, has attempted to highlight the fundamental role the CJEU has had 
thus far had in harmonising the aspects of copyright law which the EU legislator has 
not considered worthy of address. This has been the case, in particular, with regard 
to the originality requirement. However, as is well known, the CJEU case law has not 
only harmonised originality. Indeed, as explained by Prof Lionel Bently, the Court has 
provided a harmonised meaning of other fundamental concepts, such as ‘work’, 
‘public’ and ‘part’. Prof Bently has incisively defined this process as ‘harmonisation by 
stealth’.736 
 When discussing harmonisation through CJEU case law, concerns may 
certainly arise relating to the need for democratic law-making and legitimacy.    
However, to address these would be outwith the scope of this present work.  To an 
extent, we can lay these to one side. What matters most is the fact that 
harmonisation effect of the CJEU has been achieved through references for 
preliminary ruling, referred by the national courts of Member States. In other words, 
this shows that the CJEU needed to intervene, in order to provide guidance in areas 
which were either unclear, or for which no legislative guidance was available. Thus, 
in areas such as originality, a certain level of judicial appreciation has been required 
to address concepts left outwith the EU legislative plan because harmonisation was 
deemed unnecessary in light of major EU objectives (such as the internal market).  
 This contribution has attempted to demonstrate that this attitude of EU 
legislative is parochial, also in light of the difficulties and doubts which some Member 
States (notably the UK insofar as originality is concerned) have been experiencing 
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following CJEU decisions. Michel Barnier, current European Commissioner for 
Internal Market and Services has recently written about the need to develop the 
digital single market, by addressing four main copyright-related challenges in the 
years to come. These pertain to collective rights management, orphan works, the 
online dissemination of audiovisual works, and the enforcement of rights. However, 
no full copyright harmonisation should be pursued, in that the single market in 
creative works should be “a Single Market but not a uniform one”.737 
 Contrary to the belief of Commissioner Barnier, it is submitted that the time is 
apt for the EU to approach the issue of full copyright harmonisation. A properly 
integrated and fully functioning market at the European level requires a common 
framework for copyright protection, particularly considering the massive digitalisation 
of goods and the parallel development of digital distribution channels. What was for a 
long time a distinctive feature of intellectual property rights, ie their territorial nature, 
has been challenged by a series of phenomena. With regard to copyright, these 
relate not only to the cross-fertilisation of different legal solutions and theories, but 
also the supranational reach of judicial decisions738, all of which result from the 
intangibility of channels through which works are exchanged and enjoyed.  
 Even if those academics united under the Wittem Project preferred not to take 
a position on the opportunity to harmonise copyright fully at the European level, the 
drafting of a codification of copyright seems to recognise implicitly the desirability of 
going down this route. In addition, Article 118 TFEU may be a good legal basis for 
the issuing of a EU copyright regulation. 
 However, what matters most is that a full harmonisation project is discussed in 
detail as soon as possible. EU legislators cannot leave the task of shaping EU 
copyright policy to the CJEU. This is also on account of the fact that the Court 
appears more interested in harmonisation as an end in itself, rather than in matters of 
policy.739 In any case, pursuing a EU copyright policy is not within the competence of 
the Court, nor should it be.   
                                                          
737
 M Barnier, ‘To be or not to be: Copyright makes all the difference’, in L’Ingénieur Conseil – 
Intellectual Property (ICIP) (ed), The future prospects for intellectual property in the EU: 2012-2022 
(2011) 13, 18. 
738
 See GW Austin, ‘Global networks and domestic laws: some private international law issues arising 
from Australian and US liability theories’, in A Strowel (ed), Peer-to-Peer file sharing and secondary 
liability in copyright law (2009) 124. 
739




 Europe as a continent is a powerful producer of cultural goods and services, 
and yet its market for digital content still lags behind. In the words of Neelie Kroes, 
this is a tragedy740, but also an opportunity to commence a political and legal project 
which relies on an efficient system of EU copyright. EU copyright can no longer be 
subject to ad hoc harmonising interventions. What is needed now is a EU copyright 
title, no matter whether this is an optional or a compulsory one (at least at this stage 
of the discussion). This is necessary to not only ensure the competitiveness of the 
European economic and legal model, but also the very survival of copyright itself. In 
the age of digital production and dissemination of works, good, well drafted, law is 
required in order to keep the pace with technological progress. Within the concept of 
good law, there is a EU-wide copyright. This is necessary to safeguard the 
proprietary interests of creators, support sustainable industries and acknowledge the 
needs and demands of users of copyright-protected materials which are no longer 
drawn along national borders. Since there exist EU consumers of goods and 
services, there must also be EU consumers of copyright-protected content. What is 
missing is a EU copyright that is fit for the digital age. 
 As suggested by John Howkins, copyright material is best protected by a 
mixture of two factors: good law, and bad technology. The meaning assigned to 
‘good law’ is law which is fair and effective, and whose remedies are proportionate to 
the injury. ‘Bad technology’ refers to the inability of technology to make good copies. 
As such, whilst “it is much easier, and more fun, to make new technology than new 
law, the whole point of a property contract is to reconcile these two forces.”741 As 
things currently stand, we have bad law and good technology: a perfect combination 
to accelerate the decline of copyright. 
 In conclusion, we cannot look backwards. We must instead (and as quickly as 
possible) move forwards to ensure technological, cultural and economic investments 
are combined with effective, EU-wide legal rules. Although an air of nostalgia is 
sometimes unavoidable, this should not be given credence when it comes to 
providing a legal shape for technologically-driven sectors, as is the case for copyright 
law. In short, it seems appropriate to conclude with a literary quotation, which 
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manages to sum up this very sentiment.  We can learn from and cherish the past, but 
at the same time we must also embrace a new future. In order to do so, it is 
important that we do not get caught up with something, somewhere, which is instead 
lost for good: 
 
 
And as I sat there brooding on the old, unknown world, I thought of Gatsby’s 
wonder when he first picked out the green light at the end of Daisy’s dock. He 
had come a long way to this blue lawn, and his dream must have seemed so 
close that he could hardly fail to grasp it. He did not know that it was already 
behind him, somewhere back in that vast obscurity beyond the city, where the 
dark fields of the republic rolled under the night. 
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgiastic future that year by year 
recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter – tomorrow we will 
run faster, stretch out our arms further … And one fine morning –  
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the 
past.742 
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